Citing references

Sergeant Jacob Zorn used a “ ‘pain compliance tech- nique’ ” called a rear wristlock on Shela Linton, a nonviolent protestor who was peacefully demonstrating at a sit-in in the Vermont capitol. 135 F. 4th 19 , 24–25 CA2 (2025).

The central decision O’Pharrow cites to show that right was clearly established is Linton v. Zorn, 135 F.4th 19 (2d Cir. 2025), rev’d, 146 S. Ct. 926 (2026), and vacated and remanded, No. 22-2954, 2026 WL 1615029 (2d Cir. June 2, 2026).

Linton v. Zorn, 135 F.4th 19, 30 (2d Cir. 2025). In general, a defendant official is entitled to qualified immunity “unless the official’s conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.” Id. at 31 .

Linton v. Zorn, 135 F.4th 19, 32 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 , 735 (2011) (cleaned up)).

Linton v. Zorn, 135 F.4th 19, 30 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007)). Additionally, because Plaintiff’s pro se complaint was sworn under penalty of perjury, (see Dkt.

Linton v. Zorn, 135 F.4th 19, 30 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 ). Accordingly, the doctrine “provide[s] ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”

See Linton v. Zorn, 135 F.4th 19, 30 (2d Cir. 2025).

See Linton v. Zorn, 135 F.4th 19, 35, 37 (2d Cir. 2025), petition for cert. filed, 94 U.S.L.W. 3073 (U.S.

Linton v. Zorn, 135 F.4th 19, 30 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 ).

Linton v. Zorn, 135 F.4th 19, 30 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 ). The Second Circuit engages “in a two-step inquiry to determine whether qualified immunity is appropriate.

Linton v. Zorn, 135 F.4th 19, 32 (2d Cir. 2025) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Briskin, 135 F.4th 19 at 760 (quoting Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at 359 ). “The first half of th[e] standard asks 20 about causation; but . . . some relationships will support jurisdiction without a causal 21 showing.”

Linton v. Zorn, 135 F.4th 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2025) (alteration adopted) (citation omitted).

Linton v. Zorn, 135 F.4th 19, 30 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)). “In short, courts should view ‘the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.’” Id. (quoting Scott, 550 U.S. at 381 ).

Linton v. Zorn, 135 F.4th 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2025) (cleaned up). Importantly, “the reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”

Linton v. Zorn, 135 F.4th 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2025) (citation modified).

Estabrook, 144 F.4th 80 , 93 (2d Cir. 2025) (alterations adopted) (quoting Linton v. Zorn, 135 F.4th 19, 32 (2d Cir. 2025)).

Linton v. Zorn, 135 F.4th 19, 30 (2d Cir. 2025) (second alteration in original) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).

Linton v. Zorn, 135 F.4th 19, 30 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).

Linton v. Zorn, 135 F.4th 19, 30 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A fact is ‘material’ if “it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law[.]” Red Tree Invs., LLC v.

Linton v. Zorn, 135 F.4th 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2025) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Linton v. Zorn, 135 F.4th 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989); then quoting Figueroa v. Mazza, 825 F.3d 89, 105 (2d Cir. 2016)).

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009); see also Linton v. Zorn, 135 F.4th 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2025). Under the two-step framework articulated by the Supreme Court in Saucier v.

See Linton v. Zorn, 135 F.4th 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2025), cert. granted, opinion rev'd on other grounds, 146 S. Ct. 926 (2026).

Linton v. Zorn, 135 F.4th 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2025) (citing Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650 (2014)).