Citing references

On June 8, 1983, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).

There we erroneously concluded that the Federal constitutional principles expressed in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), required the exclusion *372 of the seized evidence.

See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 (1983); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 415 (1969).

Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). However, pursuant to art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, Massachusetts courts employ a more precise standard based on the principles of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v.

I know he got it from Honneus.” 9 The judge did not examine the credibility of the informant or the reliability of his information. 10 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), does not alter this result.

The defendant makes a passing argument that the warrant application did not establish probable cause under principles enunciated in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233, 238 (1983).

Caggiano, 899 F.2d 99, 103 (1st Cir. 1990), the court, in response to Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), said that detail could be used as a factor in assessing the reliability of informants.

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983), quoting from Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960). This test was adopted by North Carolina in State v.

White, 110 S.Ct. 2412 (1990); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). We decline to do so. In the probable cause context, "[w]e [have] rejected the `totality of the circumstances' test now espoused by a majority of the United States Supreme Court.

Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 [1983]), or that the issuing magistrate have “a substantial basis for concluding that any of the articles described in the warrant are probably in the place to be searched” (Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 370 [1985]).

Gates , 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), and the "totality of the circumstances" test announced there to replace the Aguilar - Spinelli test.

Illinois v.

See Upton , 394 Mass. at 371 -375 , 476 N.E.2d 548 (rejecting the rule adopted in Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 [1983] ). See also Commonwealth v.

See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-239 (1983) (abandoning "rigid" two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test in favor of "totality of the circumstances" test).

Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), recently adopted a “totality of the circumstances” approach in which the informant’s veracity and basis of knowledge are still important but are not elements indispensible to a finding of probable cause where the tip is adequately

See Illinois v.

They argue that the motion judge erroneously applied the “totality-of-the-circumstances” test of Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), in considering whether the affidavit of Trooper Nicolosi was sufficient to establish probable cause.

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , reh’g denied, 463 U.S. 1237 (1983). We have under advisement a case raising the issue of the appropriate State standards to be applied under State law in reviewing a magistrate ’ s determination of probable cause.

Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 374-375 (1985) (rejecting “totality of the circumstances” test set forth in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 [1983], and concluding that “principles developed under Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 [1964], and Spinelli v.

White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-233 (1983). The information known to the police in the present case approximates that known to the police who conducted the investigatory stop in Florida v.

Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), nor defer review pending our decision in Commonwealth v. Upton, 390 Mass. 562 (1983), rev’d and remanded, 466 U.S. 727 (1984). We have Upton under advisement.

Under the “totality of the circumstances” test applied by the judge in deciding the motion (see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 [1983]), his decision may well have been correct.

The standard for evaluating probable cause under art. 14 of the Declaration of Rights is, thus, more strict than that demanded by the Fourth Amendment as construed in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). (b) Vagueness of the warrant.

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-231 (1983). Under art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, however, we continue to apply the Aguilar-Spinelli test to probable cause determinations in the assessment of an informant’s tip. See Commonwealth v.