Citing references

See Gould v. Davis, 165 F.3d 265, 269-73 (4th Cir.1998); Vathekan v. Prince George’s County, 154 F.3d 173 , 179-80 (4th Cir.1998).

See Gould v. Davis, 165 F.3d 265, 269-73 (4th Cir.1998); Pritchett v.

In fact, this case closely resembles Gould v. Davis, 165 F.3d 265 (4th Cir.1998), discussed by Plaintiffs in their supplemental brief. (Pis.’ Supplemental Br. at 6).

Gould v. Davis, 165 F.3d 265 (4th Cir. 1998), did little more to put the officers in this case on notice that the circumstances they confronted were insufficient to justify a no-knock entry.

Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931-34 (1995); Gould v. Davis, 165 F.3d 265, 270 (4th Cir. 1998).

Gould v. Davis, 165 F.3d 265, 272 (4th Cir.1998). The Court’s first task is to “identify the specific right that the plaintiff asserts was infringed by the challenged conduct.” Wilson v.

Gould v. Davis, 165 F.3d 265, 268 (4th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added).

Gould v. Davis, 165 F.3d 265, 268 (4th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added). “Whether we agree or disagree with the district court’s assessment of the record evidence,” in other words, “is of no moment in the context of [an] interlocutory appeal.” Culosi v.

Ferreyra, 965 F.3d 302, 308 (4th Cir. 2020) (emphasis in original) (quoting Gould v. Davis, 165 F.3d 265, 268 (4th Cir. 1998)). Thus, we do not disturb “the district court’s assessment of the record evidence” on this appeal. Id.

Hawkins, 139 F.3d 29, 32 (1st Cir.1998); Gould v. Davis, 165 F.3d 265, 272 (4th Cir. 1998); Ingram, 185 F.3d at 589 n. 7; United States v. Weeks, 160 F.3d 1210, 1214 (8th Cir.1998). [5] See, e.g., United States v.

Gould v. Davis, 165 F.3d 265 (4th Cir.1998).

They cite Gould v. Davis, 165 F.3d 265 (4th Cir. 1998), for the principle that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement “basically encompasses officer safety and the destruction of easily-disposed evidence.”

Schroeder, 312 F.3d 625, 639 (4th Cir.2002) (quoting Gould v. Davis, 165 F.3d 265, 270-71 (4th Cir.1998)).

Gould v. Davis, 165 F.3d 265, 268 (4th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). That limit on our jurisdiction is critical here.

Ferreyra, 965 F.3d 302, 308 (4th Cir. 2020) (emphasis in original) (quoting Gould v. Davis, 165 F.3d 265, 268 (4th Cir. 1998)). Thus, we do not disturb “the district court’s assessment of the record evidence” on this appeal. Id.

Gould v. Davis, 165 F.3d 265, 268 (4th Cir. 1998); see also, e.g., Cox, 828 F.3d at 235 .

Simi Valley, 226 F. 3d 1031 , 1041-1042 (CA9 2000) (same); Gould v. Davis, 165 F. 3d 265, 270-271 (CA4 1998) (same). As far as we know, civil liability is an effective deterrent here, as we have assumed it is in other contexts.

Davis, 165 F.3d 265, 269 (4th Cir.1998) (holding that "`reasonableness' of the officers' decision in applying for and executing the warrant is a legal question" and therefore, the court had jurisdiction to hear appeal from the district court's order denying summary

See Gould v. Davis, 165 F.3d 265, 272 (4th Cir.1998) (rejecting officers’ argument that mere presence of handguns in house justified forceful entry and denying qualified immunity despite officers’ having obtained no-knock warrant).

Gould v. Davis, 165 F.3d 265, 270-71 (4th Cir.1998).

See Gould v.

(emphasis omitted) (quoting Gould v. Davis, 165 F.3d 265, 268 (4th Cir. 1998)).

Gould v. Davis, 165 F.3d 265, 269 (4th Cir.1998). “A police officer should prevail on an assertion of qualified immunity if a reasonable officer possessing the same information could have believed that his conduct was lawful.” Slattery v.

See Gould v. Davis, 165 F.3d 265, 272 (4th Cir.1998); United States v. Fluker, 543 F.2d 709, 717 (9th Cir.1976). Appellants do not seriously contest appellees' contentions regarding Richards .

Gould v. Davis, 165 F.3d 265, 269 (4th Cir.1998), quoting Pritchett, 973 F.2d at 312 . “The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”