Citing references

Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 451 (4th Cir. 2000) (“When law enforcement officials are searching for evidence of a crime, reasonableness requires probable cause and a warrant unless one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement applies.”).

Most recently, in Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440 (4th Cir.2000), the Fourth Circuit tackled the question of whether § 290dd-2 afforded the § 1983 plaintiff an individual statutory right.

Harris, 489 U.S. at 388-92 , 109 S.Ct. 1197 ; see also Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 456 (4th *702 Cir.2000); Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 221 (4th Cir.1999); Anthony D.

See Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440 , 449 7 (4th Cir. 2000); Ellison v. Cocke Cnty., 63 F.3d 467 , 471–72 (6th Cir. 1995).

See Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 456 (4th Cir.2000). As in Broderick , “[tjhere is simply nothing in the record to suggest that [Vienna’s] lack of instruction of its officers ... was the result of an affirmative, conscious decision.” Id.

Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 456 (4th Cir. 2000), the Fourth Circuit explained that “any deficiency in training” must be due to a “conscious choice by a municipality.” Est. of Jones, 961 F.3d at 672 (quoting Broderick, 225 F.3d at 456 ).

As one court remarked, officials will not stand trial “for ‘bad guesses in gray areas’ but only for ‘transgressing bright lines.’ ” Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 453 (4th Cir.2000).

Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 , 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1359-60 , 179 L.Ed.2d 417 (2011); Harris, 489 U.S. at 388-91 , 109 S.Ct. 1197 ; Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 456 (4th Cir.2000); Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 220-21 (4th Cir.1999); Cornfield v. Consol. High Sch.

(citing Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 456 (4th Cir. 2000))).

Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 456 (4th Cir. 2000).

Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 450 (4th Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 447-48 (4th Cir.2000) *146 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 450 (4th Cir.2000); see California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 , 108 S.Ct. 1625 , 100 L.Ed.2d 30 (1988).

Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 447-48 (4th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Cnty. of Orange, 6 F.4th 961 , 974 (9th Cir. 2021); Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 456 (4th Cir. 2000); Beard v. Town of Topsail Beach, No. 7:19-CV-97-FL, 2021 WL 2638147 , at *10 (E.D.N.C.

Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 456 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Only where a failure to train reflects a ‘deliberate’ or ‘conscious’ choice . . . can a [governmental actor] be liable for such failure under § 1983.” (quoting City of Canton v.

See Doe v.

Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 448 (4th Cir. 2000).

at 388-92; Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 456 (4th Cir. 2000); Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1389-90 (4th Cir. 1987); Brown v. Frazier, No. 4:12-CV-290, 2013 WL 5739091 , at *2-3 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 22, 2013) (unpublished); Cooper v.

See, e.g., Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 447 (4th Cir. 2000) (“The Supreme Court historically has been loath to infer a private right of action from a bare criminal statute.”); see also Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v.

See Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440 , 447–48 (4th Cir. 2000). In other words, citizens cannot enforce criminal statutes without Congress’s express authorization. See id.

See Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 447 (4th Cir. 2000) (“The Supreme Court historically has been loath to infer a private right of action from a bare criminal statute.”).

See Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 447 (4th Cir. 2000).

E.g., Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 450 (4th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff’s briefing does not elucidate the intrusion about which she complains. See Mem. Opp’n 8–15, ECF No. 46.