Citing references

United States, 655 F.2d 1034 (10th Cir.1981). The Arvayos, on the other hand, argue that the Government’s chacterization of the cause of the injury is overly simplistic.

United States, 655 F.2d 1034, 1035 (10th Cir.1981). For example, in Gustavson , when Mr. Gustavson was a child, he visited military doctors regarding a bedwetting problem. 655 F.2d at 1035 .

United States, 655 F.2d 1034 (10th Cir.1981) and stated: Inasmuch as the plaintiff in Gustavson was not explicitly informed as to a possible connection between the lump in his neck and his kidney problems in 1973, this court implicitly placed a burden

United States, 655 F.2d 1034 (10th Cir.1981); Robbins v. United States, 624 F.2d 971 (10th Cir.1980). Neither Gustavson nor Robbins is factually similar to the present case.

United States, 655 F.2d 1034 (10th Cir.1981); Robbins v. United States, 624 F.2d 971 (10th Cir.1980); and Hatch v. United States, unpublished op. no. 80-1195 (10th Cir., Aug. 10, 1981) (per curiam).

United States, 655 F.2d 1034, 1036 (10th Cir.1981) (medical malpractice claim); see also Robbins v. United States, 624 F.2d 971, 973 (10th Cir.1980) (uncertainty as to the “ultimate damage” does not toll § 2401(b)).

United States, 655 F.2d 1034, 1036-37 (10th Cir.1981) (date of accrual is date of notice of injury and its cause; knowledge of malpractice is irrelevant to the running of the statute of limitations).

United States, 655 F.2d 1034, 1037 (10th Cir. 1981) (“Whether doctors who treated him had been negligent in not discovering his condition and recommending surgery relates to the question of knowledge of malpractice, a matter irrelevant to the running of the

United States, 655 F.2d 1034, 1037 (10th Cir.1981) (holding that once a plaintiff is aware of the injury and its cause, he has an affirmative duty to "ascertain in what instances his condition should have been recognized").

United States, 655 F.2d 1034, 1036 (10th Cir.1981). 9 . Arvayo, 766 F.2d at 1420 . 10 . Id. at 1421-22 . 11 . See United States v.

United States, 655 F.2d 1034, 1036, 1037 (10th Cir.1981). 21 . Brief for Appellee at 8. See also id. at 2 (1972 lawsuit demonstrated awareness of injuries and their cause). 22 . See text supra at notes 9-11. 23 . Donaldson v.

United States, 655 F.2d 1034 (10th Cir.1981); Robbins v. United States, 624 F.2d 971 (10th Cir.1980). The cases on which Mrs. Manko relies to support the distinction either do not apply in the present context, see Sterling Drug, Inc. v.

United States, 655 F.2d 1034, 1036 (10th Cir.1981), where we opined, "[l]ack of knowledge of the injury's permanence, extent, and ramifications does not toll the statute." 35 The United States also argues that the district court erred by failing to find that

United States, 655 F.2d 1034 (10th Cir. 1981). Determining precisely what knowledge the hundreds of individual plaintiffs were “armed with” regarding the claims asserted herein, however, is not readily susceptible to wholesale a priori determination.

United States, 655 F.2d 1034, 1037 (10th Cir.1981); Allen, 527 F.Supp. at 490 .

United States, 655 F.2d 1034, 1036 (10th Cir.1981); Matson, 240 F.3d at 1236 (“Rather than waiting for a physician’s diagnosis, a plaintiff has an affirmative duty to investigate his injury and any suspect cause once he experiences symptoms.”

U.S., 655 F.2d 1034, 1036 (10th Cir.1981).

United States, 655 F.2d 1034, 1036 (10th Cir.1981) (decided under the Federal Torts Claims Act); Robbins v. United States, 624 F.2d 971, 972-73 (10th Cir.1980) (decided under the Federal Torts Claims Act).

U.S., 655 F.2d 1034, 1036 (10th Cir.1981); see also Fries, 909 F.2d at 1095 (explaining that the discovery rule requires “an objective inquiry into when the plaintiff knew or should have known, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, the essential facts

United States, 655 F.2d 1034, 1036 (10th Cir.1981); Robbins v.

United States, 655 F.2d 1034, 1036 (10th Cir.1981).

United States, 655 F.2d 1034, 1036 (10th Cir.1981). Finally, there are no grounds to toll the statute of limitations. The BLM made efforts to determine whether plaintiff had properly filed in 1979 and accepted filing fees in December of 1983.

United States, 655 F.2d 1034, 1036 (10th Cir. 1981). Plaintiff waited six years after his cancer diagnosis to file his complaint.

United States, 655 F.2d 1034, 1036 (10th Cir. 1981) (“Lack of knowledge of the injury’s permanence, extent, and ramifications does not toll the statute.”). Furthermore, the FDA announced that problems caused by the chemical could be permanent.

United States, 655 F.2d 1034, 1036 (10th Cir. 1981). Plaintiff’s claim against Rogers therefore must be dismissed with prejudice, both for failure to plead a plausible claim for relief and because it is time-barred.