Citing references

Monclavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1981), is readily distinguishable from the facts in the case at bar. In Monclavo-Cruz , an immigration officer stopped the defendant's car and placed her under arrest. See id. at 1286 .

Monclavo Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir.1981), which holds that neither the arrest of a suspect nor the seizure of his belongings operates to deprive him of his Fourth Amendment privacy rights.

Monclavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir.1981), an officer arrested a female passenger of an automobile and seized her purse, which was either in her hand, on her lap, or on the seat beside her.

Monclavo-Cruz (9th Cir. 1981) 662 F.2d 1285 . In that case the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was faced with a factual situation very similar to appellant’s case.

Monclavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285, 1289 (9th Cir.1981), we held that "the community caretaking functions of the police are usually well served by simply inventorying personal baggage as a unit without searching it.”

Mondavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285, 1290 (9th Cir.1981).

Monclavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1981), which held the defendant had a recognized expectation of privacy in her purse.

Monclavo-Cruz (9th Cir.1981), 662 F.2d 1285 for its authority. The majority erroneously adopts Lamping as controlling law in this case. The contradictions within the Lamping opinion and now this majority opinion are glaring and problematic.

Monclavo Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285, 1290 (9th Cir.1985).

Monclavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir.1981)(warrantless search of purse one hour after arrest and after purse was in exclusive police custody did not fall within search incident to an arrest exception); United States v.

Monclavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285, 1287 (9th Cir.1981) (citing Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 424-25 , 101 S.Ct. 2841 , 69 L.Ed.2d 744 (1981)) (plurality).

Monclavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1981). Thus, the courts distinguish between items found on the person, such as a wallet or cigarette package, from *279 purses, briefcases or luggage, the latter having a greater expectation of privacy. State v.

Monclavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285, 1287-88 (9th Cir.1981) similarly limiting Belton. But see United States v. Brown, 671 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir.1982), applying Belton to street arrest and United States v.

Monclavo-Cruz (9th Cir. 1981) 662 F.2d 1285, 1288 [delayed warrantless search of purse held unreasonable: "The fact that an officer is prevented from conducting a Chimel/Belton search, however, is not a sufficient reason to justify a search an hour later at the

Monclavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285, 1290 (9th Cir.1981).

Monclavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285, 1289 (9th Cir. 1981).

Monclavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285, 1290 (9th Cir.1981) (purse like suitcase and briefcase, not clothing; search of purse at station house not valid as incident to arrest). In United States v.

Mondavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285, 1288 (9th Cir.1981) (holding that the warrantless search of an arrestee’s purse at the station house, about an hour after she was arrested next to her car, was not sufficiently contemporaneous with the arrest to be incident to arrest

Monclavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285, 1287 (9th Cir.1981). 1 This argument proves too much. Removal of blood from a defendant’s blood stream eliminates immediately the danger that evidence of blood-alcohol content will be lost.

Monclavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285, 1288 (9th Cir. 1981) (relying on the narrowing construction given to the majority opinion by Justice Powell, who was also a necessary member of the majority, to limit the majority’s holding in South Dakota v.

Monclavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285, 1288 (9th Cir.1981) (holding that the search of the purse of an arrestee “more than an hour after her arrest at the station house” was not valid incident to arrest).

Monclavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir.1981) [purse]; United States v. Bloomfield, 594 F.2d 1200 (8th Cir.1979) [knapsack]; United States v. Schleis, 582 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir.1978) [locked briefcase]; Sumlin v.

Monclavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir.1981). The trial court also determined that the evidence was admissible because it was discovered pursuant to a valid inventory of the contents of the impounded vehicle. Colorado v.

Monclavo-Cruz , 662 F.2d 1285 , 1287-88 (9th Cir. 1981) ; State v. Carrawell , 481 S.W.3d 833 , 840-41 (Mo. 2016) (en banc).

Monclavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir.1981); United States v. Bloomfield, 594 F.2d 1200 (8th Cir. 1979); and United States v.