Citing references

Elliott, et al. , 876 F.3d 637 , 641 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing Saucier v. Katz , 533 U.S. 194 , 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151 , 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) ).

Elliott, 876 F.3d 637, 642 (4th Cir. 2017). Even so, in determining whether alleged conduct violated clearly established rights, courts should not limit the inquiry to the precise factual circumstances of the case at hand.

Elliott, 876 F.3d 637, 641 (4th Cir. 2017) (emphasizing “the importance of drawing inferences in favor of the nonmovant, even when . . . a court decides only the clearly-established prong” (quoting Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014))).

Elliott, 876 F.3d 637, 644 (4th Cir. 2017) (quotation omitted).

Elliott , 876 F.3d 637 , 641-42 (4th Cir. 2017) ("[W]hen resolving the issue of qualified immunity at summary judgment, a court must ascertain the circumstances of the case by crediting the plaintiff's evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in the

Elliot, 876 F.3d 637, 641 (4th Cir. 2017) (same). Because the § 2255 claim is predicated on the same factual scenario, it is — like the § 1983 claim — also barred by qualified immunity. 29

Elliott, 876 F.3d 637 , 641–42 (4th Cir. 2017) (“[W]hen resolving the issue of qualified immunity at summary judgment, a court must ascertain the circumstances of the case by crediting the plaintiff’s evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in the

Elliott, 876 F.3d 637, 641 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)). In our Circuit, Defendants bear the burden of proving that the unlawfulness of their conduct was not clearly established. Stanton v.

Elliott, 876 F.3d 637, 641 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7 , 11 (2015) (per curiam)).

Elliott , 876 F.3d 637 , 645 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) ). *948 The burden falls on the petitioning party to demonstrating the reasonableness of both the rates and time charged. McAfee v.

Elliott, 876 F.3d 637, 641 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotations omitted).

Elliott, 876 F.3d 637 , 641–42 (4th Cir. 2017) (“[W]hen resolving the issue of qualified immunity at summary judgment, a court must ascertain the circumstances of the case by crediting the plaintiff's evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in the

Elliott, 876 F.3d 637 , 641–42 (4th Cir. 2017) (“[W]hen resolving the issue of qualified immunity at summary judgment, a court must ascertain the circumstances of the case by crediting the plaintiff's evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's

Elliott, 876 F.3d 637 , 641–42 (4th Cir. 2017) (“[W]hen resolving the issue of qualified immunity at summary judgment, a court must ascertain the circumstances of the case by crediting the plaintiff's evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in the

Elliott, 876 F.3d 637, 645 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Hoyle v. Freightliner, LLC, 650 F.3d 321, 329 (4th Cir. 2011)). B.

Elliott, 876 F.3d 637, 643 (4th Cir. 2017) (“[Plaintiff] does not cite, nor have we found, a single case that so holds.”). 11 Plaintiff argues that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment is implicated in this case because [P]laintiff’s arrest constituted a seizure

Elliott, 876 F.3d 637, 641 (4th Cir. 2017) (emphasizing “the importance of drawing inferences in favor of the nonmovant, even when . . . a court decides only the clearly-established prong” (quoting Tolan v.

Elliott, 876 F.3d 637, 641 (4th Cir. 2017) (emphasizing “the importance of drawing inferences in favor of the nonmovant, even when . . . a court decides only the clearly-established prong” (quoting Tolan v.

Elliott, 876 F.3d 637, 643 (4th Cir. 2017) (“[Plaintiff] does not cite, nor have we found, a single case that so holds.”). IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 10) is GRANTED.

Elliott, 876 F.3d 637, 642 (4th Cir. 2017).

Elliott, 876 F.3d 637, 641 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)).

Elliott, 876 F.3d 637, 641 (4th Cir. 2017).

Elliott, 876 F.3d 637, 644 (4th Cir. 2017)). Although qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for “objectively reasonable” mistakes of law or fact, Gandy v. Robey, 520 F. App’x 134, 140 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Pearson v.

Elliott, 876 F.3d 637, 641 (4th Cir. 2017)).

Elliott, 876 F.3d 637, 641 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotations and citation omitted); see also District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 590 (2018) (“We start by defining the circumstances with which the officers 23 were confronted.”)