Citing references

In Harrill , the plaintiff sued police officers after being found not guilty on a charge of concealing stolen property.

Harrill v. Blount County, 55 F.3d 1123, 1126 (6th Cir.1995). Morgan and Anderson each seek qualified immunity. (Doc. No. 53 at 19-20.)

This case is thus more like Harrill v. Blount County, 55 F.3d 1123 (6th Cir.1995), in which a pretrial detainee was not allowed to call her father but could have called a lawyer. Id. at 1125 .

Blount County, TN, 55 F.3d 1123, 1125 (6th Cir.1995) (state law cannot create a federal constitutional right); Spruytte v. Walters, 753 F.2d 498, 508 (6th Cir.1985) (violation of state law does not by itself constitute deprivation of due process).

Harrill v. Blount County, 55 F.3d 1123, 1125-26 (6th Cir.1995). Plaintiffs' insistence otherwise does not make it so. E. Miscellaneous Claims of Error 1.

Blount County, 55 F.3d 1123, 1125 (6th Cir.1995) ("The right to make a telephone call immediately upon arrest is not a recognized property right, nor is it a traditional liberty interest recognized by federal law.").

See also Collins, 503 U.S. at 127 , 112 S.Ct. 1061 ; Harrill v. Blount County, 55 F.3d 1123, 1125-26 (6th Cir.1995); Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1216-17 (7th Cir.1988); Henderson, 931 P.2d at 1154-55 .

Harrill v. Blount County, 55 F.3d 1123, 1125 (6th Cir. 1995) (“The violation of a right created and recognized only under state law is not actionable under § 1983.”); Unger v. City of Mentor, 387 F.

(quoting Harrill v. Blount Cty., 55 F.3d 1123, 1125 (6th Cir. 16 1995)).

See Harrill v. Blount County, Tenn., 55 F.3d 1123, 1125 (6th Cir.1995) (“A state statute cannot ‘create’ a federal constitutional right.”).

See Harrill v. Blount County, 55 F.3d 1123, 1125 (6th Cir.1995).

See Harrill v. Blount County, 55 F.3d 1123, 1125 (6th Cir.1995). Nonetheless, we consider the Tuckers claims under the ADA framework.

See Harrill v. Blount County, Tenn., 55 F.3d 1123, 1125 (6th Cir.1995) (“The violation of a right created and recognized only under state law is not actionable under § 1983.”).

Blount County, TN., 55 F.3d 1123, 1125 (6th Cir.1995) (state law cannot create a federal constitutional right); Spruytte v. Walters, 753 F.2d 498, 508 (6th Cir.1985) (violation of state law does not by itself constitute deprivation of due process).

Blount County, Tenn., 55 F.3d 1123, 1125 (6th Cir.1995) (state law cannot create a federal constitutional right); Spray tte v.

Harrill v. Blount County, Tennessee, 55 F.3d 1123, 1126 (6th Cir.1995).

Harrill v. Blount Cty. (C.A.6, 1995), 55 F.3d 1123, 1124 ; see Malley v. Briggs (1986), 475 U.S. 335, 341 , 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1096 , 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law”).

A state law, like Ohio’s collective bargaining statute, cannot create a federal right, Harrill v. Blount County, 55 F.3d 1123, 1125 (6th Cir.1995), and therefore cannot underlie Unger’s § 1983 claim.

City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 , 100 S.Ct. 1398 , 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980) (holding that the defense of qualified immunity is not available to municipal governments); Harrill v. Blount County, Tenn., 55 F.3d 1123, 1124 (6th Cir.1995) (same).

Blount County, TN, 55 F.3d 1123, 1125 (6th Cir.1995) (state law cannot create a federal constitutional right); Spruytte v. Walters, 753 F.2d 498, 508 (6th Cir.1985) (violation of state law does not by itself constitute deprivation of due process).

See, e.g., Harrill v. Blount Cnty., 55 F.3d 1123, 1125 (6th Cir.1995) (“The right to make a phone call immediately upon arrest is not a recognized property right, nor is it a traditional liberty interest recognized by federal law.”); State Bank of St.

Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 , 545—46, 105 S.Ct. 1487 , 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985); see also Harrill v. Blount County, Tenn., 55 F.3d 1123, 1125 (6th Cir.1995) (holding that state statutes and local ordinances cannot expand federal constitutional rights).

See, e.g., Harrill v. Blount County, Tenn., 55 F.3d 1123 (6th Cir.1995). Thus, to the extent that plaintiff is relying on § 1983 to provide a remedy for violations of state statutory or constitutional law, her claims are dismissed. 2.

Morgan, 477 F.3d 326, 332 (6th Cir.2007) (citing Harrill v. Blount Cnty., 55 F.3d 1123, 1125-26 (6th Cir.1995)). The doctrine of qualified immunity shields state actors from § 1983 liability based upon their discretionary acts. Anderson v.