Citing references

Ivy, 165 F.3d 397, 401 (6th Cir.1998). As Jackson acknowledges, consent is an exception to the constitutional prohibition against both warrantless entry of police into a person’s home, Ivy, 165 F.3d at 402 ; United States v.

Ivy, for example, the defendant argued that police shoved him and entered his home without his consent, making the subsequent search illegal. 165 F.3d 397, 400 (6th Cir.1998).

Ivy, 165 F.3d 397, 402-04 (6th Cir.1998), but the facts of that case, while superficially similar in some respects, reveal egregious police conduct not in evidence here.

Ivy, 165 F.3d 397, 402 (6th Cir.1998) (inter- *759 nal quotation omitted). Voluntary consent must be “unequivocal, specific and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).

Ivy, 165 F.3d 397, 401 (6th Cir.1998). Such findings are overturned only if the reviewing court has the “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Worley, 193 F.3d 380, 384 (6th Cir.1999).

Ivy , 165 F.3d 397 , 401 (6th Cir. 1998). Harris argues that Klare's search was unreasonable for two reasons.

Ivy, 165 F.3d 397, 402 (6th Cir.1998) (citation & quotation marks omitted); accord Schneckloth v. Busta *996 monte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973).

Ivy, 165 F.3d 397, 402 (6th Cir. 1998).

Ivy, 165 F.3d 397, 401 (6th Cir.1998). Lawrence challenges the trial court’s factual determination relating to the location of his trash cans at the time the police searched them.

Ivy, 165 F.3d 397, 402 (6th Cir.1998). 6 Yet, the district court did not examine the effects of the prior illegal search of Haynes' vehicle.

Ivy, 165 F.3d 397, 401-02 (6th Cir.1998)).

Ivy, 165 F.3d 397, 402 (6th Cir.1998); see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); United States v. Kelly, 913 F.2d 261, 265 (6th Cir.1990).

Ivy, 165 F.3d 397, 401 (6th Cir.1998). However, the prohibition does not apply where consent to enter has been obtained voluntarily. Id.

Ivy, 165 F.3d 397, 403-04 (6th Cir.1998) (officer's threat to arrest Ivy's wife and take away her child were "attempt[s] to overcome's Ivy's resolution not to consent" to a search and therefore "constituted an objectively improper police action... significantly

Ivy, 165 F.3d 397, 401-04 (6th Cir.1998) (analyzing first whether consent to entry was given before assessing whether consent to search was given and was voluntary). We apply the same standards for consent when analyzing either issue.

Ivy, 165 F.3d 397, 401 (6th Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). In fact, "when there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact finder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous." Id. at 401-02 .

Ivy, 165 F.3d 397, 402 (6th Cir.1998). We also consider the length and nature of the detention, the use of coercive or punishing conduct by the police, and indications of more subtle forms of coercion that might have affected Lucas’s judgment. Id.

Ivy, 165 F.3d 397, 401 (6th Cir. 1998)). Further distinguishing this case, Macklin conceded that he “stopped somewhat beyond the stop sign,” and the record did not include video footage arguably contradicting the officer’s account of events. Id.

Ivy, 165 F.3d 397 (6th Cir.1998), United States v. Crowder, 62 F.3d 782 (6th Cir.1995), and United States v. Bolin, 514 F.2d 554 (7th Cir.1975) all concern the threatened arrest of an innocent third person.

Ivy, 165 F.3d 397, 402 (6th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Ivy, 165 F.3d 397, 401 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Rose, 889 F.2d 1490, 1494 (6th Cir. 1989)).

Ivy, 165 F.3d 397, 404 (6th Cir.1998).

Ivy, 165 F.3d 397, 402 (6th Cir.1998).

Ivy, 165 F.3d 397, 402 (6th Cir.1998). In this inquiry, the Court should consider the circumstances surrounding the search for “more subtle forms of coercion that might flaw [an individual’s] judgment.” Ivy, 165 F.3d at 402 (citing United States v.

[that] significantly intensifies] the coercive tenor of the request for consent.” 165 F.3d 397, 403 (6th Cir.1998). The facts in Ivy are different from those we have here.