Citing references

McLaughlin, 170 F.3d 889, 892-93 (9th Cir.1999) (citing United States v. Moorehead, 57 F.3d 875, 878 (9th Cir.1995) and United States v. Nelson, 102 F.3d 1344, 1346 (4th Cir.1996)).

McLaughlin, 170 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir.1999)). Although contemporaneity is important, we have made clear that it is not the sole inquiry.

McLaughlin, 170 F.3d 889, 891-92 (9th Cir.1999).

McLaughlin, 170 F.3d 889, 891 (9th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Doward, 41 F.3d 789 (1st Cir.1994).

McLaughlin, 170 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 1999)). [2] Although contemporaneity is important, we have made clear that it is not the sole inquiry.

McLaughlin, 170 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir.1999). The requirement that the search and the arrest be roughly contemporaneous is not strictly temporal in nature.

McLaughlin, 170 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir.1999)). That is, the arrest and search were not “so separated in time or by intervening acts that the latter cannot be said to have been incident to the former.” United States v.

McLaughlin, 170 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir.1999); United States v. Hudson, 100 F.3d 1409, 1419-20 (9th Cir.1996).

McLaughlin, 170 F.3d 889, 891 (9th Cir.1999) (upholding search of car five minutes after defendant taken away because it was part of a “continuous series of events closely connected in time to the arrest”).

McLaughlin, 170 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir.1999)).

McLaughlin, 170 F.3d 889, 891 (9th Cir.1999) (Belton exception “may be invoked regardless of whether the arresting officer has an actual concern for safety or evidence” and it “does not depend upon a defendant’s ability to grab items in a ear”); United

McLaughlin, 170 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir.1999). The arrest and search should not be separated in time or by intervening acts. McLaughlin, 170 F.3d at 893 . The actions following the arrest must be one continuous series of events closely connected in time.

McLaughlin, 170 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 1999)).

McLaughlin, 170 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 1999)). Here, the arrest and search were not “so separated in time or by intervening acts that the latter cannot be said to have been incident to the former.” Id. (quoting McLaughlin, 170 F.3d at 893 ).

McLaughlin, 170 F.3d 889, 894 (C.A.9 1999) (Trott, J., concurring) (observing that Belton has been applied to condone "purely exploratory searches of vehicles during which officers with no definite objective or reason for the search are allowed to rummage around

208 F.3d 1190 (10th Cir. 2000) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CARLTON HUMPHREY;NANCY REGAN, Defendants-Appellants.

McLaughlin, 170 F.3d 889, 891 (9th Cir.1999), citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 , 101 S.Ct. 2860 , 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981).

McLaughlin, 170 F.3d 889, 891 (9th Cir.1999) (police may search a motor vehicle, its passenger compartment, and any containers therein, even when the search commences some five minutes after an arrestee has been removed from the scene, so long as the search occurs

McLaughlin, 170 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir.1999).

McLaughlin , 170 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir. 1999).

McLaughlin, 170 F. 3d 889, 890 (CA9 1999); United States v. Humphrey, 208 F. 3d 1190, 1202 (CA10 2000); Wesley, supra, at 544 ; see also 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 7.1(c), pp. 448-449, n. 79 (3d ed. 1996 and Supp. 2004) (citing cases).

McLaughlin, 170 F.3d 889 , 891 & n. 2 (9th Cir.1999) (holding Knowles inapplicable to cases in which defendants are arrested). 15 . Recodified in 2001 as D.C.Code § 50-2201.04(b) & (c).

McLaughlin, 170 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir.1999); United States v. Currence, 446 F.3d 554, 557 (4th Cir.2006) (“[O]fficers may separate the suspect from the item to be searched, thereby alleviating their safety concerns, before they conduct the search.”)

McLaughlin, 170 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 1999) (search of vehicle that commenced 5 minutes after defendant was arrested and removed from scene valid). See, also, United States v.