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254 A.D. 265 Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York May 27, 1938
She brings this action against defendant to recover damages for personal injuries suffered by her as a result of the negligent manner in which the doctor assigned by defendant performed the operation.
Defendant may be held liable only for its negligence in selecting the doctor, not for the latter’s negligence or malpractice in performing the *267 operation. (Hamburger v. Cornell University, 240 N. Y. 328 .)
Hence, it cannot be held to answer for the doctor’s negligence or malpractice. It may be held liable only for its negligence in selecting doctors who are incompetent and unfit to perform the work assigned to them.
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81 A.D.2d 1003 Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York May 15, 1981
The complaint does not allege that the defendant hospital is vicariously liable for the claimed negligence of the physician.
Accordingly, plaintiff should furnish particulars only as to the defendant hospital which may, however, demand to know whether plaintiff claims that the hospital is vicariously liable and, if so, the acts of physician negligence upon
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144 A.D.2d 910 Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York November 15, 1988
The evidentiary material submitted by defendant hospital is insufficient to establish as a matter of law that it may not be held vicariously liable for the negligence of the emergency room physician who treated plaintiff.
A hospital may be held vicariously liable for a physician’s malpractice when the patient sought medical care from the hospital rather than from a particular physician, even where the allegedly negligent physician was an independent
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49 A.D.2d 889 Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York October 6, 1975
In Action No. 2 plaintiff seeks to recover damages for the alleged negligence of defendant’s physicians in their treatment of his fractured ankle. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of defendant.
The trial court then charged, with respect to defendant’s negligence: "If you find * * * that the hospital’s action or omissions, through its employees or doctors, in failing to immobilize the plaintiff’s leg and to giving him the
Under such circumstances, damages are reduced to the degree that the plaintiff’s negligence increased the extent of the injury (Morse v Rapkin, 24 AD2d 24, 25 ; 45 NY Jur, Physicians & Surgeons, § 171).
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45 A.D.3d 755 Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York November 20, 2007
In this regard, one physician can be held vicariously liable for another physician’s active negligence if the physician had “some control of’ the actively negligent physician’s “course of treatment” of a patient (Kavanaugh v Nussbaum
Thus, a finding of vicarious liability could be predicated upon a physician’s “control in fact” over an actively negligent physician (Kavanaugh v Nussbaum, 71 NY2d at 547 ; see Hill v St. Clare’s Hosp., 67 NY2d 72, 79 [1986]; cf.
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65 A.D.2d 388 Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York December 18, 1978Cited by 54 Concurring in Part, Dissenting in Part · Suozzi
The complaint alleges, inter alia, that the defendant doctors were all employees of the hospital and were negligent in treating the deceased.
by their negligence.
If on the other hand, these employees remained employees of the hospital, then they either acted reasonably in obediently following the negligent direction of the doctors, or they acted unreasonably, i.e., negligently, in so doing.
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134 A.D.2d 308 Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York November 9, 1987
A hospital may under appropriate circumstances be held vicariously liable for a physician’s malpractice when the patient sought medical care from the hospital rather than from a particular physician; this is so even where the allegedly
negligent physician was an independent contractor rather than an employee of the hospital (see, Hill v St.
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283 A.D. 105 Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York December 15, 1953
master may be liable for the negligence of the physician who is protecting the master’s interests and is acting for the benefit of his employer.
It matters not whether the negligent act *109 is ascribed to a physician or nurse; it is the act and not the position of the actor that furnishes the test.
Upon the proof adduced, the trial court was justified in finding that plaintiff’s injuries are the result of the negligent acts of the physician and that in the circumstances of this case appellant was liable for such negligence.
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111 A.D.2d 128 Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York May 28, 1985
New York Hospital moved to dismiss anyway, claiming that the dismissal of the action against the doctors meant the doctors were not negligent, therefore the hospital could not be negligent.
Having brought an action against the hospital and the doctors, by discontinuing the case against the doctors, the plaintiffs were admitting that no negligence occurred, and this would be binding against them in favor of the hospital
over-all negligence or negligence of other employees.
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250 A.D. 619 Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York April 16, 1937
Further assuming the appellant in the respects mentioned was negligent, such negligence must be attributed to its doctors and nurses.
The rule is now well settled that a hospital, whether charitable or private, is immune from liability to patients by reason of the negligence of its doctors and nurses with respect to any matter relating to the patient’s medical care
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53 A.D.2d 860 Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York July 6, 1976
In this medical malpractice action, plaintiffs have alleged that the negligence of certain doctors, and of the hospital in which plaintiff, an expectant mother, was confined, resulted in plaintiff having given birth to a brain-damaged
It is specifically alleged that one of the defendant doctors was negligent in administering a certain birth-inducing drug, namely Pitocin, to plaintiff which aggravated her already unstable and deteriorating condition.
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199 A.D.2d 79 Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York December 14, 1993
We agree with the IAS Court that this case, involving the alleged negligence of a doctor in failing to remove an IUD previously implanted, cannot be distinguished from Rodriguez v Manhattan Med.
Group ( 77 NY2d 217 ), involving the alleged negligence of a doctor in failing to remove an IUD previously implanted by another doctor, and that the alleged negligence did not transform the IUD from a "fixation device” into a "foreign
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50 A.D.3d 976 Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York April 22, 2008
SIUH moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it on the ground that it was not liable for the actions of a private attending physician, and there was no evidence of any independent acts of negligence
In general, a hospital cannot be held vicariously liable for the negligence of a private attending physician (see Hill v St. Clare’s Hosp., 67 NY2d 72, 79 [1986]; Cerny v Williams, 32 AD3d 881, 883 [2006]).
In addition, a hospital “cannot be held concurrently liable with such a physician unless its employees commit independent acts of negligence or the attending physician’s orders are contraindicated by normal practice” (Cerny v Williams
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149 A.D.2d 799 Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York April 6, 1989
Therefore, the only theory on which defendant can be held liable for any malpractice committed by nonemployee physicians is if defendant had notice of prior acts of negligence or incompetence of the physician and breached its duty
to plaintiff by permitting an unqualified physician to exercise staff privileges (see, Byork v Carmer, 109 AD2d 1087, 1088 ).
In Carroll v Nunez ( 137 AD2d 911 ), a medical malpractice action involving a cause of action against a hospital based upon the theory that the hospital was negligent in permitting an unqualified doctor to operate on the plaintiff,
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251 A.D.2d 988 Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York June 10, 1998
not a Hospital employee at the time of the alleged malpractice, “[a] hospital may be *989 held vicariously liable for a physician’s malpractice when the patient sought medical care from the hospital rather than from a particular physician
, even where the allegedly negligent physician was an independent contractor rather than an employee of the hospital (see, Hill v St.
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219 A.D.2d 469 Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York September 7, 1995
from said demand, unanimously reversed, on the law, defendants’ motion granted and plaintiffs’ cross motion denied, plaintiffs to serve a response to item #8 of the demand specifying the acts and omissions upon which their claims of negligence
against the physician defendants are based, and item #10 reinstated and plaintiffs directed to respond thereto, without costs
Plaintiffs’ response to item # 8 does not do, this, setting forth only identical vague, nonresponsive allegations of negligence against the physician defendants that cover every conceivable medical malpractice claim without distinguishing
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242 A.D. 346 Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York November 15, 1934
Recovery against the insurance carrier on the theory that its physicians were guilty of malpractice is entirely dependent upon plaintiff’s ability to prove negligence.
If the appellants’ contention is sound then the negligent physician and not the unfortunate injured workman becomes the beneficiary of the statute.
or increased by the negligence, mistake or lack of skill of such physician or surgeon, the law regards the negligence of the wrongdoer in causing the original injury as the proximate cause of the damages flowing from the subsequent
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234 A.D.2d 9 Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York December 3, 1996
As stated in Nykorchuck v Henriques ( 78 NY2d 255, 259 ): "The gravamen of plaintiff’s claim is not that the doctor performed certain negligent acts or omissions during a course of treatment * * * but rather that the doctor was negligent
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213 A.D.3d 712 Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York February 1, 2023 No. 66636/14
The causes of action arose out of the same conduct, to wit, the alleged negligence of the doctor defendants and the PA defendants in providing medical care and treatment to the decedent, which they all did within the scope of their
Here, the plaintiff has failed to establish that the PA defendants are united in interest with the doctor defendants, as she has failed to show that the doctor defendants are vicariously liable for the PA's alleged negligent acts or
Further, while "[a] physician can be held vicariously liable for another physician's active negligence if the physician had 'some control of' the actively negligent physician's 'course of treatment' of a patient" ( Ross v Mandeville
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19 A.D.2d 426 Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York November 7, 1963
Y. 116 ), liability was similarly imposed on a business corporation, under very limited circumstances, for the negligence of a physician in its employ. (See, e.g., Matter of Bernstein v. Beth Israel Hosp., 236 N. Y. 268 .)
A family physician who participated in the diágnosis of a fracture for which a cast was negligently applied by a specialist and continued in active charge of the case after the cast was applied was held jointly negligent (Morrill v
Even in situations when he would normally be regarded as under control of another, a physician had been treated as an ‘ ‘ independent contractor ’ ’ and liability for his negligence was not passed on (Schloendorff v.
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