Since a malpractice action is essentially a negligence action, based on negligence pertaining to doctors, dentists, lawyers, engineers and others who practice in specialty fields, the distinction between malpractice and negligence

P.): "Conduct may be deemed malpractice, rather than negligence, when it 'constitutes medical treatment or bears a substantial relationship to the rendition of medical treatment by a licensed physician’.

The issue that may be decided by the jury without the need of expert testimony (if defendant’s version of the facts are accepted) is whether the doctor was negligent in failing to advise his patient, prior to the day scheduled for

Plaintiff claims that the rule of res ipsa loquitur applies and that she established a prima facie case of negligence on the part of defendant, the operating physician.

Nothing is shown in this case, except that the plaintiff suffered severely, was compelled to revisit the dentist for subsequent treatment, and that at *344 some later period a physician was called in.

This does not establish defendants’ negligence. The judgment should be reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs' to appellants to abide the event. All concur.

Plaintiff had a right to go upon •defendant’s track finder the circumstances disclosed, and there was no testimony showing him to be guilty of negligence.

He was allowed, however, to testify what his attending physician “charged” for his services, but gave no proof that the amount so charged was reasonable or proper.

This is one of the ordinary actions to recover for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff through the alleged negligence of the defendant.

Upon the trial, the physician who attended the plaintiff and dressed the wounds received by her testified with considerable certainty as to the condition of the plaintiff’s head, but stated that he was unable to say that such injuries

This was the reasonable value of the services of the plaintiff’s physician, as testified to bn the trial.

Having thus succeeded upon the issue of negligence, the plaintiff is without any compensation for his own injuries, being only repaid the reasonable value of his doctor’s services. This is an injustice and cannot be tolerated.

It now appears that the “ flags ” have been obtained with respect to one ¡of the physicians. Under these circumstances, the objection is deemed sterile.

However, in this personal injury negligence action, on this record, the verdict is excessive.

single act of drunkenness would warrant a servant’s discharge; as, for example, in the case of a minister of the gospel, where the act might bring personal reproach, and tends to degrade the moral standard of religion; or of a family physician

, where it might result in negligence; or malpractice in pharmacy or surgery.”

The action is for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff through the negligence of defendant. The pleadings are in writing. The only witnesses called were plaintiff and her doctors.

The defendant was not responsible for consequences which would be “likely” to flow from its servant’s negligence, but from those which did flow from it.

It would have been proper enough for the doctor to have testified, if he could have done so, that in his opinion the rheumatism for which he treated plaintiff resulted from the- injuries received in the accident.

A medical provider such as defendant may be liable not only for malpractice on the part of the physicians it employs, but also <font color="FF0000">[*4]</font>for negligence on the part of its lab's employees (<i>see Berg v New York

circumstances, it might be urged that the highway in question were better closed to all' except the employees of the railroad company.” ' The evidence in this case as in that clearly authorized the finding of the jury that the defendánt was negligent

The court said to the plaintiff’s attending physician: “ You may describe at length what you found to be this man’s condition,” and the witness accordingly' stated it.

Appellant contends, however, that, based upon the testimony of the physician who performed the tonsillectomy that “ a broad answer ” to the question whether the bleeding “ could have been an act of negligence on the part of the anesthesiologist

whether a Justice of the City Court passing upon a case pursuant to special rule I of the City Court has the right to take into consideration, in evaluating the injuries, opposing medical affidavits or affidavits of an impartial doctor

This is a negligence action for damag’es for personal injuries and property damage arising out of an automobile collision which occurred on October 22,1956. The action was commenced in the Supreme Court on May 15, 1957.