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397 A.2d 803 Superior Court of Pennsylvania 1979年2月2日 No. 1240
of the original wrongdoer and the negligent physician are separate from each other in nature and time, the damages are accordingly apportionable.
A growing number of courts have either accepted or are accepting this latter rationale and recognize that a release of the original wrongdoer does not in itself preclude an action against the negligently treating physician.
For example, an original wrongdoer may have the right of indemnity against the treating physician if the original tortfeasor is held liable for damages resulting from both his negligence and that of the physician.
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441 A.2d 381 Superior Court of Pennsylvania 1982年2月5日 Nos. 381, 398, 399 and 400
In each action Voyles claims that the defendant physicians treated him negligently. In the one action, Dr. Hisrich joined Doris Walker as an additional defendant, and she joined Dr. Krosnoff as an additional defendant.
Should a jury so find, the physicians would be liable to Voyles for that portion—but only that portion—of Voyles’s injuries attributable to their negligence. In Lasprogata v.
Instead, where identifiable acts of negligence of the original wrongdoer and the negligent physician are separate from each other in nature and time, the damages are accordingly apportionable.
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585 A.2d 1004 Superior Court of Pennsylvania 1990年12月4日 No. 1037
negligence.
At trial, appellant asserted that physician negligence was the cause of the burns.
The jury rejected all allegations of physician negligence and awarded damages against Johnson and Johnson. Judgment was entered and Johnson & Johnson appealed.
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594 A.2d 365 Superior Court of Pennsylvania 1991年7月17日 No. 1104
If the injuries in question would have been sustained even if the physician had not been negligent, then the negligent conduct of the defendant physician would not be a substantial factor in causing the injuries in question.
Stated differently, the negligent conduct of the defendant physician is a substantial factor in causing his patient’s injuries if the injuries would not have been sustained, had the physician not acted in a negligent manner.
When a defendant physician, such as Dr.
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408 A.2d 496 Superior Court of Pennsylvania 1979年12月18日 No. 7
The question is not the worth and sanctity of life, but whether the doctors were negligent in their surgical attempts at vasectomy and abortion.
The alleged negligence and misrepresentations of both doctors and by the alleged breach of contract by Dr. Finegold has also been adequately pleaded.
Gratton, 55 Cal.App.3d 698 , 127 Cal.Rptr. 652 (action against physician for allegedly negligent performance of an abortion); Zepeda v.
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980 A.2d 159 Superior Court of Pennsylvania 2009年8月31日 No. 173 WDA 2007
Professional negligence consists of a negligent, careless or unskilled performance by a physician of the duties imposed on him by his professional relationship with his patients.
And folks, as a general proposition that applies in any case, doctors or physicians do not guarantee a cure to their patients, and negligence should not be presumed from the occurrence of an unfortunate result.
In particular, our appellate courts struggled to explain the interrelated notions that a doctor does not promise a cure and that mistakes by doctors are not necessarily the result of negligence. In Williams v.
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789 A.2d 748 Superior Court of Pennsylvania 2001年12月31日
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS OF NEGLIGENCE AND MISRPRESENTATION, WHERE THE DEFENDANT HEALTH PLAN WAS NEGLIGENT INDEPENDENT OF THE CONDUCT OF THE PHYSICIANS AND WHERE THERE WAS A DUTY ON
We conclude that the issue of the treating physicians' negligence was raised and fully litigated by Executrix in the prior medical malpractice action and that the physicians' negligence is a prerequisite to consideration of Keystone's
of the particular doctors who treated Appellant's decedent, I would agree that these portions of Count III are barred by the jury's finding in the prior proceeding that the decedent's treating physicians were not negligent.
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170 A.3d 1156 Superior Court of Pennsylvania 2017年9月12日 No. 1723 EDA 2016
j *1161 (4) Whether the [tjrial [jjudge erred by charging the jury a second time on the issue of physician negligence (which was Question Number 1 on the verdict sheet), where the nature of the jury’s question during jury deliberation
indicated that the jury had decided .the issue of physician negligence adverse to the Appellees, and was focused on the impact of comparative negligence of the Appellant’s Decedent (which was Question Number 3 on the verdict sheet
at 45) (“[T]he natui-e of the jury’s question ... indicated that the jury had decided the issue of physician negligence adverse-to the Appellees ....”) (emphasis added).
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619 A.2d 319 Superior Court of Pennsylvania 1993年1月13日 No. 1331
The jury’s task was to determine whether the doctors were negligent.
The interrogatories provided: VERDICT SLIP 1— Was there negligence on the part of any one of the defendant doctors?
These questions asked whether the jury had to attain seven “yes” votes to determine that the doctors were negligent and whether the jury had to attain seven “no” votes to determine that the doctors were not negligent.
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430 A.2d 647 Superior Court of Pennsylvania 1980年10月10日 No. 791
Philip Pollice despite the fact that the doctor was an independent contractor.
Haskell, Hospital Responsibility for Physician Negligence: Changing Concepts of Liability, 1 Med. Malprac. Cost Containment J. 32, 36 & n.16 (1979).
Several courts have applied the ostensible agency concept to cases involving hospital liability for the negligence of independent contractor physicians. See, e. g., Seneris v.
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606 A.2d 1175 Superior Court of Pennsylvania 1992年3月10日 No. 480
Dubois Regional Medical Center, 409 Pa.Super. 83 , 597 A.2d 671 (1991), we were confronted with a similar situation wherein a physician was sued for negligent infliction of emotional distress for allegedly failing to treat his patient
Rather appellant witnessed the traumatic event, and the earlier negligence of the doctor.
Bloom sued his wife's doctor and the hospital for negligent infliction of emotional distress on the basis that the doctor and the hospital failed to adequately test, diagnose and supervise his wife. .
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390 A.2d 765 Superior Court of Pennsylvania 1978年7月12日 Nos. 344, 403, 410 and 416
conduct, and may be made further liable for the later alleged negligent conduct of the cross-defendant doctors and hospital.
Herrero’s liabil *182 ity for the negligence of the doctors and hospital would arise out of a positive rule of decisional law of this state, as stated in Ash v.
and his injuries are aggravated by the negligence of such doctor, the law regards the act of the original wrongdoer as a proximate cause of the damages flowing from the subsequent negligent medical treatment and holds him liable therefor
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746 A.2d 642 Superior Court of Pennsylvania 2000年2月4日
Appellant’s reliance is misplaced, however, because the cause of action involved was not “negligent referral.” The court specifically stated that the two referring doctors “were plaintiffs continuing treating ne-phrologists.”
They were not being sued strictly for their negligence in referring the plaintiff to the third doctor. As continuing treating physicians, they had a duty to monitor the plaintiffs use of the drug prescribed by the third doctor.
This case held that a doctor may be found negligent for referring a patient to another doctor whom the referrer knew to be incompetent.
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753 A.2d 829 Superior Court of Pennsylvania 2000年5月30日
On June 27, 1997, Miller commenced this action raising allegations of professional negligence against the physicians and corporate negligence against Sacred Heart Hospital (referred to collectively hereafter as “Defendants”).
Brannan, 417 A.2d at 201 (concluding that expert testimony was not *834 necessary to establish negligence of hospital staff members who failed to comply with supervising physician’s written orders and to notify physician of patient
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803 A.2d 738 Superior Court of Pennsylvania 2002年6月17日
Under the doctrine of ostensible agency, a hospital [or HMO] may be held liable for the negligent acts or omissions of an independent doctor.
A patient who submits himself to the care of a doctor for the performance of an in-office medical procedure should be entitled to recover damages from the doctor for the negligence of the doctor’s independent contractors just as a
The patients should *749 also be informed that the doctors are not liable for the negligence of the independent contractors.
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723 A.2d 719 Superior Court of Pennsylvania 1999年1月14日
¶8 Where a third party has sponsored a medical examination of a person and the person later alleges negligence on the part of the physician who performed the examination, that person cannot succeed on a negligence cause of action
¶ 13 Based upon the facts of this case, we are not willing to create a theory of liability for negligent doctors or medical laboratories that have contracted with third parties for employment-related testing.
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652 A.2d 1382 Superior Court of Pennsylvania 1995年1月25日
Edwards sued the hospital and the doctors who treated him there for professional negligence.
We simply agree with the trial court that even if the ER doctor was negligent, Mr.
Edwards’ treating physician should have *685 consulted with an infectious disease expert earlier in his case, then his treating physician may have been negligent. But to make out a viable Thompson claim, Mr.
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421 A.2d 803 Superior Court of Pennsylvania 1980年8月22日 No. 1526
Under the negligence standard, a patient may recover for injury which results when a physician prescribes a drug without first obtaining the patient's informed consent.
Thus, several of the leading cases adopting the negligence theory of informed consent have employed a similar standard in determining whether the physician breached his duty of care.
In the Incollingo case cited by appellants, a physician was held liable for negligent prescription of the drug chloromycetin.
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428 A.2d 1366 Superior Court of Pennsylvania 1981年8月24日 No. 233
The alleged negligence and misrepresentations of both doctors and by the alleged breach of contract by Dr. Finegold has also been adequately pleaded.
After carefully reviewing our decisions in Speck and Stri-bling, we find that the negligence of the physician and not the physical condition of the infant is at the crux of the matter.
As we stated in Speck , the question in determining whether a cause of action exists is not the worth and sanctity of life, but whether doctors were negligent in their surgical attempts at sterilization. 268 Pa.
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615 A.2d 372 Superior Court of Pennsylvania 1992年10月20日 No. 03238
The trial court concluded, as a matter of law, that the second physicians were not liable for the injuries attributable to the third physician because the third physician’s negligent conduct constituted a superceding or intervening
cause which relieved the second physicians of liability.
Qualls, this court suggested that an original wrongdoer may have the right of indemnity against the treating physician if the original tortfeasor is held liable for damages resulting from both his negligence and that of the physician
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