not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”

Therefore, we must determine whether the rights at issue were clearly established at the time of defendants’ alleged misconduct.

Felkner argues that there are active claims against RIC, for which the defense of qualified immunity cannot be raised.

We are of the opinion that, in an appropriate case, the doctrine of qualified immunity might well be applied by this Court. See Harlow v.

Bryant, 502 U.S. 224 , 112 S.Ct. 534 , 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991), the Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, made the following observation regarding qualified immunity: “Our cases establish that qualified immunity shields [law enforcement

officers] from suit for damages if ‘a reasonable officer could have believed [an arrest] to be lawful, in fight of clearly established law and the information the [arresting] officers possessed.’

Stone also argued that applicable statutes of limitations as well as the qualified immunity he possessed as a state official barred Salisbury’s suit. 3 .

Salisbury also argued that under case law establishing a rationale for extending qualified immunity to government officials.

Stone does not possess such immunity. 4 .The trial justice also held that since Salisbury failed to allege that Stone violated any of Salisbury's statutory or constitutional rights clearly established and reasonably knowable at

This Court is further satisfied that the State, and its officers acting in an official capacity, enjoy a qualified immunity as a matter of law, since the director's conduct violated no clearly established statutory or constitutional

In January of 2012, petitioners, Mayor Cianci and Chief Rattigan, moved for summary judgment on Counts Six and Seven on the basis of qualified immunity. 7 The two officials argued that respondents had no clearly established right

The respondents vociferously disagreed, arguing in their objection to the motion for summary judgment (1) that qualified immunity was no bar to any injunctive or declaratory relief in their favor; and (2) that, more importantly, in

Layne, 526 U.S. 603 , 119 S.Ct. 1692 , 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999), the United States Supreme Court stated that “government officials performing discretionary functions generally are granted a qualified immunity and are ‘shielded from

liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” Id.

But the first step in evaluating a claim to qualified immunity is to “determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all * * *.” Id. (quoting Conn v.

The defendants, for their part, have asked us-if we vacate the judgment the hearing justice entered in their favor-to conclude that qualified immunity bars Felkner's claims against them.

The defendants argue that, even if their actions are deemed to have violated any of Felkner's constitutional rights, none of the violations were against clearly established constitutional rights, thereby entitling the individual defendants

to qualified immunity.

With respect to the defense of qualified immunity, the parties refer the Court to Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 102 S.Ct. 2727 (1982).

In Harlow the court stated that ". . . government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional