aggravated (without any negligence on the part of the employee) we think the employer under such circumstances would be liable therefor even though he had not been negligent in employing or furnishing the physician.

knowledge, consent, or acquiescence of the employer, an incompetent, negligent, or unskillful physician.

as no claim is made that the employee was negligent in seeking or employing such physician, the aggravated loss or condition of the employee so occasioned by the negligence or unskillfulness of such physician cannot be said to be

Eisengraver’s negligence in treating appellant, and allegations of further negligent treatment of appellant by the association’s physicians and surgeons up to March, 1918; and, also, allegation of the amount of damages suffered by

appellant from all of such alleged negligent selection of incompetent physicians and surgeons and their treatment of appellant.

It is true in that case the negligence alleged to have been the result of the death of plaintiff’s husband was the negligence of the physicians and surgeons of the association; it not being claimed that the association negligently

It was claimed that the doctor was negligent in the selection of the substance and in the introduction of it into his blood.

The proof utterly fails to sustain the allegations of negligence respecting the diagnosis of the disease, or the determination of the doctor to use the particular medicine.

Negligence on the part of a physician may not be inferred from the effect his medicine may have on the patient.

D’Amato was guilty of contributory negligence, and assumed the risk of the injury, and because the defendant is a charitable organization, and, therefore, not liable for negligence of its physicians and nurses.

A hospital maintained as a charitable institution for the care and healing of the sick is not liable for the negligence of its physicians and nurses in the treatment of patients.

In our opinion, public policy requires that a charitable in-' stitution maintaining a hospital be held not liable for injuries . resulting to patients through the negligence or carelessness of its physicians and nurses, even if the

The defendant can only be held liable under the theory that said defendant, was negligent in the selection of the physician, who was incompetent, and that plaintiff was damaged by this negligence as a proximate cause; in other words

The Judge told the jury in effect that the negligence of the physician could not be imputed to the defendant, unless he was negligent in selecting an incompetent physician to treat plaintiff, and in such case, defendant would be placed

negligent in the selection of the said physician.

The court below held that the waiver doctrine is the foundation of the rule which exempts a hospital from liability for the negligence of its physicians and nurses in the treatment of patients who are regarded as the beneficiaries

The distinction is sought to be made between exoneration from liability for the negligence of physicians and nurses employed by the hospital to care for its patients and for the negligence of cooks, maids and orderlies who also act

On the 2d day of July, 1917, plaintiff instituted the instant action against the defendant, in the district court of Pawnee county, Okla., seeking damages -resulting from the negligence of the physician so employed to exercise reasonable

For reversal, plaintiff relies upon two grounds: First, Does the district court have jurisdiction to entertain an action for damages for personal injuries occasioned by the negligence of the physician furnished by an employer pursuant

It is the contention of the plaintiff that the injuries resulting from the negligent or unskillful treatment by a physician, furnished by an employer pursuant to, and in treating his employe for injuries coming within the purview of

Counsel for appellant claims that the evidence was not such as to justify the jury in determining that the physicians were negligent, or that either of them was negligent, in the premises.

This brings us to the final question, which i.s whether or not the defendant, after using due care in the selection of a physician, is liable for his negligence.

Upon the *741 record here presented1, we are of the opinion that the hospitals of the defendant were not charitable institutions and that the defendant is responsible for. the negligence of the physician employed by it.

It was held that the finding of the jury that the doctor was negligent in not looking to see where or against what he placed the child was sustained by the' evidence. Defendant relies on the case of Malkowski v.

The court held that the negligence was the negligence of Mrs.

Lenga, not of the doctor; that any person of common intelligence and experience was competent as the doctor to prepare and place the hot iron at the feet of the patient; and that he was not negligent in relying upon Mrs.

The allegation is that the physician was guilty of negligence in examining the injured limb, diagnosing the injury and prescribing treatment therefor, and that this negligence resulted in so aggravating the condition of the injured

Damage is claimed not on account of the original injury, but solely on account of the negligence of the physician. We think that the demurrer was properly sustained.

And we think, also, that defendant is not liable under the statute for the negligence of the physician, for the reason that the physician is not an “officer, agent or employee,” for whose negligence the company is made liable.

The company had always employed an adequate number of competent doctors, and no complaint is now made either of the insufficient number of doctors, or of the competency of the (doctor of whom complaint is made, but only of his negligence

If he was competent, but negligent in the particular case, and there was no contract for medical service except that of the company doctor, the company is not liable for his negligence. As said in Big Stone Gap Iron Co. v.

It is not alleged that there were not enough doctors, nor that the “company doctor” was incompetent, but only that he was negligent, and of this negligence no notice to the company is alleged.

Immunity from liability for negligence of its physicians in the treatment of the case, on the part of the defendant, is not claimed.

The policy of the law forbids liability of a state or municipal hospital for negligence of its servants *233 and physicians, it being a governmental agency.

Va. 159 , it is held that, to be contributory, negligence must be contemporaneous with the main fact charged as negligence, and that the patient’s negligence after dismissal of the physician, or his abandonment of the ease, does not

Plainly Galloway could not recover compensation from his employer for injuries resulting to him from any negligence of his physician.

Nor could the employer, or his insurance carrier, maintain any action against the physician for negligent injury to Galloway. The physician was liable, if liable at all, only to his patient.

Complaint is made that one of the physicians was not permitted to express an opinion to the effect that the X-ray picture showed proper treatment by the physician who originally set the arm.

respondent’s present condition is the result of the original injury or that injury in connection with its treatment, for the law unquestionably is that if an injured party, in good faith and in the exercise of reasonable care, employs a physician

to treat his injury and it is aggravated through the mistake or negligence of his physician, such negligent or mistaken treatment of the physician does not become an intervening cause, and that the injured party may recover damages

This was one of the issues in the case, and the jury eliminated that issue of negligence.

The other issue of negligence was that “Doctor Urrutia, after having been called, if he was called, failed to wait upon and treat Edward M. Patino.”

*583 This states the only issue: Was it negligence for the doctor to refuse to call and treat the deceased on the Sunday in question, and was it such negligence as to he the proximate cause of his dea.th? We think not.

In an action by a patient against a physician for malpractice causing an X-ray burn, the burden is on the patient to prove negligence by the physician in administering the X-ray treatments. p. 591. 2.

Where a physician gives X-ray treatments to patients for *Page 589 curative or healing purposes, proof of a bad result from such treatments should not constitute proof of negligence by the physician, any more than any other agency

of negligence on the part of the physician, any more than when any other agency is applied or ministered.

.: “Nor would it have been material, if that had been found to be the fact, that the bedsore was due to the mistake or the negligence of the physicians acting honestly.”

Seelye, 231 Mass. 434 , at page 437, that “The reason why a wrongdoer is held liable for the negligence of a physician whose unskilful treatment aggravates an in *387 jury, is that such unskilful treatment is a result which reasonably

At common law it is well settled that in an action for personal injury a party may recover for injuries resulting from the defendant’s negligence even though such injuries are aggravated by the mistaken but honest treatment of a physician

If such a photograph was essential in order to discover the fracture, and the physician, in the exercise of that degree of care required of him, advised that it be taken and the patient refused this advice, the physician cannot be

charged with negligence.

The patient cannot charge the physician with negligence if the patient himself refuses to carry out the directions because ignorant of the consequences which might result from such failure.

Doctor Keller was sued for the alleged negligence of the other physician.

In that case we held that the employment of the other doctor constituted an independent contract, and that Doctor Keller was not responsible for the negligence or want of skill of that doctor.

Not being negligent in those respects, he can not be held responsible for the negligence of the other physician who was left in charge merely because the other physician took charge on his suggestion and arrangement.”