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249 P.2d 8 California Supreme Court October 24, 1952 No. S. F. 18614
That ease not only directly held that an action lies in the civil courts against an attending physician by an employee injured by reason of the negligence of the insurance doctor in attending an industrial injury, but also suggested
“It is equally clear, of course, that, if an employee of a doctor goes to that doctor for treatment of a nonindustrial injury, and the doctor is guilty of negligence, the employee may sue his employer for malpractice.
Had he sent [ ] [plaintiff] to the insurance doctor and had that doctor been negligent in treating the industrial injury, that doctor would have been liable for malpractice.
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277 P.2d 444 California Court of Appeal December 13, 1954 No. Civ. 16046
But if the jury found (in view of the evidence this seems highly unlikely) that appellant was not guilty of any independent negligence but that the doctors were negligent, then appellant could be held liable for the doctors’ negligence
It seems to be the general rule that an employer who undertakes gratuitously to furnish medical attention to his employees is liable only if he is negligent in the selection of the physician, and is not liable for the negligence of
Consequently, it is further held that the company is liable for the negligent acts of the physicians employed.”
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297 P.2d 728 California Court of Appeal May 23, 1956 Nos. Civ. 21344, 21282
The sixth count is also a duplicate of the third, except that the defendant Koff is named as the negligent physician.
The seventh count is also a duplicate of the third, except that *743 Scharles is named as the negligent physician.
doctors.
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65 S.E.2d 575 Supreme Court of Virginia June 18, 1951 No. Record 3785
The rule is well settled that where one has received a personal injury as a result of the negligence of another and pursues due care in the selection of a physician or surgeon to treat the injuries and they are aggravated by the negligent
E. 7 .58, a personal representative of the deceased employee sued an insurance carrier and a physician, charging that the insurance carrier was negligent in employing a physician who negligently treated the injuries of her intestate
He alleged that the carrier was negligent in employing unskilled physicians to attend his injuries and that the physicians were guilty of negligence in their treatment.
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255 F.2d 176 Tenth Circuit May 6, 1958 No. 5779
and in following the advice and instructions qf the physician throughout the treatment, and his injuries are aggravated, or a poor result obtained by the negligence of the physician, the law regards the negligence of the one who caused
The Keown and Paris cases were both malpractice actions against physicians who had treated plaintiffs with broken bones caused by the alleged negligence of others, where the original tort-feasors had been released from liability by
caused, provided the injured party tused care in selecting a doctor.
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234 P.2d 34 California Supreme Court June 29, 1951 No. L. A. 21416
“Negligence on the part of a physician or surgeon will not be presumed; it must be affirmatively proved.” (Engelking v. Carlson, supra, 13 Cal.2d 216, 221 ; Lashley v. Koerber, supra, 26 Cal.2d 83, 89 .)
Finally, in disposition of plaintiff’s charge of malpractice against defendant doctor, there remain two other points for consideration: (1) Plaintiff claims that the doctor was negligent in failing to give complete and proper instructions
As the record has been above reviewed with regard to the alleged malpractice claim against defendant doctor, it is manifest that plaintiff has failed to prove that the doctor was negligent or unskilful in his diagnosis and adoption
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256 F.2d 542 Tenth Circuit June 9, 1958 No. 5774
Edwards contends that Cecelia’s injuries were aggravated by negligent treatment which she received from her doctors and that the trial court errone *543 ously instructed the jury as to the liability of Edwards for such injuries
New Mexico Construction Co., 39 N.M. 216 , 44 P.2d 489, 494 , appears the following dictum: _ “ * * * The negligence of physician, surgeon, or nurse may intervene to aggravate an injury or make it fatal.
The tort involved in the Valdez case was negligent language.”
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123 N.E.2d 801 New York Court of Appeals December 31, 1954
.— the case against the physician was discontinued by consent — the Trial Judge determined that the physician had been negligent, that his employer, Sunshine, was responsible for his negligence, and that plaintiff was entitled to $30,000
Defendant relies on the rule, firmly established in this State, exempting hospitals from liability for the negligence of their physicians and nurses in the treatment of patients.
In such cases, it is not the person (i.e., the physician, nurse or orderly), but the nature of the negligent act, which determines the hospital’s liability (Dillon v. Rockaway Beach Hosp., supra).
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265 S.W.2d 779 Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976) March 5, 1954
. ■ Plainly .Galloway could not recover compensation from his employer for injuries resulting to him from any negligence. of his physician.
Nor could the .employer, or his insurance carrier, maintain any action against the physician for negligent injury to Galloway.
Galloway, relied upon by the appellant, is. not controlling here, because Powell, the negligent physician in that case, was the employee Galloway’s personal physician and choice, and the employer had nothing to do with his selection
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125 F. Supp. 411 E.D. Washington October 28, 1954 No. 1181
or carelessness of the employer’s selected physician.”
of the physicians who treated the injury.
negligence in the selection.
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96 S.E.2d 390 Court of Appeals of Georgia November 29, 1956 No. 36190Cited by 2 Dissent · Felton
Whether or not the doctor was negligent in this case is a medical question the answer to which must be established by medical testimony, of which there is none authorizing a finding that the doctor was negligent.
In order to make out a case, the plaintiff had to prove that the doctor was negligent in taking the risk of leaving the tube in the artery, assuming that the doctor knew of the danger and possibility of the tube’s being cut off and
The mere fact that the jury had evidence from which it could find that the leaving of the tube in the artery contributed to the condition which necessitated the amputation could not take the place of proof that the doctor was negligent
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283 A.D. 105 Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York December 15, 1953
master may be liable for the negligence of the physician who is protecting the master’s interests and is acting for the benefit of his employer.
It matters not whether the negligent act *109 is ascribed to a physician or nurse; it is the act and not the position of the actor that furnishes the test.
Upon the proof adduced, the trial court was justified in finding that plaintiff’s injuries are the result of the negligent acts of the physician and that in the circumstances of this case appellant was liable for such negligence.
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1951 OK 182, 233 P.2d 963 Supreme Court of Oklahoma June 19, 1951 No. 34154
Ensey’s negligent act in so doing. The evidence shows without dispute that the relationship of physician and patient was created between Dr. Ensey and plaintiff. Dr.
Ensey, the attending physician, and without any act of negligence on her part. The same may be said of the case of Tulsa Hospital Ass’n v. Juby, 73 Okla. 243 , 175 P. 519 , cited by plaintiff.
Ensey in giving his instructions to the nurse and not because of any independent act of negligence on her part after the doctor left the hospital, as in the cases relied on by plaintiff.
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13 Misc. 2d 794 New York Supreme Court September 16, 1958
There plaintiff sustained a fractured leg in an auto accident caused by the negligence of one Wheeler. Due to the alleged malpractice of plaintiff’s physicians his fractured leg was required to be amputated.
Wheeler thereafter served a third-party complaint against the physicians where he sought to be reimbursed for the amount of damages resulting from the physicians’ negligence.
It was alleged that a callous on plaintiff’s foot was negligently treated by the chiropodist resulting in an infection of the foot and leg; that thereafter the physicians treated the foot and leg but through their negligence a further
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146 A.2d 676 Supreme Court of New Jersey December 1, 1958
See Note, “Release of one responsible for injury as affecting liability of physician or surgeon for negligent treatment of injury ” 40 A. L.
R. 2d 1075 (1955); Note, “Liability of one causing personal injury for consequences of negligence, mistake, or lack of skill of physician or surgeon,” 126 A. L. R. 912 (1940).
She then sued the defendant doctors, alleging that they had negligently treated her.
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321 P.2d 831 California Court of Appeal February 21, 1958 No. Civ. 22605
Plaintiff has called our attention to the line of cases which have permitted an employee injured in an industrial accident to recover damages in a civil suit against the attending physician whose negligence has aggravated the original
The employer’s insurance carrier is held responsible in workmen’s compensation for the negligence of the doctor since that negligence is one of the foreseeable consequences of the original industrial injury. (Heaton v.
Shane, supra, it was held that an employee injured in an industrial accident could maintain a civil action for damages against the doctor whose negligent treatment aggravated the injury, even though the doctor who treated the employee
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218 F.2d 34 D.C. Circuit August 2, 1954 No. 11950Cited by 75 Dissent · Prettyman
Barber in the sum of $10,000. 1 But, where damages, in the form of an award to a third party, are inflicted upon a business man, a doctor, or a hospital by the negligence of his or its duly authorized agent, the courts do not relieve
If a patient secures a judgment against a doctor because of the negligence of the doctor’s assistant, we do not relieve the doctor because the negligence was that of his employee.
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184 F.2d 72 Third Circuit August 18, 1950 No. 10138_1
The court -below found in substance, that ■ the ship’s officers were negligent in'not pre- ■ venting the knifing and that the.army doctor was negligent in his treatment of Jensen’s injury.
The court below allowed recovery upon-the first ground but rejected as a basis of recovery the negligent treatment of Jensen’s injury by the army doctor. See 88 F.Supp. 541, 543 .
The negligence of the army doctor, as we have indicated, has been asserted as a ground for recovery, separate and apart from the negligence of the ship’s officers in not preventing the knifing.
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309 P.2d 636 Supreme Court of Kansas April 6, 1957 No. 40,451
.: This was an action by a surviving husband to recover for the wrongful death of his wife, alleged to have resulted from the negligence and malpractice of defendant physician and hospital.
Plaintiff’s evidence not only did not establish negligence — it in fact refuted it. The demurrer of defendant physician was properly sustained.
As has been said with respect to defendant physician, negligence is never presumed — it must be established, and until established by *115 competent evidence a jury has no function to perform.
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89 So. 2d 13 Supreme Court of Florida July 31, 1956
The question here narrows down to whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable, upon the breaking of the instrument, to make a prima facie case of negligence against the doctor.
Thornton, 125 Fla. 699 , 170 So. 459, 461 , this Court said, "In the decision dated August 10, 1933, we held in effect that, in an action for damages resulting from an injury caused by negligent treatment of a patient by a doctor,
The defect was a latent one, and in the absence of a showing of specific negligence of the doctor with reference to it, the holding was clear that res ipsa loquitur was not applicable.
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