immunity for his conduct.

“A government official performing a discretionary function is entitled to qualified immunity provided his or her conduct does *671 not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

To be entitled to qualified immunity, Seals was required to establish that it was objectively reasonable for him to believe that his conduct was appropriate under the circumstances, or that officers of reasonable competence could disagree

Furthermore, the actions of a superintendent are entitled to qualified immunity.

A party is entitled to qualified immunity if his or her conduct is not violative of clearly established rights which a reasonable person knew, or objectively and reasonably believed, did not violate such rights (see Anderson v Creighton

After a lengthy hearing, Supreme Court (Coccoma, J.) determined that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity due to the exigent circumstances and granted the motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals.

Government officials performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity, thereby shielding them from civil liability, as long as their actions did not violate the plaintiffs clearly established legal rights; it must

If we assume that defendants did violate plaintiffs rights by remaining on his property, and the right to be free from unreasonable seizures of property is clearly established, we must then address the second part of the qualified

Defendants nevertheless have qualified immunity for their conduct if they did “not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known” (Mullenix v Luna, 577 US —, —, 136

Defendants’ actions, in short, did not violate a “clearly established statutory or constitutional right[ ] of which a reasonable person would have known” (Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 US 800, 818 [1982]; see Hayes v O’Connor, 2004

Thus, Supreme Court properly held that qualified immunity protected defendants from plaintiffs 42 USC § 1983 claim. The remaining contentions advanced by plaintiff have been considered and rejected.

We reject defendant’s contention that the state constitutional claims should be dismissed because defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. “ ‘A government official is entitled to qualified immunity provided his or her conduct does

not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known’ ” (Linen v County of Rensselaer, 274 AD2d 911, 914 [2000]; see Maio v Kralik, 70 AD3d 1, 13 [2009]; Rigle v County of

Qualified Immunity, the Sheriff, and “John Does 1-5” Regarding the plaintiffs claim pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 , the individual defendant, James F. Kralik, as Sheriff of the County of Rockland, was entitled to qualified immunity.

“A government official is protected by qualified immunity insofar as the official’s conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known” (Sagendorf-Teal v County

A reasonable official in this circumstance would not have known that Penal Law § 400.05 (6) actually excluded rifles and shotguns, and therefore would not have known that disposing of the weapons “violated clearly established statutory

The individual defendants argue that they are entitled to dismissed of the charges against them because they enjoy a qualified immunity when executing a facially valid search warrant.

“A government official performing a discretionary function is entitled to qualified immunity provided his or her conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

To be entitled to qualified immunity, it must be established that it was objectively reasonable for the police officer involved to believe that his or her conduct was appropriate under the circumstances, or that officers of reasonable

Supreme Court properly concluded that Ashe has not established as a matter of law that he is entitled to qualified immunity.

"[O]fficers are entitled to qualified immunity under [42 USC] § 1983 unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the [*3]unlawfulness of their conduct was 'clearly established at the time'" ( District

As to the second prong, "[e]ven where an officer is found to have used excessive force, . . . the doctrine of qualified immunity will shield that officer from liability for damages if his [or her] conduct did not violate clearly established

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in permitting the defendants to amend their answer to assert the affirmative defense of qualified immunity (see CPLR 3025 [b]).

State officials are entitled to qualified immunity under 42 USC § 1983 for discretionary functions if either (1) their conduct did not violate clearly established constitutional rights, or (2) it was objectively reasonable for them

If the officer's actions did not violate a clearly established right or law, or if it was objectively reasonable for an officer to believe that his actions did not violate a clearly established right or law, his or her actions are

privileged under the doctrine of qualified immunity ( see Pearson v Callahan, 555 US 223, 231-232 ; Boyd v City of New York , 149 AD3d at 686 ; Lepore v Town of Greenburgh , 120 AD3d at 1203 ; Taravella v Town of Wolcott , 599 F3d

“If found to be objectively reasonable, [an] officer’s actions are privileged under the doctrine of qualified immunity” (Lepore v Town of Greenburgh, 120 AD3d 1202, 1203 [2014]; see Williams v City of New York, 129 AD3d 1066

“The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known” (Mullenix

The individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, as they are government officials performing discretionary functions, and their conduct did not violate any clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which

More recently, the Second Circuit held that, as of its 2006 decision in Earley , it was clearly established, for purposes of qualified immunity, that administrative imposition of PRS violated federal due process guarantees (see Vincent

*206 Qualified Immunity The individual defendants asserted the defense of qualified immunity which applies if their conduct “ ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

We reject defendant’s contention that the state constitutional claims should be dismissed because defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. “ ‘A government official is entitled to qualified immunity provided his or her conduct does

not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known’ ” (Linen v County of Rensselaer, 274 AD2d 911, 914 ; see Maio v Kralik, 70 AD3d 1, 13 ; Rigle v County of Onondaga

Police officers performing their governmental duty are entitled to qualified immunity “as long as their actions did not violate the plaintiffs clearly established legal rights” (Colao v Mills, 39 AD3d 1048, 1050 [2007]; see Baez v

Defendants' further contention that, even if selective-enforcement claims survived Engquist , they are entitled to qualified immunity under 42 USC § 1983 , is not preserved for our review ( see generally Ciesinski v Town of Aurora

Public officials may invoke qualified immunity under 42 USC § 1983 unless, inter alia, the unlawfulness of their conduct was clearly established at the time ( see generally Mahoney v City of Albany , 211 AD3d 1408, 1409-1410 [3d Dept

As for the plaintiffs 42 USC § 1983 claims asserted against Miller and Conlon, they established, prima facie, their entitlement to qualified immunity by demonstrating that it was objectively reasonable for them to believe that their

acts did not violate clearly established constitutional or statutory rights regardless of whether they made a mistake of law or fact in applying the Town Code (see Pearson v Callahan, 555 US 223 , —, 129 S Ct 808, 815 [2009]; Sonne

emotionally disturbed persons to inform the standard of care ( see Lubecki v City of New York , 304 AD2d 224, 233-234 [1st Dept 2003], lv denied 2 NY3d 701 [2004]), under the totality of the circumstances, Officer Gleason was entitled to qualified

immunity because his actions in attempting to arrest Conrad were matters of discretion and professional judgment that did not violate any clearly established procedures or protocol ( see Davila v City of New York , 139 AD3d 890, 892

Moreover, the defendants’ actions are entitled to qualified immunity because it was objectively reasonable for them to believe that their acts did not violate clearly established constitutional or statutory rights (see Anderson v Creighton