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397 A.2d 803 Superior Court of Pennsylvania February 2, 1979 No. 1240
of the original wrongdoer and the negligent physician are separate from each other in nature and time, the damages are accordingly apportionable.
A growing number of courts have either accepted or are accepting this latter rationale and recognize that a release of the original wrongdoer does not in itself preclude an action against the negligently treating physician.
For example, an original wrongdoer may have the right of indemnity against the treating physician if the original tortfeasor is held liable for damages resulting from both his negligence and that of the physician.
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648 N.E.2d 1375 Ohio Court of Appeals September 24, 1993 No. 1942.
The hospital, in effect, argued that Albain thus permits the subsequent negligence of a physician to relieve the negligence of a nurse.
The physicians’ continued acts of negligence operated to break the chain of causation between the nurses’ acts and appellant’s injuries.
After 3:50 p.m., the nurses committed no negligent acts cooperating with the physicians’ negligent acts. Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons we overrule appellants’ assignment .of error.
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305 So. 2d 724 Louisiana Court of Appeal December 10, 1974 No. 6500
of a treating physician.
These cases hold that the tort feasor owes the full amount of damages including that part caused by the negligence of the treating physician. We see no distinction where such negligent treatment produces the death of the patient.
It is obvious that a negligent physician would be liable for damages resulting from his negligence but not for the initial damages where they could be separated.
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628 P.2d 337 New Mexico Court of Appeals April 16, 1981 No. 4637
Civ. 8.1, that the only way it could decide whether the Doctor was negligent was “from evidence presented in this trial by physicians and surgeons testifying as expert witnesses.”
were based on negligence on the part of the Doctor.
The jury’s answers established that the Doctor was not negligent. Negligence on the part of the Doctor is not involved in this point.
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227 Cal. App. 2d 69 California Court of Appeal May 6, 1964 Nos. 21146, 21147
and his injuries are aggravated by the negligence of such doctor, the law regards the act of the original wrongdoer as a proximate cause of the damages flowing from the subsequent negligent medical treatment and holds him liable therefor
The court determined that plaintiff would be entitled to a judgment against all defend *76 ants, and that the original negligent defendant would he entitled to judgment against the negligent doctor for the aggravation of damages
It is alleged that a blood transfusion was negligently administered to decedent by the cross-defendant doctors and hospital and that decedent died the day following her admission to the hospital.
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207 S.E.2d 659 Court of Appeals of Georgia June 18, 1974 No. 49365
Accordingly, a hospital is not liable for the negligent treatment of a patient by a physician who is not employed as a servant, but performs his duties as an independent contractor. Pogue v.
App. 230 (4), supra: "A hospital is not liable for the negligence of a physician employed by it where the negligence relates to a matter of professional judgment on the part of the physician when the hospital does not exercise and
In the matter sub judice, the administrator’s *169 affidavit failed to establish that the allegedly negligent doctor was an independent contractor of the hospital.
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808 N.E.2d 1078 Appellate Court of Illinois March 31, 2004 Nos. 1-02-2513, 1-02-2867 cons.
In counts XX and XXI, plaintiff alleged medical negligence against Doctor Williams.
To permit a physician on its staff whom the hospital knows or should have known is unqualified or negligent is a breach of the hospital’s duty of due care to its patients.
Counts XX and XXI also allege that beginning on February 1, 1999, Doctor Williams was negligent in her capacity as the decedent’s treating physician. A.
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521 A.2d 1377 New Jersey Superior Court App Division December 3, 1986
The question presented in this medical malpractice case is whether an unsolicited opinion contained in the report of plaintiff's treating physician, that the defendant-doctor was not negligent in his treatment of the plaintiff, is
Included in the report was the treating physician's opinion that defendant-doctor was not negligent in the performance of the surgery.
negligence of defendant-doctor.
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651 S.W.2d 364 Tex. App. Ct., 12th Dist. (Tyler) April 28, 1983 No. 12-81-0075-C
In each, the plaintiff sought to hold the doctor liable for negligent treatment of him or her as a patient. *368 On the other hand, in the instant case a physician-patient relationship undisputedly existed between Dr.
The doctor and Group Health denied negligence, and were dismissed at the conclusion of the evidence on the grounds that the evidence showed no standard of care to which the doctor was bound, and even if negligent in failing to warn
The court went on to hold: The negligence of the bus driver is a jury question, and should the jury find the bus driver to be negligent, the doctor would nevertheless be liable if the jury finds he failed to give warning of the side
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449 N.E.2d 628 Indiana Court of Appeals June 9, 1983 No. 4-1181A182
White and Ireland Road Family Physicians, Inc. The action arose out of the alleged negligence of the doctors which purportedly caused the fatal heart attack of Max Fall on April 11, 1978.
Where there are two or more methods of treating a problem which are recognized as proper by physicians in similar practices at the time in question, it is not negligence for the physician to adopt any one of the recognized treatment
*636 A physician is negligent where he selects a treatment method which is not recognized as proper by physicians with the same specialty in this or similar communities at the time in question."
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277 P.2d 444 California Court of Appeal December 13, 1954 No. Civ. 16046
But if the jury found (in view of the evidence this seems highly unlikely) that appellant was not guilty of any independent negligence but that the doctors were negligent, then appellant could be held liable for the doctors’ negligence
It seems to be the general rule that an employer who undertakes gratuitously to furnish medical attention to his employees is liable only if he is negligent in the selection of the physician, and is not liable for the negligence of
Consequently, it is further held that the company is liable for the negligent acts of the physicians employed.”
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260 S.E.2d 493 Court of Appeals of Georgia September 4, 1979 No. 57671
App. 577 (4) ( 206 SE2d 853 ), in support of their proposition that a person who originally negligently inflicts an injury on a person and a physician who later negligently treats the injury cannot be regarded as joint tortfeasors.
resulted in a door falling upon plaintiffs head) and the alleged negligence of the attending physician, which the court stated "resulted from his treatment of the patient
Appellees’ assertion that an original tortfeasor and a subsequently negligent physician cannot be joint tortfeasors is without merit. See Gilmore v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth., supra. 2.
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772 P.2d 26 Court of Appeals of Arizona January 19, 1989 No. 2 CA-CV 88-0256
Her instruction on this theory was rejected by the trial court which, instead, instructed the jury that the referring physician is not liable for the negligent acts of the covering physician so long as the referring physician exercises
The general rule is that a physician is not liable for a substitute’s negligence unless the substitute physician is in his employment or is his agent, partner, or unless due care is not exercised in making the substitution.
If liability were now to be imposed vicariously on physicians for the independent negligence of their covering doctors, some would doubtless be discouraged from making arrangements for the continuous care of their patients, but those
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181 P.3d 357 Colorado Court of Appeals November 15, 2007 No. 05CA2752
; and (2) DHHA is liable for the negligent acts of its non-physician employees.
The physicians involved here were not DHHA employees. Thus, DHHA did not hire them, much less hire them negligently.
Negligent Acts of Non-Physician Employees Ms. Villalpando also contends Colorado law permits her claim against DHHA *365 for negligence committed by non-physician employees. The trial court dismissed this claim based on Ms.
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574 P.2d 481 Court of Appeals of Arizona November 14, 1977 No. 2 CA-CIV 2621
Appellant did not produce any evidence from medical doctors that the doctors were negligent.
However, appellant’s witnesses were not competent to give an opinion as to whether the doctors were negligent.
And for centuries the courts of this and other countries have, almost without exception, held that expert medical evidence is required to establish negligence respecting the service a physician or a surgeon renders his patient.”
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137 A.3d 299 Court of Special Appeals of Maryland May 31, 2016 No. 2170/14
The appellants are correct in that “[t]he classic examples of legally foreseeable negligence by treating physicians arose in automobile cases where doctors aggravated, or failed to cure, injuries caused by the negligent driver.”
This is because in cases involving acts of negligence by subsequent treating physicians, the liability of the initial treating physician can be cut off if subsequent negligence by another physician constitutes a superseding cause.
Corso does not, as the appellants contend, stand for the proposition that a negligent treating physician is liable per se for the negligence of subsequent treating physicians.
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135 P.2d 29 California Court of Appeal March 16, 1943 No. Civ. 3040
Paragraph five alleges other standards of good practice of dentists in Kern County; that Doctor Samuel Smith was negligent in failing to follow them; and that Wanda Kraft was damaged by such alleged negligence of Doctor Samuel Smith
Paragraph three alleges certain standards of good practice of physicians and surgeons in Los Angeles County; that Doctor- Innis was negligent in failing to conform to those standards in the treatment of Wanda Kraft.
It seems to be true that each of the three doctors is accused of a separate tort and that there is no allegation of concurrent negligence, at least between the two Doctors Smith and Doctor Innis.
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297 P.2d 728 California Court of Appeal May 23, 1956 Nos. Civ. 21344, 21282
The sixth count is also a duplicate of the third, except that the defendant Koff is named as the negligent physician.
The seventh count is also a duplicate of the third, except that *743 Scharles is named as the negligent physician.
doctors.
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646 S.W.2d 655 Court of Appeals of Texas February 17, 1983 No. 2-82-089-CV
Testimony by a medical expert of whether a defendant doctor was negligent, or of what constitutes negligence or malpractice on the part of a defendant doctor, or what that medical expert would have done, is inadmissible in a medical
Then, unless the evidence shows as a matter of law that the doctor is not negligent or that his negligence, if any, was not a proximate cause of his patient’s injury, the jury is to determine whether the doctor met the standard of
was negligent.
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441 A.2d 381 Superior Court of Pennsylvania February 5, 1982 Nos. 381, 398, 399 and 400
In each action Voyles claims that the defendant physicians treated him negligently. In the one action, Dr. Hisrich joined Doris Walker as an additional defendant, and she joined Dr. Krosnoff as an additional defendant.
Should a jury so find, the physicians would be liable to Voyles for that portion—but only that portion—of Voyles’s injuries attributable to their negligence. In Lasprogata v.
Instead, where identifiable acts of negligence of the original wrongdoer and the negligent physician are separate from each other in nature and time, the damages are accordingly apportionable.
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