at 396 , 109 S.Ct. at 1872 . 5 Many courts have found the law prohibiting excessive force to be clearly established *915 for qualified immunity purposes. See, e.g., Street v.

In Anderson , however, the Court extended the reach of qualified immunity by holding that even if the law was clearly established at the time the officer acted, the officer should be permitted to argue on summary judgment that

by the defendant, the defendant's actions violated clearly established law and are therefore not within the scope of the qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity is available if the officer did “not violate clearly established stat *39 utory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.

Simply stated, if the law the officer allegedly violated was “clearly established” there would exist no immunity, but, if not, qualified immunity would be available. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819 , 102 S.Ct. at 2738-39 .

Alleging violation of a generalized right, even though “clearly established,” would “convert the rule of qualified immunity * * * into a rule of virtually unqualified liability simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract rights

Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability if “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.

not clearly established.

To avoid application of qualified immunity, the law regarding Mornson’s right to be free from the unreasonable use of force must have been clearly established at the time of the pursuit.

Because the right was not “clearly established” on that date; and since the federal doctrine of qualified immunity was applicable, see Finch v. Wemlinger, 310 N.W.2d 66, 70 (1981); under Harlow v.

Qualified immunity shields certain public officials from liability in actions *868 brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).

Therefore, the trial court correctly held respondents had a qualified immunity protecting against liability for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 .

at 818 , 102 S.Ct. at 2738 . 1 See generally, Note, Qualified Immunity for Government Officials: The Problem of Unconstitutional Purpose in Civil Rights Litigation, 95 Yale L.J. 126 (1985).

The court of appeals found the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiffs’ rights under the Fourth Amendment were clearly established at the time of the incident. Creighton v. City of St.

immunity principles.”

"It is clearly established that a State may not discharge an employee on a basis that infringes that employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of speech.” Rankin v.

For purposes of qualified immunity, “[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what [she or] he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v.

immunity.

An official will not be personally liable under § 1983 if the official conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.

Therefore, to prevail on the issue of qualified immunity, Haavisto must show that the conduct of the officials causing the seven month delay in the diagnosis of his active tuberculosis violated his right under the Eighth Amendment

to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and that the constitutional right violated was a clearly established constitutional right in 1982 of which a reasonable prison administrator would have known.

The Eighth Circuit held that the prison officials' qualified immunity *795 barred relief because the prisoner did not establish that the officials violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the conduct

On those grounds, I would reject this argument outright. 12 In the context of qualified immunity, we have noted that a “right is clearly established when there is controlling authority or a robust consensus of cases of persuasive