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517 N.W.2d 911 Supreme Court of Minnesota June 30, 1994 No. C7-92-1622
at 396 , 109 S.Ct. at 1872 . 5 Many courts have found the law prohibiting excessive force to be clearly established *915 for qualified immunity purposes. See, e.g., Street v.
In Anderson , however, the Court extended the reach of qualified immunity by holding that even if the law was clearly established at the time the officer acted, the officer should be permitted to argue on summary judgment that
by the defendant, the defendant's actions violated clearly established law and are therefore not within the scope of the qualified immunity.
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511 N.W.2d 747 Court of Appeals of Minnesota February 1, 1994 No. C3-93-1496
The district court concluded that Stone was not a political appointee and that her dismissal violated her “clearly established right to freedom of association,” thus defeating the defense of qualified immunity.
Did the district court err in holding that the law supporting appellants’ claim was sufficiently clearly established to defeat qualified immunity? II.
Once the official asserts qualified immunity, the plaintiff “must do more than identify in the abstract a clearly established right and allege that the defendant has violated it.” Pueblo Neighborhood Health Ctrs. v.
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526 N.W.2d 209 Court of Appeals of Minnesota March 14, 1995 No. CO-94-1580
Normally, evaluating a claim of qualified immunity involves two inquiries: (1) “whether the plaintiff has alleged the violation of a clearly established constitutional right”; and (2) whether an officer could reasonably have believed
In Mitchell , the United States Supreme Court stated: Unless the plaintiff's allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the commencement
Based on this language, appellant argues that review of a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity may involve either of two issues: (1) does the plaintiff's complaint allege a violation of clearly established law?
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501 N.W.2d 683 Court of Appeals of Minnesota June 22, 1993 No. C5-93-236
State officials are entitled to qualified immunity when “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.
“The test for qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage is an objective one.” Johnson v. Hay, 931 F.2d 456, 460 (8th Cir.1991).
Unless the plaintiffs allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before commencement of discovery. Mitchell v.
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453 N.W.2d 31 Supreme Court of Minnesota March 23, 1990 No. C8-88-2614
Qualified immunity is available if the officer did “not violate clearly established stat *39 utory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.
Simply stated, if the law the officer allegedly violated was “clearly established” there would exist no immunity, but, if not, qualified immunity would be available. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819 , 102 S.Ct. at 2738-39 .
Alleging violation of a generalized right, even though “clearly established,” would “convert the rule of qualified immunity * * * into a rule of virtually unqualified liability simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract rights
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708 N.W.2d 475 Supreme Court of Minnesota January 10, 2006 No. A04-729
Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability if “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.
not clearly established.
To avoid application of qualified immunity, the law regarding Mornson’s right to be free from the unreasonable use of force must have been clearly established at the time of the pursuit.
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547 N.W.2d 448 Court of Appeals of Minnesota May 14, 1996 No. C2-95-2434
State officials are entitled to qualified immunity when “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.
Where officers of reasonable competence would disagree on the issue, qualified immunity should apply. Id. at 345 , 106 S.Ct. at 1098 . “The test for qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage is an objective one.”
Unless the plaintiffs allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before commencement of discovery. Mitchell v.
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361 N.W.2d 865 Supreme Court of Minnesota February 8, 1985 No. C3-83-640
Because the right was not “clearly established” on that date; and since the federal doctrine of qualified immunity was applicable, see Finch v. Wemlinger, 310 N.W.2d 66, 70 (1981); under Harlow v.
Qualified immunity shields certain public officials from liability in actions *868 brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
Therefore, the trial court correctly held respondents had a qualified immunity protecting against liability for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 .
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428 N.W.2d 453 Court of Appeals of Minnesota August 23, 1988 No. C1-88-610
qualified immunity.
violate appellants’ right to equal protection; therefore, they are entitled to qualified immunity.
The “clearly established right” required under Harlow must be more particularized than, as in this case, the right to be free from racial discrimination. See Anderson v.
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480 N.W.2d 121 Court of Appeals of Minnesota January 21, 1992 No. C5-91-37
Morris, 453 N.W.2d 31, 40 (Minn.1990) (issue of qualified immunity is appropriately resolved on summary judgment); Reuter v.
City of New Hope, 449 N.W.2d 745, 749 (Minn.App.1990) (summary judgment is the most appropriate means for addressing issue of qualified immunity), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 28, 1990).
Whether qualified immunity exists turns on whether the officials violated clearly-established statutory or constitutional rights, the existence of which a reasonable person would have known. Elwood, 423 N.W.2d at 674-75 .
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763 N.W.2d 646 Court of Appeals of Minnesota March 31, 2009 No. A08-0765
Qualified Immunity Appellant challenges the district court’s determination that appellant’s section 1983 liberty- and property-interest counts could not proceed against Maturi because he is entitled to qualified immunity.
Qualified immunity protects “government officials performing discretionary functions ... from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
Maturi, as a government official, receives the protections of qualified immunity when performing dis *655 cretionary functions unless he could reasonably be expected to recognize that his conduct would violate clearly established
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423 N.W.2d 671 Supreme Court of Minnesota May 6, 1988 No. CX-87-1597
at 818 , 102 S.Ct. at 2738 . 1 See generally, Note, Qualified Immunity for Government Officials: The Problem of Unconstitutional Purpose in Civil Rights Litigation, 95 Yale L.J. 126 (1985).
The court of appeals found the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiffs’ rights under the Fourth Amendment were clearly established at the time of the incident. Creighton v. City of St.
immunity principles.”
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498 N.W.2d 746 Court of Appeals of Minnesota June 9, 1993 Nos. C0-92-1719, C7-92-1720
immunity grounds if they can show plaintiff's Eighth Amendment right to be free from the "cruel and unusual" conditions was not clearly established during the time he was incarcerated); Bogard, 586 F.2d at 409 (problem of qualified
Whether qualified immunity exists turns on whether the official violated a clearly established statutory or constitutional right, the existence of which a reasonable person would have known. Id. at 674-75.
Id. at 957-58 . [1] *755 Public officials are entitled to the affirmative defense of qualified immunity unless "the officials' conduct violated `clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
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637 N.W.2d 286 Court of Appeals of Minnesota December 18, 2001 No. C8-01-827
A governmental official performing discretionary functions is entitled to qualified immunity if the official’s conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional or statutory rights that a reasonable person would have known
A police officer is denied qualified immunity only where “it is obvious that no reasonably competent police officer would have concluded” that his actions were legal. Medley, 475 U.S. at 342, 106 S.Ct. at 1096.
Evaluating a claim of qualified immunity involves two inquiries: (1) “whether the plaintiff has alleged the violation of a clearly established constitutional right”; and (2) whether an officer could reasonably have believed his actions
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449 N.W.2d 745 Court of Appeals of Minnesota January 2, 1990 No. C0-89-1337
Although the right to be free from unreasonable seizures is a clearly established right, the Supreme Court of the United States has said that a general constitutional violation alone does not dissolve the qualified immunity.
DECISION Officers Erickson and Campbell are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law against the Reuters’ section 1983 claims.
The Reuters failed to present evidence that the officers violated a clearly established law or acted in an objectively unreasonable manner.
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497 N.W.2d 314 Court of Appeals of Minnesota May 11, 1993 No. C7-92-1622
Under this objective standard, officials are entitled to qualified immunity when “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Id.
Qualified immunity is denied only when “it is obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded” that the defendant’s actions were legal. Malley v.
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419 N.W.2d 799 Court of Appeals of Minnesota February 23, 1988 No. C7-87-1556
ISSUE Did the trial court err in failing to apply an objective standard to appellants’ claim of qualified immunity pursuant to Harlow v. Fitzgerald? DISCUSSION Under the standard set forth in Harlow v.
Whether the law was clearly established is a threshold question; if the trial court finds the law was not clearly established when the conduct occurred, “the inquiry ceases” and “the official is entitled to summary judgment as a matter
The scope of the qualified immunity doctrine is broad: As the qualified immunity defense has evolved, it provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law. Malley v.
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472 N.W.2d 100 Supreme Court of Minnesota June 21, 1991 No. C5-90-397
"It is clearly established that a State may not discharge an employee on a basis that infringes that employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of speech.” Rankin v.
For purposes of qualified immunity, “[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what [she or] he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v.
immunity.
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458 N.W.2d 714 Court of Appeals of Minnesota August 7, 1990 No. C6-89-2265
First Amendment Claims The federal standard of qualified immunity applies in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought in Minnesota courts. *717 Finch v. Wemlinger, 310 N.W.2d 66, 70 (Minn.1981).
Balancing these interests in the context of qualified immunity moves the fulcrum on which the decision turns.
To penetrate the government officials’ qualified immunity, the balance must be in favor of the employee to a degree that evidences a clearly established right.
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494 N.W.2d 77 Court of Appeals of Minnesota December 29, 1992 No. C5-92-1070
that were ‘clearly established’ at the time it was taken.”
The scope of the qualified immunity doctrine is broad. McIntire v. State, 419 N.W.2d 799, 802 (Minn.App.1988), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 20, 1988).
If the allegedly violated law is a clearly established one, however, the immunity defense ordinarily will fail, since a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his or her conduct.