The Court granted Youngblood qualified immunity on the basis that he did not violate any of Boreen’s clearly established rights of which a reasonable person should have known.

Youngblood is raising the qualified immunity defense on the basis that Boreen’s protected property interest in her employment was not a clearly established right at the time she was constructively discharged.

Because we hold that Boreen’s property interest in her employment was not clearly established in April of 1990, we need not reach the second prong of the Harlow test for granting qualified immunity.

Did the District Court err in granting Defendant Capp qualified immunity on the basis that it was not clearly established at the time of Losleben’s discharge from employment that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause gives

to qualified immunity

¶14 In determining whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity, we ordinarily begin with a two-part analysis: (1) we consider whether the law governing the official’s conduct was clearly established at the time of the

Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from civil damages “ ‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

— was clearly established at the time of the conduct giving rise to the litigation.

As discussed above, our threshold inquiry in addressing qualified immunity is whether the due process right arising from Orozco’s liberty interest in good time credits was clearly established at the time of the individual defendants

There, the federal district court had denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, concluding that the defendant’s actions violated clearly established law, and the Third Circuit held that the order

Reiterating the well-established standard of qualified immunity articulated in Harlow v.

Stated more narrowly, the Mitchell Court concluded that the Circuit Courts have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from a federal district court’s denial of qualified immunity where the basis for the denial is that clearly established

Under these circumstances, we conclude that Zenker was entitled, at the very least, to qualified immunity for those actions. C.

Qualified immunity still protects Zenker ¶34 Where allegedly injurious conduct arguably falls outside of the *429 quasi-judicial functions, the prosecutor’s conduct is entitled to qualified immunity rather than absolute immunity

“The doctrine of qualified immunity operates to shield government officials performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

We now turn to the issue of whether the Officers’ failure to knock and announce was reasonable for purposes of determining qualified immunity.

¶42 b) Was the knock and announce rule clearly established in the context of the situation the Officers confronted when entering Cassady’s home?

Instead, the Court remanded to consider whether the law was clearly established in a more ‘“particularized sense’” to answer the question of qualified immunity. Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 199 , 125 S.Ct. at 599 .

In analyzing whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity, a court must identify the right violated, determine whether the right was clearly established at the time of the violation and, if the right was clearly established

¶ 119 As we discussed above in addressing the issue of qualified immunity, it was not clearly established prior to this case that a law enforcement officer's entry into a person's residence and seizure of property therein pursuant

The majority's decision to affirm the dismissal of Brophy and Stillwater County is based on the same unsound conclusion on which its qualified immunity decision is based—i.e., that Dorwart had no clearly established right prior to

Sacco contends that in the instant case, her clearly established right to be free from arrest without probable cause was violated by Dighans.

Harlow presents a two-pronged test to determine whether an official will be granted qualified immunity — first, we must consider whether a clearly established right has been violated and second, we must determine whether a reasonable

See § 2-9-305(5), MCA.8 ¶20 Lawellin is also personally protected by qualified immunity under Pearson, which provides that individual government officials are immune from 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil damages when their conduct “does

not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Ct. at 815-23 (law enforcement officers were entitled to qualified immunity, and thereby immune from civil damages, because their conduct was not a constitutional violation).

Skuletich and Scott are entitled to qualified immunity unless Jacobsen can establish that they violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. See, e.g., Harlow v.

established” at the time.

Ct. at 2815 (government officer “entitled to dismissal” of compensatory civil claim due to qualified immunity “[u]nless the [complaint] allegations” are facially sufficient to “state a claim of violation of clearly established”

qualified immunity claims”). 3. Rule 12(b)(6) Application of Absolute and Qualified Prosecutorial Immunity to Obert’s Direct Tort Claim Against County Attorney Swanson.

We conclude that neither Wonnacott's notification nor his recommendation violated any of Lewis' clearly established statutory or constitutional rights and, thus, that the first part of the Harlow test has not been satisfied; as a result

We hold that the District Court did not err in concluding that Wonnacott was entitled to qualified immunity against Lewis' 5 1983 claim for monetary damages and in granting summary judgment to Wonnacott on that basis. 2.