Qualified immunity protects police officers “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

It is clear from the Supreme Court’s description of the second, “clearly established” step of the qualified immunity analysis that the second step, in turn, has two aspects.

Under the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis, the trial court determined that the plaintiffs right to be free from confinement under the circumstances in this case “was not clearly established,” and that “the officers

Clearly Established Right We now turn to the second part of the qualified immunity test, whether Porter’s First Amendment rights were clearly established at the time Lafond constructively terminated him.

Based upon the evidence that was presented at trial, we conclude that Porter’s , First Amendment right to speak out was clearly established at the time of his constructive termination. 3.

that the constructive discharge constituted a constitutional violation, we conclude that the trial court correctly ruled that Lafond is not entitled to qualified immunity.

We begin by reviewing the doctrine of qualified immunity. The doctrine of qualified immunity is a creature of federal law. Id. at 42 .

“In resolving questions of qualified immunity at summary judgment, courts engage in a two-pronged inquiry.” Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1865 (2014).

Thus, the mere fact that Sheehan relied upon the unofficial policy does not necessarily preclude the application of qualified immunity. 3.

Under the doctrine, “government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from *43 liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

We have employed a three-part test to determine whether a public official is entitled to qualified immunity: (1) whether a plaintiff has established a constitutional violation; (2) whether that right was clearly established at the

The defendants next contend that Porter is entitled to qualified immunity.

“Government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

; (2) whether that right was clearly established at the. time of the violation; and (3) whether a similarly situated reasonable official would have understood the constitutional right at issue.

In a case of either variety, qualified immunity may be raised as a defense to a claim against a governmental official for money damages. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, supra at 818 n.31.

Thus, the law on which the plaintiff rests his claim was “clearly established” long before *238 the State defendants took their actions, and their presumptive knowledge, see Borucki v.

Ryan, 827 F.2d at 838 , of the Constantineau-Roth standards, as clarified in Paul , bars them from sustaining their claim of qualified immunity to the first cause of action, for violating a liberty interest.