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Indiana Court of Appeals December 30, 2014 No. 71A03-1404-CT-109Not cited Unpublished
Lee filed a proposed complaint with the Indiana Department of Insurance on December 12, 2012, alleging that the Doctor was negligent in failing to diagnose him with PTSD.
The Doctor filed a petition in the Lake County Superior court requesting a preliminary determination of law and filed a motion for summary judgment. On May 15, 2013, Lee requested a change of venue to St.
The undisputed facts designated for summary judgment reveal that the Doctor did not treat Lee at any time after July 27, 2010. Consequently, the alleged negligence could only have occurred on or before that date.
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Indiana Court of Appeals July 24, 2012 No. 53A05-1109-CT-488Not cited Unpublished
Using the section 323 analysis, a plaintiff must show that the doctor was negligent, the negligent act increased the risk of harm to the patient, and the negligence was a substantial factor causing the plaintiff’s harm.
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Indiana Court of Appeals June 14, 2013 No. 49A02-1301-MI-13Not cited Unpublished
Our supreme court held that the plaintiff’s claim 1 The Estate argues that Boggs and Overton are distinguishable because neither involved the negligence of a physician with an ongoing patient-physician relationship and Kleckner had
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Indiana Court of Appeals July 16, 2013 No. 20A03-1205-PL-235Not cited Unpublished
Generally, in order to establish a claim of medical malpractice, the plaintiff must establish by expert medical testimony (1) the applicable standard of care required by Indiana law, (2) how the defendant doctor breached that standard
of care, and (3) that the defendant doctor’s negligence in doing so was the proximate cause of the injuries complained of.
When the defendant doctor is the moving party and can show that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to any one of the aforementioned elements, the defendant doctor is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
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Indiana Court of Appeals December 27, 2013 No. 40A04-1304-PL-184Not cited Unpublished
Analysis The controversy between the parties distills to whether Shipley’s action was timely commenced in accordance with the Act, which requires claims to be filed within two years of the allegedly negligent act or omission.
Anonymous Doctor A and Anonymous Hospital C point out that Shipley’s surgeries preceded her filing of the proposed complaint with the IDOI by more than two years.7 Shipley responds that she attempted 7 The filing of a proposed
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Indiana Court of Appeals December 27, 2013 No. 49A02-1211-CT-943Not cited Unpublished
We think that loss of chance is better understood as a description of the injury than as either a term for a separate cause of action or a surrogate for the causation element of a negligence claim.
If a plaintiff seeks recovery specifically for what the plaintiff alleges the doctor to have caused, i.e., a decrease in the patient’s probability of recovery, rather than for the ultimate 16 outcome, causation is no longer debatable
James argued during the trial and reiterates the argument on appeal that the physicians and staff at Clarian altered documents pertaining to James’s care and fraudulently concealed the precise nature of Clarian’s negligence to Jessica
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Indiana Court of Appeals December 31, 2012 No. 82A04-1202-CT-56Not cited Unpublished
It is well settled that, “[i]n a medical malpractice action based on ordinary negligence, the plaintiff must establish (1) a duty on the part of the defendant physician in relation to the plaintiff, (2) failure of the physician
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Indiana Court of Appeals May 22, 2013 No. 68A05-1209-JT-490Not cited Unpublished
He was still living in the home when doctors diagnosed N.S. with failure to thrive. We are unconvinced by Father’s argument that N.S. was removed solely because of Mother’s negligence.