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51 A.2d 632 Supreme Court of New Hampshire March 4, 1947 No. 3637.
There is evidence from which a jury could find causal negligence on the part of the defendant physician that resulted in unnecessary physical and mental suffering.
This was the first child for this couple and the jury could find that they were not necessarily negligent in failing to recognize the true facts and to give the doctor a more accurate description of the situation.
The plaintiff is entitled to recover however for any and all pains of childbirth and of the following bodily condition that were not prevented or eased because of the negligent failure of the physician to attend or to prescribe.
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534 A.2d 720 Supreme Court of New Hampshire November 9, 1987 No. 87-133
In order to respond to the district court’s inquiries, we must first clarify the nature of our physician-patient privilege and the extent to which it is available in medical negligence actions.
The district court’s inquiry as to whether the plaintiff in a medical negligence action may refuse to permit a defendant to interview her treating physicians ex parte presents a question that courts in other jurisdictions have examined
We therefore hold that a plaintiff who places her medical condition at issue in an action for medical negligence does not waive the physician-patient privilege so as to permit defendants to interview treating physicians ex parte.
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776 A.2d 1270 Supreme Court of New Hampshire June 22, 2001 No. 99-188
Mauriello, 603 A.2d 827, 830-31 (Del. 1992) (holding “mere error of judgment” instruction permits jury to incorrectly conclude physician may not be liable even if negligent); Parodi v.
A doctor is not negligent simply because his or her efforts prove unsuccessful.
The fact that a doctor may have chosen a method of treatment that later proves to be unsuccessful is not negligence if the treatment chosen was an accepted treatment on the basis of the information available to the doctor at the time
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465 A.2d 1221 Supreme Court of New Hampshire August 31, 1983 No. 82-425
and the hospital for negligent treatment of the injury.
treating physician, unless the settlement fully compensated the injured party.
Carter, 79 N.H. 150 , 106 A. 602 (1919), is recognized as one of the earliest applications of the doctrine that a release of the original tortfeasor does not of itself bar an action against a physician for negligent treatment of the
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36 A.2d 633 Supreme Court of New Hampshire March 7, 1944 No. 3463.
On such a state of facts it is probably doubtful if the defendant can be charged with negligence. There is no evidence that defendant could and should have seen the doctor in time to have avoided the accident.
But we do not have to decide whether the evidence fails to prove negligence on the part of the defendant, for it conclusively appears that the doctor was contributorily negligent.
Though 83 years of age, the doctor was in full possession of his faculties, very active, in good health, of good hearing and good eyesight.
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399 A.2d 608 Supreme Court of New Hampshire February 28, 1979 No. 78-138
These are actions against individual doctors employed by the New Hampshire Hospital, the superintendent of the hospital, and the State hospital itself for the negligent treatment of an involuntarily committed mental patient.
This is not to say that an action may be maintained for negligent treatment when a doctor decided to employ one type of an accepted therapy as opposed to another type. See Bartlett, v. State, 52 App.
JUR. 2d Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 106 (1972). The plaintiff must still prove by a preponderance of evidence that “negligent acts or omissions” in the performance of the doctor’s duties caused her injuries.
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178 A.2d 502 Supreme Court of New Hampshire March 6, 1962 No. 4997
There was no evidence presented upon which the defendant physician could reasonably be found negligent in ordering the bedrails removed.
The evidence likewise discloses no reason to attribute negligence to the defendant hospital in following the order of the attending physician, or in failing to seek to have it modified.
There was no claim that the training of the witness in any way qualified her to express an opinion that the physician was negligent in giving the order, and no showing that the standard of care exercised by hospitals in Manchester
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512 A.2d 1126 Supreme Court of New Hampshire July 17, 1986 No. 85-099
In this medical malpractice case the plaintiff sued Portsmouth Hospital and Doctors Eugene B. Andes and Frank A. Graf for negligence in connection with their medical treatment of her husband following an automobile accident.
In Hicks , the plaintiff, who was the administrator of a deceased woman’s estate, alleged that the woman’s death was caused by the negligence of a doctor who failed to properly diagnose and treat the *303 woman.
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931 A.2d 1203 Supreme Court of New Hampshire August 9, 2007 No. 2006-151
It also provided that the hospital would be responsible for billing all charges related to the EKG services and paying the doctor for those services.
The Follonis also argued that Exeter Hospital was vicariously liable for the doctors’ negligence under the doctrine of apparent authority.
On count five, the trial court ruled that the physicians who treated Helen Folloni were independent contractors; thus, Exeter Hospital could not be vicariously liable for their negligence.
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883 A.2d 319 Supreme Court of New Hampshire September 8, 2005 No. 2004-422
Specifically, the plaintiffs discussed the issue of negligence, various elements of Bisson’s and Parkland Physician Services’ negligence, and their burden of proof.
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786 A.2d 859 Supreme Court of New Hampshire December 11, 2001 No. 2001-049
Nadeau, J.) erred in: (1) allowing an ophthalmologist to testify as to the standard of care for an emergency room physician; (2) ruling that there was sufficient evidence to prove that Dr.
Stem’s alleged negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury; (3) admitting into evidence a chart showing excerpts of a witness’s testimony written by plaintiffs counsel as he examined the witness; (4) admitting into
Stein’s personnel file; and (5) allowing plaintiffs counsel in closing argument to say that the jury could find the doctor negligent for his failure to supervise the physician’s assistant working with him in the emergency room.
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668 A.2d 50 Supreme Court of New Hampshire December 19, 1995 No. 93-343
The plaintiff, April Chase, brought a multi-count negligence action against the defendants, Mary Hitchcock Memorial Hospital and Doctors William Young, Barry Smith, and John Ketterer, following the induced delivery and subsequent death
The plaintiff sued the hospital and several doctors alleging negligence and, on behalf of the infant, wrongful death. Prior to trial, the defendants moved in limine to limit the testimony of the plaintiff’s medical expert, Dr.
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428 A.2d 1250 Supreme Court of New Hampshire April 17, 1981 No. 80-389
Because it appeared that the defendant might be charged with negligent homicide, the police had a doctor take a sample of the defendant’s blood without his consent. The defendant was eventually charged with negligent homicide.
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133 A. 4 Supreme Court of New Hampshire March 2, 1926
In none of these cases was any distinction made between negligence of the owner and of his servants.
Cases holding an employer not responsible for the negligence of a doctor furnished by him if due care in engaging a competent doctor is used are readily to be distinguished, as a doctor is not the employer’s agent or servant.
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64 A. 190 Supreme Court of New Hampshire June 5, 1906
Hospital, 120 Mass. 432 , which deny the liability of the defendant to a patient for the negligence of the attending physician or surgeon, seem to concede that if the corporate officers have been negligent in selecting' subordinate
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149 A. 512 Supreme Court of New Hampshire March 4, 1930
The physician intended to apply a proper amount of heat only. Through his negligence he made an excessive application. This is as much an accident as though he had carelessly dropped a red hot iron upon his patient.
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498 A.2d 334 Supreme Court of New Hampshire August 15, 1985 Nos. 84-286; No. 84-323
*159 In this case, the question was, first, whether the decedent’s delay in consulting a doctor in 1980 was negligent; and second, whether that delay was in some measure a cause of his death.
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770 A.2d 1103 Supreme Court of New Hampshire April 4, 2001 No. 99-179
The loss of opportunity doctrine, in its many forms, is a medical malpractice form of recovery which allows a plaintiff, whose preexisting injury or illness is aggravated by the alleged negligence of a physician or health care worker
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653 A.2d 561 Supreme Court of New Hampshire January 31, 1995 No. 90-363
He argues, inter alia, that the trial court erroneously excluded evidence that the victim would not have died but for the negligence of his treating physicians, and that his twin *351 convictions of manslaughter and assault violate
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914 A.2d 1218 Supreme Court of New Hampshire December 19, 2006 No. 2006-024
The trial court interpreted the New Hampshire Insurance Guaranty Association Act (Guaranty Act), RSA 404-B:l et seq. (1998), not to require NHIGA to partially reimburse OB/GYN for the payment OB/GYN made to settle a professional negligence
action against itself and one of its physicians whose professional liability insurer had become insolvent.
OB/GYN argues that the Covenant policy provided no coverage for the estate’s claims because it expressly excluded coverage for the negligence *562 of physicians providing direct care to patients.