The Grecos, mother and child, in this case seek to recover damages from the United States arising out of the negligence of physicians who, they claim, negligently failed to make a timely diagnosis of physical defects and anomalies

We note that the mother is not claiming that her child’s defects were caused by her physicians’ negligence; rather, she claims that her physicians’ negligence kept her ignorant of those defects and that it was this negligence which

The damage Sundi Greco has sustained is indeed causally related to her physicians’ malpractice. Sundi Greco’s claim here can be compared to one in which a physician negligently fails to diagnose cancer in a patient.

for negligent treatment of the injury where the injured person claims new and additional injury directly and proximately caused by the negligence and carelessness of the physician and surgeon and further where the injured party makes

It does not in terms contain a reservation of the right to seek compensation from the doctors treating appellant’s injury, for negligence in such treatment.

“It is settled that where one who has suffered personal injuries by reason of the tortious act of another exercises due care in securing the services of a doctor and his injuries are aggravated by the negligence of such doctor, the

in furnishing plaintiff an unskilled and negligent doctor to give him "first-aid treatment.”

Plaintiff’s second cause of action, which was based upon the alleged negligence of the doctor in giving the "first-aid treatment," was voluntarily dismissed by plaintiff; but, notwithstanding the dismissal, the court, at plaintiff’

of the doctor who gave the "first-aid treatment."

On September 30, 1985, appellants, Charles and Beverly Oehler, filed a complaint against respondent and numerous physicians, including Dr. Christensen, alleging that they had negligently treated her medical problems.

First, appellants contend that a hospital can be held liable for negligently supervising a nonemployee physician with medical staff privileges under the corporate negligence theory of liability.

Therefore, a hospital may be liable for the negligent *351 supervision of a nonemployee physician who has staff privileges under the corporate negligence theory of liability.

urged by respondents, the following is most fundamental: the respondents’ position would bar any recovery in tort on behalf of the survivors of many potentially terminal patients, no matter how blatant the health care provider’s negligence

Through negligence, a physician or other health care provider could reduce a patient’s chances of survival from as high as fifty percent to, for example, ten percent, and yet remain unanswerable in the law of tort.

In such circumstances, discovery of the physical injury is actually simultaneous with discovery of the only possible cause, and obvious negligence.

In contrast, the damage here was consistent with postoperative recovery, and treatment was continued under the operating doctor who reassured the patient that there was no permanent damage.

Appellant’s discovery of symptoms of dropped foot does not necessarily mean that she had discovered negligence, or that she had cause to suspect negligence. Her doctor showed no great concern until several months later.

negligence claim as to the doctors was proper.

The district court also found that the de Beckers' ordinary negligence claim was actually a claim for professional negligence. Further, 3The doctors' motion to dismiss was based on the de Beckers' original complaint.

negligence claims was not met because the assertions therein were general and not specifically delineated as to each doctor.

sought injunctive relief and claimed rights to recover damages under theories of negligence and unjust enrichment based upon the statute.

The Insurance Companies moved to dismiss the Doctors’ action with prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that (1) the Doctors have no private right of action under the statute to bring suit in district court; (2

Because the Doctors’ negligence and other claims stemmed solely from their untimely payment allegations, those claims are also subject to the administrative scheme and NDOI’s exclusive original jurisdiction. 23 See County of Clark

Next, a “complaint-letter” was sent, on September 6, 1967, to the Joint Screening Panel of the Washoe County Medical Society and the Washoe County Bar Association, charging Doctor Greear with professional negligence.

A hearing was held by that board on December 12, 1967, and the board concluded that there was no possible basis for the negligence charge.

He never was served, and so, 4 years after the act of negligence allegedly occurred, and 2 years after the complaint had been filed against him, Doctor Greear filed his 41(e) motion to dismiss for want of prosecution.

The Board’s power was not exercised for the proper and commendable purpose of protecting the public from incompetent and negligent physicians.

Instead, the Board wielded its power to ruin the career of an outspoken physician while simultaneously protecting a possibly negligent or incompetent practitioner who had questionable billing procedures.

Apparently, her bed sores resulted either from her refusal to follow directions, or her inability to do so, and were not traceable to any conduct of the doctor. In October 1974, Milan Jeffers contacted attorney Bull.

McCuskey with malpractice, and the Physicians’ Hospital with negligence then was filed.

That as a direct and proximate result of the negligence of the defendants ... it was necessary for plaintiff to have and procure competent physicians and surgeons... . IX.

[T]hat by reason of the negligence of the defendants ... plaintiff has suffered and will continue in the future to suffer loss of income... .

Gary Hoffman, alleging that the negligence of these doctors had been the cause of Alexander’s injuries. Just prior to trial, appellants reached a monetary settlement with Dr.

The plain language of NRS 41A.071 makes no mention of professional negligence. NRS 41A.071 refers expressly to “medical malpractice,” which in turn is defined as pertaining to physicians, hospitals, and hospital employees.

App. 1979) (“ ‘It is settled that an action against a doctor arising out of his negligent treatment of a patient is an action sounding in tort and not one based upon a contract.’ ” (quoting Bellah v. Greenson, 146 Cal.

The intent of the 2004 amendments that resulted in the definition of professional negligence was to overlay and expand the same protections that the Legislature attempted to provide for doctors in the state during the special legislative

Further, to say that nurses are exempt from the NRS 41A.071 affidavit requirement would also require that physicians be exempt because claims for medical malpractice and professional negligence against physicians are identical claims

As such, we conclude that NRS 41A.071 requires the attachment of expert affidavits for professional negligence claims against providers of health care, including nurses and nurse practitioners, as well as doctors, for any non-res ipsa

appellant’s instruction deviated from prior holdings that were consistent with the traditional view regarding medical standards of care, (2) NRS 41 A. 100 (1) (1979) .was “a general rule requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate the alleged negligence

of a physicián with expert testimony,” and (3) there was insufficient expert testimony to support an informed-consent instruction. 16 We revisited the issue of a physician’s failure to obtain a patient’s informed consent in

Although NRS 41A. 100(1), which requires expert medical testimony in negligence actions against physicians, dentists, registered *238 nurses or licensed hospitals, does not name chiropractors, we cannot agree with Bronneke’s position

Liability for failure to obtain informed consent is grounded in negligence, in the sense that it is negligent for a doctor to fail to inform patients of certain risks. 5 Although Capanna had not been decided at the time the

Under this two-part test, state-employed physicians enjoy immunity from medical malpractice liability only when their allegedly negligent acts involve elements of judgment or choice, and the judgment or choice made is of the kind that

Jane, 13 determined that physician faculty members of a state university medical school were not immune from negligence actions brought by university hospital patients.

U.S., 850 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1988) (concluding that a claim that a government doctor rendered negligent medical treatment, unaccompanied by any discretionary, policy-based conduct, falls outside the parameters of the discretionary-function