Smith was liable, the plaintiff alleged, for the negligence of the physicians in treating her injuries.

Powell’s injuries were aggravated by the negligent treatment of his physician, Dr. Troland.

It is true, as the present defendant-physicians point out, that in Powell we referred to the original wrongdoer and the negligent treating physician as joint tort-feasors.

The rule is well settled that where one has received a personal injury as a result of the negligence of another and pursues due care in the selection of a physician or surgeon to treat the injuries and they are aggravated by the negligent

E. 7 .58, a personal representative of the deceased employee sued an insurance carrier and a physician, charging that the insurance carrier was negligent in employing a physician who negligently treated the injuries of her intestate

He alleged that the carrier was negligent in employing unskilled physicians to attend his injuries and that the physicians were guilty of negligence in their treatment.

Eblen, 461 S.W.2d 370 (Ky. 1970), a plaintiff failed to perform exercises prescribed by his physician following the physician’s negligent care.

The court held that “to be contributory, negligence must be contemporaneous with the main fact charged as negligence, and that the patient’s negligence after dismissal of the physician or his abandonment of the case, does not bar recovery

for the negligence of the [physician], committed before termination of the relation.”

Sanchez urges this Court to hold that a hospital can be vicariously liable for the alleged negligence of a doctor working in the hospital's emergency room as an independent contractor on the theory of apparent or ostensible agency.

of emergency room physicians who were not employees of the hospitals but independent contractors.

Litvak, 682 P.2d 41 , 53-54 (Colo.1984) (hospital not liable for the negligence of a treating physician after patient was admitted to the hospital).

The company had always employed an adequate number of competent doctors, and no complaint is now made either of the insufficient number of doctors, or of the competency of the (doctor of whom complaint is made, but only of his negligence

If he was competent, but negligent in the particular case, and there was no contract for medical service except that of the company doctor, the company is not liable for his negligence. As said in Big Stone Gap Iron Co. v.

It is not alleged that there were not enough doctors, nor that the “company doctor” was incompetent, but only that he was negligent, and of this negligence no notice to the company is alleged.

The general rule is that if an injured person uses ordinary care in selecting a physician for treatment of his injury, the law regards the aggravation of the injury result *225 ing from the negligent act of the physician as a part

This rule is based on the theory that the aggravation of the injury by the negligent treatment of the physician is a result that might reasonably have been anticipated.

Fitzporter called in another physician and they treated the plaintiff. Later the plaintiff executed a paper releasing Dr. Fitzporter from all liability flowing from the negligent operation of the automobile.

And it is the general rule that there can be no recovery in a malpractice suit by one who has sustained personal injuries in consequence of a third person’s negligence, against a physician for negligent aggravation of such injuries

A settlement with the original tort feasor operates as a release of the negligent physician. [Citations omitted.]

of another and pursues due care in the selection of a physician or surgeon to treat the injuries and they are aggravated by the negligent treatment of such physician or surgeon, the person causing the original injury is liable for

Here, the defendant doctors assert that Philip Morris disposes of the plaintiff’s indemnity claim since the claims against Canterbury’s driver and the doctors are claims of active negligence.

Here, while the negligence of Canterbury’s driver and the alleged negligence of defendant doctors is different, the injuries are also different.

McLaughlin and Schirmer and, during the course of her litigation against Canterbury, “affirmatively took the position that the defendant physicians were not negligent.”

581.16, and that there is no allegation of negligence on the part of the doctor in performing the operation.

No cause of action would exist without such an allegation since the negligence in credentialing the doctor could not have been the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury unless the doctor negligently performed the surgery.

If the doctor is not alleged to have acted negligently, there is no cause of action against the Hospital.

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff was contributorily negligent by, inter alia, failing to contact his physician and inquire about his X-ray results. The Court finds that Lawrence v.

Wirth, 226 Va. 408 (1983), controls this dispute: “To be contributory, negligence must be contemporaneous with the main fact charged as negligence, and ... the patient’s negligence after dismissal of the physician or his abandonment

of the case does not bar recovery for the negligence of the physician committed before termination of the relation.”

knowledge and experience a bad result affords no presumption of negligence.

There are authorities to the effect that the failure of a surgeon to remove a foreign substance from a patient’s body constitutes negligence per se. 2 In 41 Am.

of negligence on the part of a physician or surgeon does not arise from the mere unfavorable result of an operation or treatment.

In her motion for judgment, Nawal alleged that each of the defendant-physicians “acted contrary to acceptable standards of medical care by wrongfully and negligently failing timely to diagnose coronary artery disease in . . .

Hadeed, and to examine and treat him for [the] disease;” that because the defendant-physicians were agents of Medic-24, the negligence of the defendant-physicians was imputed to Medic-24; and that the negligence of all defendants proximately

In Brown , we discussed negligence and proximate cause in the context of a medical malpractice death case.

The secondary authorities are generally agreed that an operating surgeon is not liable for the negligence of another doctor *385 who is acting independently.

App. 1985) (operating doctor was held not liable for the negligence of nurses employed by the hospital in failing to discover post-operative bleeding); Shull v.

Hanson, 338 F.2d 244 (8th Cir. 1964), which held that a doctor who erroneously treated the wrong leg of a patient was not liable for the subsequent negligence of another doctor who continued that erroneous treatment because the second

(2) If he was negligent, was his negligence a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries? The court further instructed the jury that A doctor has a duty to obtain his patient's informed consent before he treats her.

We have held that the plaintiff in an informed consent case must prove not only that the physician was negligent but also "that the negligent act was a proximate cause of her injury."

A surgery performed without consent may include (1) the intentional tort of battery, (2) an operation for which the plaintiff did not consent or had withdrawn her consent, but the physician negligently, rather than deliberately, performed

whose actions are alleged to have been negligent.

It is plaintiffs claim that Jones’ death was caused by the negligent administration of the Oxytocin by her treating physicians.

’ negligence.

defendant demurs to the claims of negligence as against him based on the neglect of nurses.

Next, there are the issues of whether the doctor defendant can be held personally or vicariously liable based on the alleged negligence of nurses.

The court believes that, without an allegation that the doctor was negligent in providing any instructions with regard to post-operative care, in the selection of such persons for the provision of such care, or that such persons stood

The motion is based upon the alleged negligence of the physician when forcibly delivering her of her second child, and in failing to give her proper surgical or medical attention thereafter.

exercised by reputable physicians in similar cases; and that they can be held responsible only in case their patients suffer because of their negligence.

A patient may not recover damages simply because he does not get well, and where actionable negligence is alleged against a physician it must be established by the evidence.

There, the negligent physician had allowed his license to lapse.

Affirmed. 1 Both sides to this controversy recognize that a small percentage of prostatic surgery patients may suffer total incontinence despite the absence of negligence on the part of the physician in performing the surgery.

Brownlee claims here, however, that his total incontinence resulted from the post-operative negligence of Dr. Schwartz and not as an incident of the surgery. 2 MMC is an S corporation chartered in Delaware.