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401 P.2d 350 Washington Supreme Court January 7, 1965 No. 37100
The bus company and driver answered and cross-complained against the doctor and Group Health, alleging that the sole cause of the accident was the negligence of the doctor.
The doctor and Group Health denied negligence and claimed that the driver was hypersensitive to pyribenzamine.
The negligence of the bus driver is a jury question, and should the jury find the bus driver to be negligent, the doctor would nevertheless be liable if the jury finds he failed to give warning of the side effects of the drug, since
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864 P.2d 921 Washington Supreme Court December 23, 1993 No. 58986-1
Under this ruling, if the Hospital were found to be negligent, it would be entitled to an offset, or credit, from the settlement with the doctors.
As part of his ruling, the trial judge determined the Hospital could not present expert evidence the doctors violated any standard of care. However, the trial court did not entirely foreclose the issue of the doctors’ negligence.
The Hospital did not attempt to introduce evidence, or make an offer of proof, that either of the two doctors had been negligent.
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595 P.2d 934 Washington Supreme Court May 31, 1979 No. 45737
Dengel, alleging the doctor negligently failed to make a diagnosis early enough to prevent the ultimate development of his disease which necessitated surgery. He introduced evidence at trial by means of the testimony of Dr.
Lindquist's proposed instruction that a negligent doctor cannot avoid liability for aggravation of injuries on the ground they resulted from negligent later treatment, where that treatment was necessitated by his own negligence.
If petitioner were not negligent, for example, he could bear no liability for the negligence of other physicians treating Mr. Lindquist.
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438 P.2d 829 Washington Supreme Court March 28, 1968 No. 37823
when, frequently, as here, the only doctor who witnessed the allegedly negligent acts was the defendant.
John’s Hosp., 63 Wn.2d 369 , 387 P.2d 527 (1963), to support his contention that negligence can be shown only by the testimony of doctors.
doctors in Tacoma, who can be a little more negligent' than doctors in Seattle, who can be considerably more negligent than the doctors in New York City.
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656 P.2d 483 Washington Supreme Court February 10, 1983 No. 48331-1
Said acts of the Madigan physicians: a. breached the standard of care for the average physician acting under the same or similar circumstances, and the physicians were thereby negligent; b. were not reasonably prudent, and therefore
Physicians may breach this duty either by failure to impart material information or by negligent performance of a procedure to prevent the birth of a defective child.
The final element which must be proved is that the negligence of the physicians was a proximate cause of this injury.
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161 P. 355 Washington Supreme Court December 5, 1916 No. 13161Cited by 31 Dissent · Ellis
The railroad company performed its duty by selecting a competent physician; but even a competent physician may be negligent, and, if he is negligent to another’s injury, I can see no reason why he should not be held to respond in damages
The physician is not a joint tort feasor. His negligence arises subsequently to the original injury.
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562 P.2d 264 Court of Appeals of Washington April 1, 1977 No. 1534-3
The assignments of error raise two basic questions: (1) What is the liability of a city for the negligence of a jail physician?
Therefore, defendant concludes it is not liable for the alleged negligence of its jail physician and, at most, it should only be liable for the negligent selection of the physician.
In our view, the liability of a city for the negligence of its jail physician depends upon the nature of the duty owed to its prisoners.
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221 P. 979 Washington Supreme Court January 7, 1924 No. 17591
Eisengraver’s negligence in treating appellant, and allegations of further negligent treatment of appellant by the association’s physicians and surgeons up to March, 1918; and, also, allegation of the amount of damages suffered by
appellant from all of such alleged negligent selection of incompetent physicians and surgeons and their treatment of appellant.
It is true in that case the negligence alleged to have been the result of the death of plaintiff’s husband was the negligence of the physicians and surgeons of the association; it not being claimed that the association negligently
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677 P.2d 166 Washington Supreme Court February 16, 1984 No. 49751-6
The issue before us is whether a hospital may be held liable under a theory of corporate negligence for its action in granting privileges to a nonemployee doctor who allegedly commits malpractice while in private practice off the hospital
Before the emergence of corporate negligence, hospital liability for the negligence of a staff physician was based on the theory of respondeat superior.
Such an analysis does not, however, address the question of the hospital's direct negligence in its selection or retention of an incompetent doctor on the hospital's medical staff.
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107 P. 869 Washington Supreme Court March 25, 1910 No. 8430
selected by the respondent negligently treated the left arm for a sprain and, as a result of the negligent diagnosis and treatment, it is deformed and its usefulness greatly impaired.
And if the company did employ the physician, as claimed by respondent, to look after and treat the sick and injured, it is not liable for his negligence, but is responsible only for want of ordinary care in selecting him.”
This case holds, upon somewhat similar facts, that the deduction of a portion of the wages of the employee and the employment of the physician makes the physician the agent of the company and renders it liable for his acts of negligence
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522 P.2d 852 Court of Appeals of Washington May 20, 1974 No. 1766-1
but for some negligent action on the part of the treating physician.
The efforts of a physician may be unsuccessful or the exercise of one’s judgment be in error without the physician being negligent so long as the doctor acted within the stand ard of care of his peers. Dinner v.
of any negligence or lack of negligence of the physician in the procedure itself.
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418 P.2d 1010 Washington Supreme Court September 29, 1966 No. 37751
The conflicting or countervailing principle is that a release of the original tort-feasor operates in law to release the physician who negligently treats the injuries incurred in the original wrongdoing. See, e.g., Martin v.
Mowery’s appeal is based principally upon the legal proposition that a release of the one responsible for the injury, the original tort-feasor, operates in law to release or discharge the physician who negligently treats the injury
Subsequently, she discovered that the physician had been negligent in giving such assurance. A second operation was required, which ultimately resulted in the shortening of her leg.
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192 P. 886 Washington Supreme Court September 1, 1920 No. 15868
respondent’s present condition is the result of the original injury or that injury in connection with its treatment, for the law unquestionably is that if an injured party, in good faith and in the exercise of reasonable care, employs a physician
to treat his injury and it is aggravated through the mistake or negligence of his physician, such negligent or mistaken treatment of the physician does not become an intervening cause, and that the injured party may recover damages
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695 P.2d 116 Washington Supreme Court January 11, 1985 No. 50601-9Cited by 31 Dissent · Pearson
Thus, the majority seeks to accomplish its desired result through an analysis that attempts to mask its real effect: substantially excusing the doctor from liability for his negligence.
Drury had performed the operation without negligence, but Mrs. Shorter had bled to death anyway, the doctor could not be held liable in this case.
If the Shorters are held to have assumed the risk of death from refusing blood, even when the blood was required because the doctor was negligent, that is in effect holding that the Shorters assumed the risk of the doctor's negligence
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410 P.2d 785 Washington Supreme Court February 3, 1966 No. 37825
Instead, she urged that the doctors were negligent in that they failed to keep a count of the instruments used in the original gall bladder surgery, and, as a result, one hemostat was enclosed in the plaintiff’s abdominal cavity at
However, it would seem to be an unduly harsh and an unnecessary burden to require a surgical patient — who was unconscious at the time one of two doctors failed to remove a hemostat — to prove which doctor was the negligent actor.
Crabill would be liable irrespective of which doctor had the responsibility for a count (there is no count of surgical instruments by doctors or nurses at Lakewood General Hospital) if he negligently failed to remove a hemostat which
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581 P.2d 177 Court of Appeals of Washington July 6, 1978 No. 2281-3
were negligent. 1 Plaintiff also objected emphatically to the court's instruction No. 15, 2 which told the jury that physicians are only liable for their own negligence in treating a patient if they act independently of any
Two doctors were concurrently negligent in that case; neither was able to shift liability completely to the other.
Mowery, 69 Wn.2d 357 , 418 P.2d 1010 (1966), the victim's having released the original tort-feasor, a negligent driver, did not release the negligent doctor when the victim had been compensated only for his original injuries and
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387 P.2d 974 Washington Supreme Court January 2, 1964 No. 36785
In the subsequent action for damages instituted by the boy’s father, the jury, in answer to special interrogatories, *536 found the doctor negligent, the boy contributorily negligent, and returned a verdict for the defendant doctor
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51 P. 402 Washington Supreme Court December 21, 1897 No. 2735
It is true that many other questions were discussed *370 in the opinion, and it is also stated that it was not shown that the company was derelict in the way of being negligent in the selection of a physician, and the followng remarks
It is true that some of the allegations of the complaint are materially as the allega *373 tions in the former complaint were, and this must necessarily be; for instance, the allegation of negligent treatment by the physician.
Of course, when the liability to procure a good physician is established, it must necessarily be established further, that the physician procured was negligent in the performance of his duties so far as the appellant is concerned,
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262 P.3d 490 Washington Supreme Court October 13, 2011 No. 84712-6
They argue that the doctors’ negligence substantially diminished her chance of recovery and that, with nonnegligent care, her disability could have been lessened or altogether avoided.
¶34 KMC argues that even if there is apparent agency, the hospital is not liable for negligent acts of physicians that it could not control. Cf. McLean v. St. Regis Paper Co., 6 Wn. App. 727, 729-30 , 496 P.2d 571 (1972).
As in Adamski , we find that a hospital may be, depending on the facts found by a jury, liable for the negligence of its contractor doctors, who are held out to be agents of the hospital.
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814 P.2d 1160 Washington Supreme Court August 15, 1991 No. 57266-6Cited by 115 Dissent · Utter
Thus, it may be held liable for a patient's injury in spite of a lack of negligence on the part of the attending physician. In the present case, Providence owed a duty to supervise Dr. Freeman.
In order to support a separate claim for corporate negligence, the plaintiff must independently show negligence on the part of the hospital, e.g., through selection, supervision, or retention of the doctor. Pedroza v.
There, the plaintiff's only evidence of the hospital's negligence was an affidavit of a physician who testified that the hospital failed to adequately supervise plaintiff's attending physician.
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