The verdict inquired whether the hospital was negligent in its nursing care and whether the doctors were negligent in their professional-medical care and treatment.

True, the question was too broadly phrased to include the defendant doctors because under the evidence any contributory negligence of Carson could not be set off against any negligence of the doctors.

Likewise, the questions on apportionment of negligence should not have included the doctors. However, this error was not prejudicial in view of the answers to the other inquiries finding the defendants were not negligent.

fact that the specific physician who committed the negligent act was an independent contractor.

Trinity, on the other hand, argues that a hospital’s liability should be limited to that stemming from negligence in selecting a physician and from the negligence of a physician who is an employee of the hospital.

According to Trinity, to impose liability when the treating physician is not a servant and the hospital has not been negligent in selecting the physician would make a hospital liable for all acts of negligence occurring within the

The plaintiffs also claim the doctor was negligent in failing to advise her of the availability of an abortion.

*776 Subject to the proof at trial, we conclude the doctor was negligent in not diagnosing the rubella the plaintiff-wife was suffering and inquiring as to pregnancy.

If the doctor is found at the trial to have been negligent in those respects, it follows he had a duty to inform the plaintiff-mother of the effects of rubella.

Doctors were also liable independently for the results of their own negligence and the doctrine was applied to give them the benefit of any general payments made by the original tort-feasor to the injured party. In Hooyman v.

The original tort-feasor and the subsequent negligent doctor, even though his negligence aggravates the original injury, are not joint tort-feasors although they may have a joint liability in part; such joint liability does not give

*288 We do not believe a negligent doctor who aggravates the original injury is liable for the damage directly caused by the original tort-feasor. The plaintiff argues he is, and there is language in Bolick v.

on the part of the doctor to conform to the applicable standards of care constitutes negligence."

has not *447 acted negligently when any expert testifies that the physician pursued a recognized method of treatment.

may not be held negligent merely because the doctor made a choice of a recognized alternative method of treatment.

and physicians.

There is no question of foreseeability in this case nor any question that the negligence of the physician was a substantial factor causing the cancer phobia, the existence of which is undisputed.

We hold that, under the circumstances of this particular case, it would be contrary to public policy to permit the physician to be liable for the cancer phobia and related manifestations of neuroses that followed the negligent insertion

When patients considering operations approach doctors in Raymond, the doctors do not admit that they can be a little more careless and act with less responsibility than can doctors in Olympia, *283 who can be a little more negligent

than doctors in Tacoma, who can be a little more negligent than doctors in Seattle, who can be considerably more negligent than the doctors in New York City.

or surgeon for damages incurred by his negligent treatment of the injury.

The bar naturally and correctly considers an injured person to have a cause of action against each person who causes an injury and that is true in respect to the negligence of the doctor.

What language is sufficient to state the intent to release the subsequent negligent doctor is to be decided on the facts of each case.

to have been negligent, but the physician was not named as a respondent in the submission of controversy and was not otherwise joined as a party.

Most importantly, a finding of negligence by a panel is to be taken by the examining board as "conclusive evidence that the physician is guilty of negligence in treatment." Sec. 448.02 (3)(b), Stats.

Thereafter, according to its new terms, a "finding by a panel established under sec. 655.02 or by a court that a physician has acted negligently is conclusive evidence that the physician is guilty of negligence in treatment."

We do not see any reason to depart from the civil standard for *198 medical negligence when determining whether, for disciplinary purposes, a physician was negligent in treating a patient.

Wisconsin courts have been developing the civil standard for medical negligence for over a century, 1 and the legislature has provided that "a finding by a court that a physician has acted negligently in treating a patient is conclusive

evidence that the physician is guilty of negligence in treatment."

The complaint alleged that the physicians' negligent care before and during Timothy's birth in 1977 had resulted in severe, permanent central nervous system damage to Timothy.

Both doctors practiced at the Racine Medical Clinic. The clinic held professional malpractice insurance through CNA and had policy limits of $200,000 per doctor. In addition, each physician had excess coverage with the fund.

When the negligence claim was filed, CNA retained separate defense counsel for each physician. The fund also tendered its defense to CNA. See sec. 655.27(5) (b).

In an action by a patient against a physician for malpractice causing an X-ray burn, the burden is on the patient to prove negligence by the physician in administering the X-ray treatments. p. 591. 2.

Where a physician gives X-ray treatments to patients for *Page 589 curative or healing purposes, proof of a bad result from such treatments should not constitute proof of negligence by the physician, any more than any other agency

of negligence on the part of the physician, any more than when any other agency is applied or ministered.

A medical negligence claim against a Wisconsin physician is subject to ch. 655. Section 655.007, Stats.

The panel in this case found the three physicians negligent in causing the patient’s injuries. 1 If St.

— Judgment affirmed. 1 The panel did not apportion negligence among the three physicians, and no question of apportionment was raised in the circuit court.

Johnson alleging that they were negligent in their duties as doctors for deciding to perform and then performing the bilateral mastectomies. With regard to the losses sustained by Mr.

Johnson was not negligent in obtaining Ms. Brown's consent to surgery; that neither doctor was negligent in rendering medical care to Ms. Brown; and that a reasonable patient in Ms.

According to the plaintiffs, the defendants' position on contributory negligence is nothing more than an attempt to make patients cure the shortcomings of their doctors and to transform a doctor's duty to inform the patient into a

Hipke, 183 Wis. 382 , 197 N.W. 333 (1924) (physicians not liable where neither physician negligent; negligence by others during an operation at which they were not involved); Brossard v.

App. 469 , 1924 WL 3713 at *8-10 (1924) (no joint liability among physicians sharing operation responsibilities; none of physicians negligent); Robinson v.

Bennett, 122 N.W. 305, 306-307 (Mich. 1909) (surgical pad left in patient; patient's physician, who assisted the operating surgeon, not liable for the alleged negligence of surgeon even though patient's physician paid surgeon from

The jury returned a verdict which failed to find either physician negligent. The basic question is whether the jury’s verdict was supported by credible evidence.

The question whether this was the result of malpractice or physicians’ negligence was one for the jury. Under the standards set forth above, the record demonstrates that the jury’s finding that neither Dr. Blanke nor Dr.

There was credible evidence which if believed by the jury would have supported a verdict that the physicians were negligent. The jury, however, did not make that finding.

Bullis and on other physicians in similar situations, springing from an objective, negligence-based reasonable patient standard, is decidedly not strict liability.

In two of this court's prominent informed consent cases, we explained how juries can find that a physician was not negligent in care and treatment but could also find the physician negligent in discharging his or her duty to inform

If the doctor fails to perform this duty, she is negligent.

*736 For liability to follow negligence whether by a physician or another, the negligence must be the cause in fact or a substantial factor in causing the eventual injury: “The instruction on whether the doctors’ negligence

is negligent.

Mokrohisky, supra where this court reversed a jury verdict finding a doctor negligent for an improper diagnosis of gallstones.