or the negligence of their attendants.

It would be a hard rule, indeed, — a rule calculated to repress the charitable instincts of men, — that would compel those who have freely furnished such accommodations and services to pay for the negligence or mistakes of physicians

of the physicians or attendants he employed.

The negligence consisted in the direction of the doctor in the hospital telling the patient to keep the bandage on all night. No inference of negligence can be made from this testimony.

The court, considering the evidence offered to sustain the charge of negligence, said: “The questions remaining to be considered are (1) whether there was actual negligence on the part of the physician and nurse in question; and(2)

whether the hospital authorities were negligent in not providing a physician to sit up at night to watch the patients, and in not providing more than one nurse in the ward.

It is true that many other questions were discussed *370 in the opinion, and it is also stated that it was not shown that the company was derelict in the way of being negligent in the selection of a physician, and the followng remarks

It is true that some of the allegations of the complaint are materially as the allega *373 tions in the former complaint were, and this must necessarily be; for instance, the allegation of negligent treatment by the physician.

Of course, when the liability to procure a good physician is established, it must necessarily be established further, that the physician procured was negligent in the performance of his duties so far as the appellant is concerned,

But it is claimed by the respondent that his hip was dislocated by the same accident which broke his leg, and that the dislocation was so apparent that nothiug but gross negligence or incompetency could have prevented the doctor from

We therefore conclude that there was sufficient evidence to justify the jury in finding the doctor guilty of negligence.

And if the com *656 pany did employ the physician, as claimed by respondent, to look after and treat the sick and injured, it is not liable for his negligence, but is responsible only for want of ordinary care in selecting him.

“A doctor attending a poor person out of charity would be liable for mere ordinary negligence in the treatment of his patient, and constructively it would not be mere ordinary negligence because his profession implies skill. ” Shir

Meg. § 432, that a physician or surgeon attending gratuitously is liable for gross negligence only, is qualified and explained by the context enunciating the principle that, as the duties of a physician relate to the preservation of

on the part of the physician and nurse-in question; and (2), whether the hospital authorities were negligent in not providing a physician to sit up at night to watch the patients, and in not providing more than one-' nurse in the

The main contention, in different forms urged, seems to be that appellant was not liable for the unskillfulness or negligence of the doctor, since, as was alleged in its answer, due care had been used by it in selecting him, and his

—To sustain the contention that in employing physicians and surgeons to treat the sick and wounded employes at the Thurber mines appellant was only dispensing a charity, and hence not liable for the negligence of the physicians and

The second paragraph required the jury to find negligence on the part of the company in the selection of the physician before it could be held liable on the phase of case submitted in that paragraph.

Was he professionally negligent in his examinations ? He was a physician of seven years’ practice, a graduate of Boston University, and must have possessed that ordinary skill and learning required in such cases.

His failure then to discover, after repeated examinations, the serious injury from which the plaintiff was suffering, must be held to be actionable negligence.

Reasonable attention from a physician of ordinary intelligence would have discovered so palpable an injury. Other complications may have caused or increased much of *499 the plaintiff’s suffering.

The court stated to the jury, among other things: “ It seems to me that this case turns upon the question of whether or not the doctor was negligent in operating upon the left leg, instead of upon the right leg. ' If I should leave

The liability, in making that mistake, must depend upon whether or not the doctor was negligent; and, as I say, there was nothing in the case which would warrant you in finding a verdict on that theory.”

The declaration avers negligence on the part of defendant in operating upon the left, instead of the right, leg.

Garner, a physician in the ‘employ of the company, and he brought an action for damages for injuries sustained in getting thrown from the engine, and also for negligent and unskillful treatment of his *54 injuries by said physician

to properly treat him in case of an injury, it would be liable for the negligence or want of skill of its physician in attending him. 1 Shear. & E., Neg., §331; 9 Am. & Eng.

There was no direct proof to show that the company had been negligent in selecting him as its physician, nor as to how or when he was selected, or how long he had been in the employ of the company, or how well he had been recommended

Plaintiff alleged and introduced evidence tending to show that the delivery of the message was delayed by the negligence of the agents of the defendant, and that the failure of the doctor to take the first trains that left Richmond

was primarily caused by such negligence.

Under the evidence the question whether the failure of the doctor to take either of said trains was attributable,to the negligence of the defendant was one of fact for the jury and not of law for the court to decide.

The question presented is whether the words, “an action for an injury to the person of the plaintiff,” in this section, cover an action against a physician for negligence or want of skill in the treatment of a patient.

Andrews was different from that given by the physician to whom she first went, and it is argued that appellee was negligent in not consulting a physician earlier than she did, and also that the treatment she received prior to going

Andrews was improper; but there is no evidence from which it can be said that she was negligent in not consulting a physician earlier than she did, nor that the treatment by the first physician was improper under the conditions as

in not calling a physician earlier and whether the treatment she received was proper or improper, and whether her subsequent sufferings were attributable reasonably and naturally as the result of her fall, or from any alleged negligence

The judge was correct, therefore, in refusing to charge that if the peritonitis was caused by the negligence of the physician or nurse, or a consequence of her own poor health, she could not recover for any injury caused thereby.

Thus an attorney is liable for negligently giving improper advice ( 117 Ind. 144 ); a physician for negligence in the treatment of his patient ( 73 Mich. 331 ).

It is insisted that the court erred in permitting appellee to prove by himself that the attending physician and surgeon, who was furnished by the appellant to treat his injuries, was negligent in his treatment of the wounds, and that

The appellant was in no way responsible for the acts of the physician, or for his neglect of the appellee, unless it be shown that appellant was careless and negligent in his selection and that he was incompetent.

There is no pretense that appellant was careless or negligent in the selection of this physician and surgeon, or that he was in any way incompetent.

It is clear, however, that no cause of action is alleged against the druggists for negligence in the formulation of the prescription, and they have no concern with any liability which the defendant physician may be under because of

such negligence, if it existed.

Fields, yet if the plaintiff could have obtained medical attention—if he could have gotten another doctor—and by his negligence failed to do so, *522 then yon will not find any damages for the plaintiff for the mental anguish suffered

by him after the time he could have obtained such a doctor, as his omission to obtain such a doctor would have been contributory negligence on his part.”

Fields on the morning train of the 12th of July, was per se contributory negligence.

Possibly it might be claimed that the complaint raises the further question of the defendant’s liability for its own negligence in failing to perform its alleged duty of appointing a house physician or interne so called; but such claim

The only question with which we have to deal is the liability of the defendant for the negligent conduct of physicians •and nurses employed by it, and in the selection of whom it has exercised due care.

The court held that the defendant was liable for its corporate negligence in the selection of its physicians.

Failure to- exercise such degree of learning or skill or care is negligence, and if, by reason of such negligence on the part- of a physician or surgeon, a patient is injured, or is caused to suffer increased or unnecessary bodily