Prior to 1900 actions against physicians and surgeons and, I take it, also dentists and other professional men based upon their negligence which resulted in bodily injury were within the three-year statute of limitations, as we have

It is said also in 26 Cyc. supra, 121, that as applied to physicians and surgeons malpractice means negligent acts committed by a physician in treating his patient or the unskillful treatment by a physician or surgeon in consequence

Prior to the legislation of 1900, above referred to, the term “ malpractice ” was applied by our Court of Appeals in a number of cases as characterizing negligence upon the part of physicians and surgeons. Carpenter v.

could not be held liable for the negligence or want of skill of the other physician.

In disposing of the case this court said: “The employment of Doctor Minor constituted an independent contract, and Doctor Keller is not responsible for his negligence or want of skill.”

Not being negligent in those respects, he can not be held responsible for the negligence of the other physician who was left in charge, merely because the other physician took charge on his suggestion and arrangement.

to administer it, and not for the negligence or malpractice of such physicians so selected; and by appellee that since said railroad company employed its physicians and maintained and supported its hospital by deductions made from

It is generally held that hospitals conducted for charity are not responsible for the negligence or malpractice of their physicians, and that persons and hospitals who treat patients for hire with the expectation and hope of securing

It was not contemplated by such employees in their contribution to this fund that it should be used in the payment of damages for the negligence or malpractice of physicians employed in the operation of such department, and certainly

Generally speaking, no inference of negligence can be drawn from the result of the treatment of a physician or surgeon.

In addition to this testimony, he introduced six physicians skilled in that particular branch of practice, whose testimony, without exception, negatived the charge of negligence.

W. 360 , was an action against a physician for negligence in the use of the X-rays in the treatment of appendicitis, and negligence in the application of the remedy.

Physicians and surgeons, § 19 * —when death of patient does not create presumption of negligence or lack of skill.

The fact that a patient dies under the treatment of a physician does not raise a presumption of negligence or lack of skill on his part. 3.

Physicians and surgeons, § 22 * -—when evidence not sufficient to show negligence or want of skill.

The employer, as we have seen, was not liable to the employee for the negligence of the physicians.

It by no means follows that the one whose negligence causes the original injury is liable for the negligence of the physician employed to treat it, and it is clearly not true that the physician is not liable to the patient for such

negligence.

The proposition that the negligence of the doctors, found by the jury, is imputed to Moehlenbrock, and defeats a recovery against defendant, although its negligence was a proximate cause of the death, strikes us as unsound and inapplicable

Appellant is not entitled to regard the operation as a joint enterprise on the part of Moehlenbrock and the doctors, so as to escape liability for its own negligence.

The verdict is against the doctors as well as against appellant. Hence the jury found concurrent negligence.

employed by appellee to treat its injured employees, and that this physician treated his injuries so carelessly and negligently that the amputation of all the fingers on the injured hand became necessary.

There is no intimation in the pleadings that appellee was negligent in selecting a physician, nor is there any testimony to that effect unless it be by inference that appellee was negligent through having employed a negligent physician

We have a case, therefore, in which the pleadings and proof show only that an injured employee was directed to, and placed in charge of, a physician who was guilty of negligence in his treatment of the case.

He sued for damages on two counts — one directly for the injury pccurring in the accident; *305 the other for negligent treatment by the company physician.

Damages were claimed both on account of the accident and the negligence of the physician.

The action was for both the original injury occurring in the accident and for negligent treatment by the physician.

It is alleged that his death was the result of these acts of negligence on the part of the association by its physicians and attendants. The trial cpurt sustained a demurrer to the petition.

Its liability to a patient for injuries resulting from negligent failure of the physicians and attendants in its employ properly to care for the patient must be determined upon the same principles of law which govern similar actions

The whole petition taken together shows that plaintiff is attempting to recover damages for the negligence of the physicians and attendants who are said to be employees of the defendant, in their failure to give to his son proper medical

It is clearly established that the physician furnished • by the defendant company was a competent man, skilled in his profession, and the defendant had shown no negligence in the selection of the physician furnished.

It will be noted that the physician had taken charge of the case and had undertaken to treat plaintiff’s child, and such injury as was suffered, if any, was occasioned by the negligence of the physician, and not on account of the failure

The uneontradicted proof shows that the physician employed, Dr. Harper, was a skilled physician and that the defendant company was not negligent in selecting him as a physician for its employees.

Where the master employs a physician, is the owner liable in all events for the negligence of that physician, or is he liable only where the master fails to exercise reasonable care in selecting the physician?

The master is not negligent when he exercises reasonable care in selecting and employs a regularly licensed physician, believing him to be competent, and intrusts the injured seaman to his care, in the belief that such physician will

This cannot of itself constitute negligence, since it is manifest that an injured seaman cannot in every instance have the choice of physicians, regardless of expediency or expense.

The authorities are almost unanimous in holding that such institutions are not liable in damages for the negligence of their physicians or nurses in the absence of proof of negligence in their selection.

or the negligence of their attendants.”

It is the settled rule that such a hospital is not liable for the negligence of its physicians and nurses in the treatment of patients.”

selected by the respondent negligently treated the left arm for a sprain and, as a result of the negligent diagnosis and treatment, it is deformed and its usefulness greatly impaired.

And if the company did employ the physician, as claimed by respondent, to look after and treat the sick and injured, it is not liable for his negligence, but is responsible only for want of ordinary care in selecting him.”

This case holds, upon somewhat similar facts, that the deduction of a portion of the wages of the employee and the employment of the physician makes the physician the agent of the company and renders it liable for his acts of negligence

court to consider the questions above referred to, for the complaint fails to state a case of negligence or malpractice on the part of the attending physician.

paragraphs in which the course of treatment pursued by the doctor is set forth.

Lohse was negligent. As was said in Houghton v. Dickson, 29 Cal.

:in the selection of physicians or in submitting to such treatment.

The offer did not include any evidence tending to show negligence on the part of the plaintiff in selecting physicians or in submitting to their treatment. Upon the plaintiff’s objection, this evidence' was excluded. In Goss v.

The necessity for the attendance and services of physicians was created by the defendant. The plaintiff, without negligence on her part, obtained the ’ attendance and services of physicians so made necessary.

The grounds of negligence alleged were, in substance, that appellee’s wife was operated upon successfully for a minor affliction by a physician selected by appellee, after which she was consigned to the authorities and nurses in charge

The verdict of the jury was against the claim of negligence in the selection of a physician by appellee, and no complaint is made of the manner of submitting that issue.

It was formerly the rule in Rhode Island that charitable institutions were not only liable for their negligence in failing to select competent physicians and nurses, but were liable for the negligence of regularly employed physicians

Those of merit may be summarized thus : (1) The default alleged is thát of one of the physicians employed by defendant, for whose neglect defendant is not liable, in the absence of allegation of negligence in his selection; (2)

The Court did not point out the allegations leading to that conclusion, but it was rested, no doubt, upon the ground that the delict alleged was that of one of the physicians for whose negligence defendant is not liable, in the absence

He does not seek to recover damages for the malpractice, or negligence, or unskillfulness of the physician, in the management of the case after he took charge of it, but for the breach' of defendant’s contractual duty, in his refusal

During the course of the general charge the court instructed the jury as follows: “The rule is that, in order to recover in this case, she must prove two things: First, that the defendant (the doctor) was negligent; that she herself

(that is the driver — the one who was driving the horse) — was not negligent.

The plaintiff must prove that the doctor was negligent, and must prove that the driver of the horse attached to the wagon she was riding in, was not negligent. * * * “The doctor also claimed that the action of the plaintiff — the