Polk County also invoked Iowa’s qualified-immunity statute, codified at section 670.4A(1)(a), to argue dismissal of the policy claims was required as they did not rest on clearly established law.

Boese resisted, arguing Polk County was the lawful custodian of records on McCoy’s personal devices, that a violation of the county’s policy was a violation of the statute, and that the law on these issues was clearly established

and thus defeated the qualified-immunity claims.

Even if absolute immunity does not shield an official from liability, “the doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established

Accordingly, Grabe is entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law for these alleged actions. 2. Whether Hester violated the clearly established constitutional rights of Minor or D.A.

Consequently, we find no genuine issue of material fact on the issue of whether Hester violated the clearly established constitutional rights of Minor or D.A. and Hester is entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. C.

In June 2021—between the date of Brinkman’s crash and the filing of her petition—a qualified-immunity amendment to the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act (IMTCA) took effect. 2021 Iowa Acts ch. 183, § 14 (codified at Iowa Code § 670

Instead, it is the existence or nonexistence of a historical social fact—whether the law was “clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” The “clearly established” standard is thus inherently backward-looking.

Further, whether the law was clearly established is inextricably intertwined with the new qualified immunity defense and only relevant to this case to the 3 The court applied only the particularity and plausibility aspects of section

We said: If asserted by the government officer, the issue of qualified immunity is readily determinable prior to trial and the standard of proof is one of objective reasonableness .... Id.

We quoted a Supreme Court case regarding qualified immunity and the philosophy underlying it: “[T]he qualified immunity defense ‘shield[s] [government agents] from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known....’

Section 670.4A(1)’s new qualified immunity protection. Iowa Code section 670.4A(1) provides: 1.

The “clearly established” standard is thus inherently backward-looking.

Further, whether the law was clearly established is inextricably intertwined with the new qualified immunity defense and only relevant to this case to the extent the new qualified immunity defense is operative in this case, and

The substantive municipal qualified immunity defense is lifted directly from this body of federal law.

Third, the plaintiff must plead “that the law was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” Id.

Our conclusion that the qualified immunity defense was intended to mirror federal law and that the qualified immunity defense does not apply to state common law claims is further evidenced by the text of the statute.

The defendants moved for summary judgment on grounds of federal qualified immunity. See Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding qualified immunity shields a government official from individual liability when his conduct does not violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

Without identifying clearly established law, such that Schaaf was on notice at the time that his actions violated Boggess’ constitutional rights, plaintiffs have failed as a matter of law to show that Schaaf is not entitled to qualified

Qualified immunity operates to immunize police officers from liability where “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known,” and in doing so

Qualified immunity protects officers from suit unless their conduct violates a clearly established constitutional right. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 206.

As a result, the district court correctly applied the qualified immunity doctrine to shield the officers from liability. C.

Under federal law, officials are entitled to qualified immunity from constitutional claims.

The plaintiff's suit was then found to be barred by this qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity would be available "if the defendant show[ed] that the state constitutional right alleged to have been violated was not clearly established." Id. at 1094 .

Despite qualified immunity not being applicable to the case, the court analyzed the heightened pleading standards. Id.

established at the time of the alleged violation.”

This delineation implied that claims not subject to the qualified immunity defense could still be held to the heightened pleading standard. See id.; Doe, 20 N.W.3d at 806; see also Blanchard v.

“[T]he doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

In addressing a defendant’s claim of qualified immunity, “we consider, in any order, whether the facts alleged by the plaintiff ‘make out a violation of a constitutional right’ and whether that right was ‘clearly established’ at

The defendants contend the issue of qualified immunity is a legal question for the court to decide and this court wrongly found a jury question precluded the granting of qualified immunity.

Also, “[u]nder federal law, qualified immunity is not a defense to common law claims.” Id.

Doe explicitly used negligence hypotheticals as examples of claims which lack a “right, privilege, or immunity secured by law” that “was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.”

So if a claim is one of common law, such as negligence, qualified immunity does not apply, and “neither does the heightened pleading standard.” Kahn, 22 N.W.3d at 258; see Iowa Code § 669 .14A.

Plaintiffs alleging a violation of law under the IMTCA in such situations must plead the claim with particularity and plausibility, and they must show that the law was clearly established at the time of its violation.

Supp. 3d at 891–94. 9 illegality of the municipal employee’s actions was not clearly established when the employee acted. Iowa Code § 670 .4A(1).

By its plain language, qualified immunity under section 670.4A is limited to “a claim brought under this chapter,” i.e., the IMTCA, “for monetary damages.”

The district court also considered the question of whether the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.

The district court concluded that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law because they were not acting outside the clearly established scope of their discretionary authority.

To get there, we analyzed the requirements of subsection (3) together with the substantive immunity in subsection (1)(a), which addresses whether the right at issue “was not clearly established at the time of the alleged deprivation

We said that “whether the law was ‘clearly established’ ” for purposes of subsection (3) “is inextricably intertwined with the new qualified immunity defense” in subsection (1). Id. (quoting Iowa Code § 760A.4A(3) (2021)).

Those questions are to be resolved early because qualified immunity not only serves as protection from liability—it protects government defendants from the risks and distractions of trial as well. See Harlow v.

But alleging that the law was clearly established is not the legislature’s imposition of a magic-words requirement.

First, Iowa Code section 670.4A(1)(a) (2022) provides qualified immunity to employees or officers subject to claims arising under the IMTCA: 1.

The right, privilege, or immunity secured by law was not clearly established at the time of the alleged deprivation, or at the time of the alleged deprivation the state of the law was not sufficiently clear that every reasonable

Iowa Code section 669.14A(2) codified a substantive qualified immunity protection that made the state and state agencies immune from liability from certain tort claims.

The statutory remedy is severe: “Failure to plead a plausible violation or failure to plead that the law was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation shall result in dismissal with prejudice.” Id.

But we determined that the separate plausibility and particularity requirements did apply to the plaintiff’s petition because he filed his initial petition more than three months after the qualified immunity statute had been in

Iowa Code section 669.14A(2) codified a substantive qualified immunity protection that made the state and state agencies immune from liability from certain tort claims.

The statutory remedy is severe: “Failure to plead a plausible violation or failure to plead that the law was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation shall result in dismissal with prejudice.” Id.

But we determined that the separate plausibility and particularity requirements did apply to the plaintiff’s petition because he filed his initial petition more than three months after the qualified immunity statute had been in