The test for determining claims of qualified immunity was explained in Harlow v.

Although that holding became binding on the department, it did not amount to a holding that the legal principle was clearly established so as to deprive the commissioner of qualified immunity.

By no stretch could it be said that Bernice’s right to a termination hearing was clearly established. It follows that the commissioner was entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. The judgment must be set aside.

Even if absolute immunity does not shield an official from liability, “the doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established

Accordingly, Grabe is entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law for these alleged actions. 2. Whether Hester violated the clearly established constitutional rights of Minor or D.A.

Consequently, we find no genuine issue of material fact on the issue of whether Hester violated the clearly established constitutional rights of Minor or D.A. and Hester is entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. C.

We said: If asserted by the government officer, the issue of qualified immunity is readily determinable prior to trial and the standard of proof is one of objective reasonableness .... Id.

We quoted a Supreme Court case regarding qualified immunity and the philosophy underlying it: “[T]he qualified immunity defense ‘shield[s] [government agents] from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known....’

Section 670.4A(1)’s new qualified immunity protection. Iowa Code section 670.4A(1) provides: 1.

The “clearly established” standard is thus inherently backward-looking.

Further, whether the law was clearly established is inextricably intertwined with the new qualified immunity defense and only relevant to this case to the extent the new qualified immunity defense is operative in this case, and

The substantive municipal qualified immunity defense is lifted directly from this body of federal law.

Third, the plaintiff must plead “that the law was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” Id.

Our conclusion that the qualified immunity defense was intended to mirror federal law and that the qualified immunity defense does not apply to state common law claims is further evidenced by the text of the statute.

The defendants moved for summary judgment on grounds of federal qualified immunity. See Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding qualified immunity shields a government official from individual liability when his conduct does not violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

Without identifying clearly established law, such that Schaaf was on notice at the time that his actions violated Boggess’ constitutional rights, plaintiffs have failed as a matter of law to show that Schaaf is not entitled to qualified

If asserted by the government officer, the issue of qualified immunity is readily determinable prior to trial and the standard of proof is one of objective reasonableness: [T]he qualified immunity defense “shieldfe] [government agents

] from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known....”

Under federal law, officials are entitled to qualified immunity from constitutional claims.

The plaintiff's suit was then found to be barred by this qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity would be available "if the defendant show[ed] that the state constitutional right alleged to have been violated was not clearly established." Id. at 1094 .

In such case, [t]he relevant question ... is the objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether a reasonable officer could have believed [this officer’s] warrantless search to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), the test for qualified immunity included a subjective, as well as objective, test.

Under this objective test, the Court speculated, the need for full trials on qualified immunity issues would be reduced, and many insubstantial claims could be resolved by summary judgment. Id.

Plaintiffs alleging a violation of law under the IMTCA in such situations must plead the claim with particularity and plausibility, and they must show that the law was clearly established at the time of its violation.

Supp. 3d at 891–94. 9 illegality of the municipal employee’s actions was not clearly established when the employee acted. Iowa Code § 670 .4A(1).

By its plain language, qualified immunity under section 670.4A is limited to “a claim brought under this chapter,” i.e., the IMTCA, “for monetary damages.”

The district court also considered the question of whether the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.

The district court concluded that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law because they were not acting outside the clearly established scope of their discretionary authority.

To get there, we analyzed the requirements of subsection (3) together with the substantive immunity in subsection (1)(a), which addresses whether the right at issue “was not clearly established at the time of the alleged deprivation

We said that “whether the law was ‘clearly established’ ” for purposes of subsection (3) “is inextricably intertwined with the new qualified immunity defense” in subsection (1). Id. (quoting Iowa Code § 760A.4A(3) (2021)).

First, Iowa Code section 670.4A(1)(a) (2022) provides qualified immunity to employees or officers subject to claims arising under the IMTCA: 1.

The right, privilege, or immunity secured by law was not clearly established at the time of the alleged deprivation, or at the time of the alleged deprivation the state of the law was not sufficiently clear that every reasonable

Iowa Code section 669.14A(2) codified a substantive qualified immunity protection that made the state and state agencies immune from liability from certain tort claims.

The statutory remedy is severe: “Failure to plead a plausible violation or failure to plead that the law was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation shall result in dismissal with prejudice.” Id.

But we determined that the separate plausibility and particularity requirements did apply to the plaintiff’s petition because he filed his initial petition more than three months after the qualified immunity statute had been in

Iowa Code section 669.14A(2) codified a substantive qualified immunity protection that made the state and state agencies immune from liability from certain tort claims.

The statutory remedy is severe: “Failure to plead a plausible violation or failure to plead that the law was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation shall result in dismissal with prejudice.” Id.

But we determined that the separate plausibility and particularity requirements did apply to the plaintiff’s petition because he filed his initial petition more than three months after the qualified immunity statute had been in

Iowa Code section 669.14A(2) codified a substantive qualified immunity protection that made the state and state agencies immune from liability from certain tort claims.

The statutory remedy is severe: “Failure to plead a plausible violation or failure to plead that the law was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation shall result in dismissal with prejudice.” Id.

But we determined that the separate plausibility and particularity requirements did apply to the plaintiff’s petition because he filed his initial petition more than three months after the qualified immunity statute had been in

The remedy for failing to meet the heightened pleading requirements is severe: “Failure to plead a plausible violation or failure to plead that the law was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation shall result in

Polk County Board of Supervisors, we reasoned that the substantive qualified immunity protections and the associated pleading standard were “inextricably intertwined” and thus 7 must be read together. 19 N.W.3d 290, 296 (Iowa 2025

First, the court concluded that the State was entitled to absolute immunity because the DHS employees were acting as “ordinary witnesses” whose actions were “intimately associated with the judicial process.”2 Alternatively, qualified

immunity was available as to the constitutional claims because the DHS employees did not violate any clearly established constitutional right.