Because their actions violated plaintiffs clearly established rights, defendants are not entitled to a qualified immunity as a matter of law.” II.

The qualified immunity defense shields officials from liability stemming from the perfor- *319 manee of a discretionary function “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

Because their actions violated [Pratt’s] clearly established rights, defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.”

immunity — typically, the issue whether the federal right allegedly infringed was ‘clearly established.’ 516 U.S. 299, 313 , 116 S.Ct. 834 , 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996) (citations omitted).

Qualified immunity shields “ ‘government officials performing discretionary functions ... from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

Several federal circuit courts have observed that a public employee’s free speech right, as guaranteed by the Pickering decision and its progeny, will rarely be “clearly established” for purposes of a qualified immunity analysis, because

Under the qualified immunity doctrine, government officials performing discretion *76 ary functions are immune from suit in actions brought pursuant to § 1983 “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory

The application of the qualified immunity doctrine turns on the “objective legal reasonableness” of the official’s action viewed in light of the “clearly established” legal rules at the time the action was taken.

Because their actions violated Ryan’s clearly established rights, Logan and Todd are not entitled to qualified immunity. III.

. [¶10] “An official sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity unless it is shown that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.”3 Plumhoff

The individual defendants are alternatively entitled to qualified immunity for the § 1983 claim because there was no clearly established right. [¶23] “Qualified immunity is meant to protect government officials where no . . .

hearing before an administrative board was and is clearly established law.

A plaintiff may maintain a section 1983 claim 3 against governmental employees only if they are not entitled to a qualified immunity.

“The two-part test for denial of qualified immunity is (1) whether the plaintiffs constitutional rights were violated, and (2) whether those rights were so clearly established that reasonable defendants would have known that their

As we have recently stated, The application of the qualified immunity doctrine turns on the “objective legal reasonableness” of the official’s action viewed in fight of the “clearly established” legal rules at the time the action

Therefore, we will review Haas’s claim that he is shielded from liability on the Webbs’ section 1983 claims by a qualified immunity. II.

Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability under section 1983 “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known

In the matter before us, the denial of the claim of qualified immunity presents just such a question of law: whether the facts taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff support a claim that Haas violated clearly established

out-of-control child was not an emergency within the meaning of the statute, and further that Hall acted with “deliberate indifference” when responding to the call. 3 The Nortons further argue that the defendants are not entitled to qualified

immunity because Hall’s actions were not objectively reasonable, and violated clearly established constitutional rights

Even if the Nortons had produced facts sufficient to support a constitutional claim, Hall would be entitled to qualified immunity because, given the information she possessed, her conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory

Qualified Immunity A plaintiff may maintain a section 1983 5 claim against governmental employees only if they are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Under this doctrine, “government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for *113 civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

The two-part test for denial of qualified immunity is (1) whether the plaintiffs constitutional rights were violated, and (2) whether those rights were so clearly established that the defendants would have known that their specific

Whether the Wrights are entitled to a qualified immunity is a question of law for the court.

Government officials performing discretionary functions are immune from actions brought pursuant to section 1983 “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

The application of the qualified immunity doctrine turns on the “objective legal reasonableness” of the official’s action viewed in light of the “clearly established” legal rules at the time the action was taken.

Haas contends that he is protected from the Webbs’ action by the doctrine of qualified immunity pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 8 because he has not violated a clearly established right of the Webbs’.

The Webbs may maintain this claim only if Haas is not entitled to qualified immunity, a doctrine shielding governmental employees from law suits and liability for their discretionary actions.

Pursuant to the doctrine of qualified immunity, “ ‘government officials performing discretionary functions[] generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory

. § 1983 because of “qualified immunity.” Whether a defendant is immune from suit is a question of law. Polley v. Atwell, 581 A.2d 410, 412 (Me.1990).

“Under the qualified immunity doctrine, government officials performing discretionary functions are immune from suit in actions brought pursuant to § 1983 ‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional

The application of the qualified immunity doctrine turns on the “objective legal reasonableness of the official’s action viewed in light of the ‘clearly established’ ” legal rules at the time the action was taken.

Ceccanti, then there is no qualified immunity for the individual defendants.

At this point there are factual disputes which preclude the granting of summary judgment for the Town employees based on qualified immunity.

The law is clear that trespass, destruction of the property of another and assault are violations of clearly established constitutional rights.

Qualified Immunity Defendants contend that even if there is a valid excessive force claim, they are entitled to qualified immunity.

was 'clearly established' at the time of the defendant's alleged violation."

The Court cited numerous cases3 to support its conclusion that the "clearly established" prong of the qualified immunity test had been met in the circumstances presented that case, namely the arrest of a woman for a nonviolent offense

The Superior Court (Kennebec County, Brody, J.) granted the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that all of the Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because they did not violate Rogers’ clearly established

. [¶ 54] The qualified immunity doctrine establishes that “ ‘[government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established

City of Lewiston, 666 A.2d 95, 99 (Me.1995). 17 [¶ 55] “The two-part test for denial of qualified immunity is (1) whether the plaintiffs constitutional rights were violated, and (2) whether those rights were so clearly established

established constitutional or statutory rights, Kemmerer is not entitled to qualified immunity from Clifford’s MCRA claims.

Qualified Immunity Thomas raises the defense of qualified immunity to Roberts’s Section 1983 claim of First Amendment retaliation.

Qualified immunity shields state officials whose actions or decisions do not violate clearly established constitutional rights that a reasonable person would have known, even if those actions violate the Constitution.

established law” for purposes of overcoming qualified immunity.

On a motion by Levesque, the court dismissed the civil rights claim finding that Levesque did not violate any clearly established statutory or constitutional rights and therefore was en *482 titled to qualified immunity.

Nor has King defeated qualified immunity for the individual defendants by demonstrating their engagement in specific actions that transgressed clearly established constitutional rights. See Lyons v.

(public official is entitled to qualified immunity if a reasonable official would not have understood that he was violating the plaintiffs rights).

Even considered in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the facts demonstrate that the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from the section 1983 claim against them.

“[Government officials performing discretionary functions are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194 , 104 S.Ct. 3012, 3019 , 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984) (qualified immunity available to state government actors); McNicholas v. Bickford, 612 A.2d 866, 870 (Me.1992).