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APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO.
Appeal from a decree of the- District Court which enjoined a combination of the appellants, at the suit of the' United States, under the Sherman Law.
I. The wage spale agreement deal's solely with, manufacture, not with interstate commerce. Its effects upon commerce, if any, are purely indirect and incidental. United States v. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1; Anderson v. United States, 171 U. S. 604; United Mine Workers v. Coronado Co., 259 IT. S. 344; Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251; Delaware, etc., R. R. Co. v. Yurkonis, 238 U. S. 439; Crescent Co. v. Mississippi, 257 U. S. 129; Gable v. Vonnegut Co., 274 Fed. 66; Oliver Co., v. Lord, 262 U. S. 172; Keister y. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 IT. S. 245; Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1. Where the subject matter of thé contract or combination is sales of articles in interstate commerce, as in Standard Sanitary Co. v. United' States, 226 IT, S. 20; Straus v. American Pub. Asm., 231 IT. S. ' 222; Eastern States-Lumber Assn. y. United States, 234 ,U. S. 600; Addyston Co. v. United States, 175 IT. S. 211;. Swift & Co: v. United States, 196 IT. S, 375, the interstate commerce is directly affected; in fact, such was the end in view. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 IT. S. 274; Duplex Co. v. Deerihg, 254 IT. S. 443; and Montague & Co. v. ’ iwry, •193. IT. . S. 38, are distinguishable.
. II. The wage scale agreement is within those legitimate objécts of labor unions which are exempted from the operation:^ the Sherman Act by the provisions of the Clayton Act,. Hitchman Co. .v. Mitchell, 245 IT. S. 229; National Fireproofing Co. v. Mason Builders’ Assn., 169 Fed. 259; Hopkins v.:United States, 171 IT. S. 578.’
Ill; The wage scale agreement, with its two-period system; if it can be said to relate to commerce at all, is "not-an undue or unreasonable restraint. Standard Oil C.o-. v; United States, 221 IT. S. 1; United States v. American Tobáceo Co., 22Í IT. S. 106; United 'States V; St. Louis Terminal, 224 U. S. 383; Standard Sanitary Co. v, United States, 226 IT. S. 20; United States v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 226 IT. S. 61; United'States v. Reading Co., 226 IT. S.' 324’¡ Nash v. United States, 229 IT. S. 373; ■Eastern States Lumber Assn. ,v. United States, 234 IT. S. 600;, Chicago Board of Trade y. United States, 246 IT. S. 231; United States v. U. S. Steel Corporation, 251 U. S. 417; United States v. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1; United States v. Addyston Co., 85 Fed. 271; Anderson v. United States, 171 U. S. .604; Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375; United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344.
I. The restraint is .for an unlawful purpose. No more complete or indefensible monopoly was ever established in any anti-trust case.. ■ It controls. substantially all of the hand-blown glass industry — a necessary material in the building industry.
The exigencies of the war required the Government to make a partial restriction in the production óf glass, but when the war had ended the exigency passed. Unfortunately in that period of restriction both manufacturers and the employees in this industry temporarily realized the advantages to them of limiting production. On the one hand, the manufacturers found that if production could be restricted below the demand of the public, the question of price was in their control and, thus basing an artificial price upon an artificial scarcity, they believed that they could make more money on a lessened production than if they met the demands of the market. Similarly, those who controlled the glass workers’ union erroneously believed that a compulsory restriction of production would increase the demand for the product and therefore the wages of labor. To centralize power, the constitution of the union was interpreted as a virtual power of attorney to the wage committee to act as it pleased, without respect to the wishes of the members of the union. Nq other committee or officer had any authority in the matter, except that, after the wage agreement was made, the executive board applied it to each manufacturer by allotting to him the first or second period, or both, if he were willing to operate two distinct plants. Even a referendum to the. members of the union was powerless to overrule the arbitrary action of the wage committee. '
II. The restraint has been imposed against the wishes of many of the manufacturers and of a large majority of the workers.
Both employer and employee were denied any freedom of action. No free labor market existed. The union had surrounded the industry with a wall, that no one could surmount. No manufacturer could operate without the consent of the union. The whole industry, employer and employee alike, only existed' by the sufferance of a wage committee.
If it be true, as is claimed, that this, alleged “ dying industry” can not survive without the restrictions in question, then it is intolerable that the public should pay on capital expenditure for a whole year and only get in return a very-restricted production of eighteen weeks. Such, a proposition is economically indefensible. That suph is not the case is clearly indicated by the fact that, until, the industry was put on half-time during the war, it not only survived but, measured by the number of employees, was growing.
The testimony shows that hand-made glass is better .in quality than machine glass, and presumably there will always be a market for the better quality. It is, however, unnecessary to theorize on this subject. The law of competition requires that the ability of any industry to survive should be pRt to the practical and unrestricted test.
The Government made little of the question of prices, for another indefensible feature of this monopoly was that there was no competition even in sales. The testimony of the manufacturers themselves was that, having originally pooled their sales through a common selling agency,. they subsequently and apparently by concerted action sold at the price fixed by the leading factory in the machine glass industry. Thus there was as little competition in selling price as there was in production.
III. The existing deficiency in the labor supply is not natural but is due to restrictions imposed upon those who wish to work in the industry. The record discloses that the great reduction in the number of 'workers has occurred since'the installation of the two-period system and that a large majority of the members of the union are opposed to that system. '
The shortage of labor was also due to the restrictions upon the manufacturers in the securing of the necessary workers.
IV. The plan restrains interstate commerce. The actions of this union, in agreeing or refusing to agree with separate manufacturéis were steps in the execution of an illegal plan upon which there had been an earlier agreement or understanding between the manufacturers’ association and the union. The manufacturers’ association comprised the major portion of the manufacturers of hand-blown window glass, and controlled all, and the-union comprised substantially all of the workers in the. industry. It was alleged and proved that a large portion of the glass manufactured was shipped in interstate commerce, that dealers in the glass were not able to fill all of their orders for interstate shipment, and that interstate commerce was very materially restrained by the severe . time limits which were imposed lay virtue of the agreement between the manufacturers’ association and the union. The restraint was not merely minor and incidental, but great and intentional. Distinguishing: United' States v. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1; United Mine Workers v. Coronado Co., 259 U. S. 344; American Column Co. v. United States, 257 TJ. S. 377; United States v. Reading Co., 226 TJ. S. 324; Nash v. United States, 229 TJ. S. 373; Ramsay Cp. v. Associated Bill Posters, 260 TJ. S. 501; United States v. American Oil Co., 262 TJ. S. 371.
Y. The Clayton Act does not exempt the agreements involved from the anti-trust laws. United Mine Workers v. Coronada Co., 259 TJ. S. 344.
Just as this Court has held that, while owners of patents and copyrights possess special privileges,, they cannot go beyond those privileges and limit resale prices-without violating the Anti-Trust Act (Standard Sanitary Co. v. United States, 226 TJ. S. 20; see also Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co;., 220 TJ; S. 273; Boston Store v. American Graphophone Co., 246 TJ. S. 8), so, also, it has held that, while workers may organize to attain the normal and “ legitimate ” objects of a labor orghnization, they may not so extend the activities protected under § 6 of the Clayton Act as to defeat the general purposes of the antitrust laws. Duplex Co. v. Peering, 254 TJ. S. 443.
. The Government does not contend that the National Window Glass Workers is in itself an illegal combination. It challenges simply one provision of the agreement or understanding between the union and the National Association of Window Glass Manufacturers, and the subsequent proceedings in execution of that portion of the agreement.
VI. The intentions of the defendants when thus restraining interstate commerce are immaterial. Addyston Co. v. United States, 175 TJ. S. 211; United States v. Patten, 226 TJ. S. 525; United States v. Reading Co., 226 TJ. S. 324; Standard Sanitary. Co. v. United States, 226 TJ. S. 20; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 TJ. Si 1; United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 TJ. S. 106.
VII. The agreement, shows on its face that it constitutes a restraint of trade in violation of the Anti-Trüst Act. Under this agreement every manufacturer of hand-blown window glass in the United States is required to keep his plant closed two-thirds of the year, no. matter how great may be the demand for glass in the building industry, no matter how eager he may be to manufacture or how earnestly the men in his plant may wish to continue in his employ. Addyston Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 211.
I. The'wage scale under attack has not curtailed or in any way lessened the production of hand-blown window glass, and has, therefore, not restrained trade. Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373.
II. The creation of the two-period plan is a reasonable and necessary regulation; it is the legitimate outgrowth of the peculiar business conditions nonfronting the industry. United States v. Reardon, 191 Fed. 454 ; 6 R. C. L. 789; Nash v. United States, supra; Standard Oil Co. 'v. United States, 221 Ü. S. 1; United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106; United States v. St. Louis Terminal, -224 U. S. 383; Standard Sanitary Co. v. United States, 226 U. S. 20; United States v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 226 U. S. 61; United States v. Redding Co., 226 U. S. 324; 183 Fed. 427; Eastern States Lumber Assn. v. United States, 234 U. S. 600; Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U. S. 231; United States v. U. S. Steel Corporation, 251 U. S. 417; United States v. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1; Anderson v. United States, 171 U. S. 604; Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375; United Mine Workers v. Coronado Co., 259 ü. S. 344,; National Fireproofing Co. y. Mason Builders’ - Assn., 169 Fed. 259.
III. The wage scale does not bind a. factory to operate during only one period, but in effect fixes the period of time during which the workers in the industry will work for one group of factories and the period of time during which the workers will work for the second group. To prevent the workers from so rationing their labor denies them a right to freedom of contract in respect to their services guaranteed to them by the Fifth Amendment. Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. 310; National Fireproofing Co. v. Mason Builders’ Assn., 169 Fed. 259; National Protective Assn. v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 315; Grassi Co. v. Bennett, 160 N, Y. S. 279; Wunch v. Shankland, 69 N. Y. S. 349;' s. c. 170 N. Y.- 573; Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572; Clemitt Y-.Watson, 14 Ind. App. 38; Jetton-Dekle Co. v. Mathew,'53 Fla. 969; Longshore Co. v. Howell, 26 Ore. -527; Bowen v. Matheson, 14 Allen, 429; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578; 2 Tiedeman, State and Federal Control of Persons and Property, p. 939; In re Jacobs, 98 N.. Y. 106; Butchers’ Unions Co. v. Crescent City Co., Ill U. S. 746; State v. Kreutzberg, 114 Wis. 530; Erdman v. Mitchell, 207 Pa. St. 79.
IV. The right to negotiate a, wage scale is one of the rights guaranteed to a labor union by § 6 of the Clayton Act. The chief function of a labor unión is the fixing of a wage scale covering periods of labor and wages. If the fixing of this scale is deemed a restraint of commerce, the right of labor to form and operate the labor union becomes an empty right, and § 6 of the Clayton Act is in effect vitiated and the benefits conferred by the act taken away. Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1; United States v. Joint Traffic Assn., 171 U.. S. 505; Martin, Modern Law of Labor Unions, p. 13; Powers v. Journeymen Bricklayers’ Union, 130 Tenn. 643.
V. The wage agreement in question involves manufacture only and not interstate commerce and is, therefore, beyond the regulatory power of Congress. United States v. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1; Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U. S. 418; United Mine-Workers v. Coronado Co., 259 U. S..344; Gable v. Vonnegut Co., 274 Fed. 66; Federal Trade Comm. v. Claire Furnace Co., 285 Fed. 936; In re Green, 52 Fed. 104; Oliver Co. v. Lord, 262 U. S. 172; Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U. S. 245; Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. '120; Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251; Delaware, etc. R. R. Co. v. Yurkonis, 238 U. S. 439; Crescent Co. v. Mississippi, 257 U. S. 129.
Syllabus and headnotes are prepared by the reporter or publisher, not the court, and are not part of the opinion.
