Cain v. Kentucky
CAIN Et Al. v. KENTUCKY
Opinion of the Court
Per Curiam.
The judgment is reversed. Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767 .
Dissent
Mr. Chief Justice Burger,
dissenting.
In my view we should not inflexibly deny to each of the States the power to adopt and enforce its own standards as to obscenity and pornographic materials; States ought to be free to deal with varying conditions and problems in this area. I am unwilling to say that Kentucky is without power to bar public showing of this film; therefore, I would affirm the judgment from which the appeal is taken.
Dissent
Mr. Justice Harlan,
dissenting.
If this case involved obscenity regulation by the Federal Government, I would unhesitatingly reverse the conviction, for the reasons stated in my separate opinion in Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 496 (1957). Even in light of the much greater flexibility that I have always thought should be accorded to the States in this field, see, e. g., my dissenting opinion in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184, 203 (1964), suppression of this *320 particular film presents a borderline question. However, laying aside my own personal estimate of the film, I cannot say that Kentucky has exceeded the constitutional speed limit in banning public showing of the film within its borders, and accordingly I vote to affirm the judgment below.
Combined text as published — syllabus, headnotes and all opinions in one document
397 U.S. 319 (1970)
CAIN ET AL.
v.
KENTUCKY.
No. 347.
Supreme Court of United States.
Decided March 23, 1970 APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF KENTUCKY.
Edmund C. Grainger, Jr., and James E. Thornberry for appellants.
John B. Breckinridge, Attorney General of Kentucky, and John B. Browning, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
PER CURIAM.
The judgment is reversed. Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767 .
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, dissenting.
In my view we should not inflexibly deny to each of the States the power to adopt and enforce its own standards as to obscenity and pornographic materials; States ought to be free to deal with varying conditions and problems in this area. I am unwilling to say that Kentucky is without power to bar public showing of this film; therefore, I would affirm the judgment from which the appeal is taken.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, dissenting.
If this case involved obscenity regulation by the Federal Government, I would unhesitatingly reverse the conviction, for the reasons stated in my separate opinion in Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 496 (1957). Even in light of the much greater flexibility that I have always thought should be accorded to the States in this field, see, e. g., my dissenting opinion in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184, 203 (1964), suppression of this *320 particular film presents a borderline question. However, laying aside my own personal estimate of the film, I cannot say that Kentucky has exceeded the constitutional speed limit in banning public showing of the film within its borders, and accordingly I vote to affirm the judgment below.
How later courts describe this case
Explanatory parentheticals written by citing courts — 2 in all; the most informative distinct ones are shown.
-
(dissents of Justices Burger and Harlan)
Cited by 32 cases
View all citing references →- U.S. Supreme Court6
- U.S. Courts of Appeals3
- Federal District Courts4
- State Highest Courts8
- State Appellate Courts8
- State Trial Courts1
- State Specialty Courts2
Relies on it most ⓘ
Citing references are not a citator: they show that a later opinion cites this case, not whether it followed, distinguished, or overruled it. Check negative history before relying on this case.