Huber v. Pointer

2026 IL App (1st) 250746-U No. 1-25-0746 Order filed May 8, 2026 Sixth Division NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ ASHLEY HUBER, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Petitioner-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 24 OP 73165 ) CHRISTOPHER POINTER, ) Honorable ) Jonathan Clark Green Respondent-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.

JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice C.A. Walker and Justice Pucinski concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Where respondent-appellant did not provide a sufficiently complete record on appeal for review, judgment is affirmed.

¶2 Christopher Pointer, proceeding pro se, appeals from a plenary stalking no-contact order

entered in favor of Ashley Huber. On appeal, Pointer challenges (i) the trial court’s findings, (ii)

the authentication and admission of evidence, and (iii) the award of attorney’s fees. Because

Pointer did not present a sufficiently complete record on appeal for review, we must affirm. No. 1-25-0746

¶3 Background

¶4 The facts are derived from the limited record on appeal, which consists solely of the

common law record.

¶5 On April 12, 2024, Huber filed a pro se petition for a stalking no-contact order against

Pointer under the Stalking No-Contact Order Act (Act) (740 ILCS 21/1 et seq. (West 2022)). Huber

alleged that on January 7, 2024, Pointer totaled her car by slashing tires, damaging the driver’s

side door, destroying the gas tank cap cover, removing the side mirrors, and pouring white paint

over the car. About a month later, Pointer again slashed tires, keyed the word “hoe” on the driver’s

side door, and removed a side mirror. On April 4, Pointer was seen on Huber’s Ring camera

approaching her back porch holding unknown items. The court denied an emergency order and

continued the case for a hearing.

¶6 In response, Pointer asserted that he and Huber were former coworkers who did not interact

outside of work. He denied having contact with Huber since March 15, 2024, when Huber

allegedly “maliciously contacted” him through a burner phone. Pointer further alleged that Huber

misused her employment to obtain his email address and register him for websites, services, and

newsletters. He also claimed she sent him text messages from other “burner” phone numbers.

Pointer argued that the petition should be denied because (i) Huber was ineligible for protection

under the Act, (ii) he had never been physically or verbally abusive, (iii) Huber never stated he

made her feel unsafe, (iv) Huber misused her employment to contact him, and (v) other barriers

prevented them from engaging with each other. Exhibits attached to Pointer’s response included

text messages, emails, and newsletters.

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¶7 In a later response, Pointer moved to dismiss the petition and alleged additional instances

in which Huber contacted him using burner phones or registered him for newsletters and services.

He contended that Huber abused the legal process to surveil and harass him through phone and

email, and she did not require an order of protection.

¶8 Huber retained counsel, who filed an amended petition. In an attachment, Huber alleged

that she and Pointer had worked at a YMCA, and that, in July 2022, Pointer asked her on a date,

which she declined. The following month, Huber left the YMCA to work at a different fitness club.

Pointer later joined that fitness club and, in July 2023, texted to invite her to a birthday dinner,

which she again declined. Between August 2023 and April 2024, Huber alleged that Pointer

vandalized and damaged her car, sent unwanted text and social media messages, arrived uninvited

at her residence, and vandalized her residence.

¶9 Pointer retained counsel. Thereafter, the court held a hearing and entered a plenary stalking

no-contact order against Pointer, based on an oral ruling. The court continued the matter to address

the issue of attorney’s fees. Huber sought $21,540 in attorney’s fees and costs, supported by an

affidavit detailing the time expended, the hourly rate, and the attorney’s experience.

¶ 10 Pointer moved for reconsideration of the plenary stalking no-contact order. The court

denied the motion and awarded Huber $13,000 in fees and costs. Pointer then moved pro se to

vacate the judgment. Because Pointer had an attorney of record, the court struck the motion.

¶ 11 Analysis

¶ 12 On appeal, Pointer argues that the trial court erred by granting a plenary stalking no-contact

order in favor of Huber because the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of stalking and

the court’s decision relied on inadmissible, unauthenticated exhibits.

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¶ 13 To succeed under the Act, a petitioner must prove stalking by a preponderance of the

evidence. Piester v. Escobar, 2015 IL App (3d) 140457, ¶ 12 . “The stalker’s contact must be

nonconsensual.” Id. The Act does not require the victim to communicate with the stalker that the

conduct is unwanted. McNally v. Bredmann, 2015 IL App (1st) 134048 , ¶ 14. Rather, “[t]he Act

merely requires that the stalker’s contact be nonconsensual.” Id. The Act focuses “on whether the

stalker’s behavior would cause a reasonable person to be fearful for [their] safety or to suffer

emotional distress.” Piester, 2015 IL App (3d) 140457, ¶ 12 .

¶ 14 Stalking is “a course of conduct directed at a specific person, and the offender knows or

should know that this course of conduct would cause a reasonable person to fear for his or her

safety, the safety of a workplace, school, or place of worship, or the safety of a third person or

suffer emotional distress.” 740 ILCS 21/10 (West 2022). A “course of conduct” means two or

more acts in which a person either directly, indirectly, or through any means “follows, monitors,

observes, surveils, or threatens a person, workplace, school, or place of worship, engages in other

contact, or interferes with or damages a person’s property or pet.” Id. “Stalking behavior includes

following a person, conducting surveillance of the person, appearing at the person’s home, work

or school, making unwanted phone calls, sending unwanted emails, unwanted messages via social

media or text messages, leaving objects for the person, vandalizing the person’s property, or

injuring a pet.” Id. § 21/5.

¶ 15 We will reverse a stalking no-contact order only where the finding was against the manifest

weight of the evidence. Piester, 2015 IL App (3d) 140457, ¶ 12 . That means “only if the opposite

conclusion is clearly apparent or if the finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the

evidence presented.” McNally, 2015 IL App (1st) 134048 , ¶ 12.

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¶ 16 Here, the absence of a report of proceedings precludes meaningful review of Pointer’s

appeal. As mentioned, the record on appeal consists solely of the common law record. As the

appellant, Pointer bears the burden of providing a sufficiently complete record to support a claim

of error. See Ill. S. Ct. Rs. 321 (eff. Oct. 1, 2020), 323 (eff. July 1, 2017); Graves v. Cook County

Republican Party, 2020 IL App (1st) 181516 , ¶ 39. In the absence of a more complete record, we

must presume that the trial court acted in conformity with the law and with a sufficient factual

basis for its findings. Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d. 389, 391-92 (1984). Any doubts arising from

the incompleteness of the record must be resolved against the appellant. Id. at 392 .

¶ 17 The record on appeal does not include a report of proceedings from that hearing, nor has

Huber provided an acceptable substitute, such as a bystander’s report or an agreed statement of

facts. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 323(a), (c), (d) (eff. July 1, 2017). As a result, we lack knowledge of the

evidence, arguments, evidentiary rulings, and objections presented at the hearing. Consequently,

we cannot determine whether the judgment was against the manifest weight of the evidence, and

presume that the trial court acted in conformity with the law and affirm the judgment of the trial

court. Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d. at 391-92.

¶ 18 For the same reasons, Pointer’s argument that the trial court improperly admitted

unauthenticated exhibits fails. “A determination of the admissibility of evidence is in the sound

discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.” People v.

Watkins, 2015 IL App (3d) 120882, ¶ 35 . Without a report of proceedings, we cannot review the

trial court’s decisions and presume proper admission of the evidence. Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 391-92.

¶ 19 Next, Pointer contends that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees,

asserting that Huber did not establish that the fees were reasonable and necessary. He argues that -5- No. 1-25-0746

Huber’s fee petition failed to specify the nature of the legal services performed, thus preventing a

proper evaluation of reasonableness of the fees under the Act.

¶ 20 The award of attorney’s fees and costs falls within the sound discretion of the trial court

and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. McHenry Savings Bank v. Autoworks of

Wauconda, Inc., 399 Ill. App. 3d 104, 113 (2010). “A properly supported fee petition must specify

the services performed, by whom, the time spent expended, and the rate charged.” Young v. Alden

Gardens of Waterford, LLC, 2015 IL App (1st) 131887, ¶ 102 . Fees are only justified when the

party seeking the fees presents more than “a mere compilation of hours multiplied by a fixed hourly

rate,” since that information is insufficient to establish the fees’ reasonableness. Kaiser v. MEPC

American Properties, Inc., 164 Ill. App. 3d 978, 983-84 (1987).

¶ 21 Pointer asserts that redactions in the fee petition do not satisfy the requirements established

in Kaiser. Huber supported her fee petition with an invoice detailing the legal fees charged by her

counsel, including time spent on entries and the amount billed for each, as well as an affidavit from

her counsel explaining counsel’s experience and the rate billed for legal services performed. Huber

maintained that the redactions were necessary to prevent disclosure of information protected by

the attorney-client privilege and that an unredacted copy was provided to the court before the

hearing.

¶ 22 Although the court must have sufficient information to assess the reasonableness of fees, a

fee petition has to present some evidence from which the court may conduct its review. See

Naperville South Commons, LLC v. Nguyen, 2013 IL App (3d) 120382, ¶ 19 . The invoice attached

to Huber’s fee petition listed the hours worked on individual entries and the fees charged for each.

Because the descriptions are redacted in the version before us, and because Pointer did not provide -6- No. 1-25-0746

the hearing transcript, we are unable to review the decision regarding reasonableness and must

assume that the decision conformed with the law. Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d. at 391-92; see also

International Ass’n of Fire Fighters Local 4646 v. Village of Oak Brook, 2024 Ill. App. 3d 220466 ,

¶¶ 62-65 (award of attorney’s fees not abuse of discretion where appellant failed to provide report

of proceedings on appeal). We affirm the award of attorney’s fees.

¶ 23 Finally, Pointer argues that the reduction in attorney’s fees constitutes an abuse of

discretion as the court did not explain the basis for the reduction. Pointer is correct that a trial court

must specify the reasons justifying a reduction. Richardson, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 315.

Notwithstanding that this argument appears to contradict Pointer’s interests, review the reduction

in fees is not possible due to the absence of a transcript. Accordingly, we must presume that the

trial court acted in conformity with the law. Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 391-92; Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7)

(eff. Oct. 1, 2020).

¶ 24 Affirmed.

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