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Art Theater Guild, Inc. v. Ewing

Art Theater Guild, Inc. v. Clark L. Ewing

Art Theater Guild, Inc. v. Ewing, 421 U.S. 923 (1975)
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Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
April 21, 1975
Docket
No. 73-1973
Judges
Brennan, Stewart, Marshall
Citations
421 U.S. 92395 S. Ct. 1649

Opinion of the Court

Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ohio dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Dissent — Brennan

Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Marshall join,

dissenting.

Appellee brought this action in the Court of Common Pleas of Lucas County, Ohio, to prohibit showing of the motion picture “Without A Stitch” on the theory that the film’s exhibition rendered the theater itself a nuisance. Under Ohio law, any place which exhibits filmed obscenity is a nuisance. See State ex rel. Keating v. A Motion Picture Film Entitled “Vixen,” 35 Ohio St. 2d 215 , 301 N. E. 2d 880 (1973). Obscenity was defined as follows:

“(A) Any material or performance is ‘obscene’ if, when considered as a whole and judged with reference to ordinary adults, any of the following apply:

“(1) Its dominant appeal is to prurient interest;

“(2) Its dominant tendency is to arouse lust by displaying or depicting nudity, sexual excitement, or sexual conduct in a way which tends to represent human beings as mere objects of sexual appetite;

“(3) Its dominant tendency is to arouse lust by displaying or depicting bestiality or extreme or bizarre violence, cruelty, or brutality;

“(4) It contains a series of displays or descriptions of nudity, sexual excitement, sexual conduct, bestiality, extreme or bizarre violence, cruelty,, or brutality, or human bodily functions of elimination, the cumulative effect of which is a dominant tendency to appeal to prurient interest, when the appeal to such interest is primarily for its own sake *924 or for commercial exploitation, rather than for a genuine scientific, educational, sociological, moral, or artistic purpose.” Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2905.34 (Supp. 1972), now Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2907.01 (1975).

The Court of Common Pleas found the film obscene and enjoined its exhibition. The Lucas County Court of Appeals and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. State ex rel. Ewing v. A Motion Picture Film Entitled “Without a Stitch,” 37 Ohio St. 2d 95 , 307 N. E. 2d 911 (1974).

It is my view that “at least in the absence of distribution to juveniles or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the State and Federal Governments from attempting wholly to suppress sexually oriented materials on the basis of their allegedly ‘obscene’ contents.” Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 113 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Since it is clear that, when tested by that constitutional standard, § 2905.34 is unconstitutionally overbroad and therefore facially invalid, I disagree with the holding that the appeal does not present a substantial federal question, and therefore dissent from the Court’s dismissal of the appeal.

For the reasons stated in my dissent in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 47 (1973), and because the judgment of the Ohio Supreme Court was rendered after Miller , I would reverse. In that circumstance, I have no occasion to consider whether the other questions presented merit plenary review. See Heller v. New York, 413 U. S. 483, 494 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

Combined text as published — syllabus, headnotes and all opinions in one document

421 U.S. 923 95 S.Ct. 1649 44 L.Ed.2d 82

ART THEATER GUILD, INC., et al. v. Clark L. EWING.

No. 73-1973.

Supreme Court of the United States

April 21, 1975

The appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice BRENNAN, with whom Mr. Justice STEWART and Mr. Justice MARSHALL join, dissenting.

1

Appellee brought this action in the Court of Common Pleas of Lucas County, Ohio, to prohibit showing of the motion picture 'Without A Stitch' on the theory that the film's exhibition rendered the theater itself a nuisance. Under Ohio law, any place which exhibits filmed obscenity is a nuisance. See State ex rel. Keating v. 'Vixen', 35 Ohio St.2d 215 , 301 N.E.2d 880 (1973). Obscenity is defined as follows:

2

'(A) any material or performance is 'obscene' if, when considered as a whole and judged with reference to ordinary adults, any of the following apply:

3

'(1) Its dominant appeal is to prurient interest;

4

'(2) Its dominant tendency is to arouse lust by displaying or depicting nudity, sexual excitement, or sexual conduct in a way which tends to represent human beings as mere objects of sexual appetite;

5

'(3) Its dominant tendency is to arouse lust by displaying or depicting beastiality or extreme or bizarre violence, cruelty, or brutality;

6

'(4) It contains a series of displays or descriptions of nudity, sexual excitement, sexual conduct, bestiality, extreme or bizarre violence, cruelty, or brutality, or human bodily functions of elimination, the cumulative effect of which is a dominant tendency to appeal to prurient interest, when the appeal to such interest is primarily for its own sake or for commercial exploitation, rather than for a genuine scientific, educational, sociological, moral, or artistic purpose.' Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2905.34.

7

The Court of Common Pleas found the film obscene and enjoined its exhibition. The Lucas County Court of Appeals and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. 37 Ohio St.2d 95 , 307 N.E.2d 911 (1974).

8

It is my view that 'at least in the absence of distribution to juveniles or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the State and Federal Governments from attempting wholly to suppress sexually oriented materials on the basis of their allegedly 'obscene' contents.' Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 113 , 93 S.Ct. 2628 , 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Since it is clear that, when tested by that constitutional standard, § 2905.34 is unconstitutionally overbroad and therefore facially invalid, I disagree with the holding that the appeal does not present a substantial federal question, and therefore dissent from the Court's dismissal of the appeal.

9

For the reasons stated in my dissent in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 47 , 93 S.Ct. 2607 , 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973), and because the judgment of the Ohio Supreme Court was rendered after Miller , I would reverse. In that circumstance, I have no occasion to consider whether the other questions presented merit plenary review. See Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 494 , 93 S.Ct. 2789 , 37 L.Ed.2d 745 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

10

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS took no part in the consideration or decision of this appeal.

How later courts describe this case

Explanatory parentheticals written by citing courts — 2 in all; the most informative distinct ones are shown.

Cited by 21 cases

View all citing references →
1975: 11976: 11977: 11978: 51979: 11981: 21983: 11984: 21985: 21988: 11991: 11994: 11997: 11998: 119752026peak 1978 · 5

Relies on it most ⓘ

  1. State ex rel. Kidwell v. U. S. Marketing, Inc.631 P.2d 622 (Idaho 1981)
  2. J-R Distributors, Inc. v. Kenneth Eikenberry, in His Official Capacity as Attorney General for the State of Washington Donald C. Brockett, in His Official Capacity as Prosecuting Attorney for Spokane County, State of Washington, James Sloane, in His Official Capacity as City Attorney for the City of Spokane, Washington, Jeffrey C. Sullivan, in His Official Capacity as Prosecuting Attorney for the County of Yakima, State of Washington, and Fred Andrews, in His Official Capacity as City Attorney for the City of Yakima, Washington, Azure Entertainment Corporation of Washington v. Kenneth Eikenberry, in His Official Capacity as Attorney General for the State of Washington Donald C. Brockett, in His Official Capacity as Prosecuting Attorney for Spokane County, State of Washington and James Sloane, in His Official Capacity as City Attorney for the City of Spokane, Washington, Jack R725 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1984)
  3. J-R Distributors, Inc. v. Eikenberry725 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1984) · Dissent
  4. Universal Amusement Co., Inc. v. Carol Vance King Arts Theatre, Inc. v. George E. McCrea the State of Texas587 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1978)
  5. People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theater550 P.2d 600 (Cal. 1976)
  6. State, ex rel. Freeman v. Pierce573 N.E.2d 747 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991)

Most recent

  1. State ex rel. Eckstein v. Midwest Pride IV713 N.E.2d 1055 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998)
  2. State ex rel. Eckstein v. Video Express, Unpublished Decision (4-28-1997)No. CA96-05-014. (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 28, 1997)
  3. State ex rel. Fisher v. Reno Hotel, Inc.641 N.E.2d 1155 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994)
  4. State, ex rel. Freeman v. Pierce573 N.E.2d 747 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991)
  5. State v. Bauer768 P.2d 175 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988)
  6. People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc.65 N.Y. 324 (1985)

Citing references are not a citator: they show that a later opinion cites this case, not whether it followed, distinguished, or overruled it. Check negative history before relying on this case.

Authorities cited 5

DepthCaseCited by
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) 2,283
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) 882
Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973) 409
State ex rel. Ewing v. A Motion Picture Film Entitled "Without A Stitch", 307 N.E.2d 911 (Ohio 1974) 41
State ex rel. Keating v. A Motion Picture Film Entitled "Vixen", 301 N.E.2d 880 (Ohio 1973) 30

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