Robert Peer, Director, Etc. v. Nanette Griffeth
Peer, Director, Department of Public Welfare of County of San Diego, Et Al. v. Griffeth Et Al.
Opinion of the Court
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Dissent
Mr. Justice Rehnquist,
dissenting.
The Court of Appeals has taken a significant step in this case to expand the ruling of this Court in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970), a step that I believe merits plenary-consideration by the full Court. The question pertains to whether an applicant for state-mandated welfare benefits is entitled to a hearing under the procedural guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution before being denied welfare benefits for failure to meet the initial requirements imposed by state law. The California courts themselves, in Zobriscky v. Los Angeles County, 28 Cal. App. 3d 930 , 105 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1972), have concluded that an applicant is not entitled to any hearing because, in the words of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, they “refused to find general relief to be a protected property interest.” Griffeth v. Detrich, 603 F. 2d 118, 121 (1979).
There has been much decisional law from this and other courts, and much scholarly commentary, as to what is a protected “property” interest under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and what procedural guarantees are necessary under that Clause before one may be denied such a property interest. See, e. g., Goldberg v. Kelly, supra; Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564 (1972); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319 (1976); Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1 (1979); Van Alstyne, Cracks in “The New Property”: Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 Cornell L. Rev. 445 (1977). Obviously this Court cannot parse every state-lajjv provision to determine whether it creates a protected “property interest” under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But *971 here I believe the District Court put its finger on the significance of the case when it ruled against respondents, saying:
“Plaintiffs [respondents] argue that the pretermination evidentiary hearing required by the Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 . . . (1970) should be applied to protect denied applicants for General Relief in San Diego County. . . . Defendants oppose An extension of Goldberg's protection of terminated, recipients of welfare to denied applicants for General Relief. The Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue. Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U. S. 280 , 284-285 . . . (1970) (Burger, C. J., dissenting).” (Emphasis supplied in part.) Griffeth v. Detrich, 448 F. Supp. 1137, 1139 (SD Cal. 1978).
Particularly when the only state appellate court to consider the question has concluded that there is no protected property interest under state law, this extension of Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, should receive plenary consideration by this Court.
Combined text as published — syllabus, headnotes and all opinions in one document
445 U.S. 970 100 S.Ct. 1348 64 L.Ed.2d 247
Robert PEER, Director, etc., et al. v. Nanette GRIFFETH et al.
No. 79-807.
Facts and opinion, D.C., 448 F.Supp. 1137 ; 603 F.2d 118 .
Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
1
April 14, 1980. Denied.
2
Mr. Justice REHNQUIST, dissenting.
3
The Court of Appeals has taken a significant step in this case to expand the ruling of this Court in Goldberg v. Kelly , 397 U.S. 254 , 90 S.Ct. 1011 , 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970), a step that I believe merits plenary consideration by the full Court. The question pertains to whether an applicant for state-mandated welfare benefits is entitled to a hearing under the procedural guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution before being denied welfare benefits for failure to meet the initial requirements imposed by state law. The California courts themselves, in Zobriscky v. Los Angeles County , 28 Cal.App.3d 930 , 105 Cal.Rptr. 121 (1972), have concluded that an applicant is not entitled to any hearing because, in the words of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, they "refused to find general relief to be a protected property interest." Griffeth v. Detrich , 603 F.2d 118, 121 (1979).
4
There has been much decisional law from this and other courts, and much scholarly commentary as to what is a protected "property" interest under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, and what procedural guarantees are necessary under that Clause before one may be denied such a property interest. See, e. g., Goldberg v. Kelly, supra; Board of Regents v. Roth , 408 U.S. 564 , 92 S.Ct. 2701 , 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates , 442 U.S. 1 , 99 S.Ct. 2100 , 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979); Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 Cornell L.Rev. 445 (1977). Obviously this Court cannot parse every state-law provision to determine whether it creates a protected "property interest" under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But here I believe the District Court put its finger on the significance of the case when it ruled against respondents, saying:
5
"Plaintiffs [respondents] argue that the pretermination evidentiary hearing required by the Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Kelly , 397 U.S. 254 [ 90 S.Ct. 1011 , 25 L.Ed.2d 287 ] (1970) should be applied to protect denied applicants for General Relief in San Diego County. . . . Defendants oppose an extension of Goldberg's protection of terminated recipients of welfare to denied applicants for General Relief. The Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue. Wheeler v. Montgomery , 397 U.S. 280, 284-285 [ 90 S.Ct. 1026 , 25 L.Ed.2d 307 ] (1970) (BURGER, C. J., dissenting)." (Emphasis supplied in part.) Griffeth v. Detrich , 448 F.Supp. 1137, 1139 (SD Cal. 1978).
6
Particularly when the only state appellate court to consider the question has concluded that there is no protected property interest under state law, this extension of Goldberg v. Kelly, supra , should receive plenary consideration by this Court.
How later courts describe this case
Explanatory parentheticals written by citing courts — 4 in all; the most informative distinct ones are shown.
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(holding that state code’s mandatory language limited the discretion of intake workers and created legitimate expectations of payment in those who met prescribed standards)
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(finding applicants for benefits under state general assistance program had a “legitimate expectation of entitlement” because of mandatory language in state statute)
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(Justice Rehnquist dissenting from a denial of certiorari in which the Ninth Circuit held that an applicant for welfare benefits is entitled to due process guarantees)
Cited by 26 cases
View all citing references →- U.S. Supreme Court1
- U.S. Courts of Appeals11
- Federal District Courts6
- State Highest Courts4
- State Appellate Courts3
- State Trial Courts1
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Citing references are not a citator: they show that a later opinion cites this case, not whether it followed, distinguished, or overruled it. Check negative history before relying on this case.