CONSOLIDATED FREIGHTWAYS CORPORATION OF DELAWARE v. KASSEL
Consolidated Freightways Corporation of Delaware v. Raymond Kassel
Opinion of the Court
Per Curiam.
The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.
Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Dissent
Justice White,
dissenting.
We granted certiorari in this case to decide one very narrow question: “May a court, without articulating its rationale, summarily deny an application for attorneys’ fees under 42 U. S. C. § 1988 ?” Petitioner concedes that “not... all cases require opinions,” Brief for Petitioner 6, n. 6, but argues that with respect to an application for fees under §1988 “[t]he combination of discretion and a standard for the exercise of that discretion necessitates a statement of reasons to determine whether the decision is proper.” Id, at 12. In my view, such an application is not sufficiently distinguishable *330 from numerous other motions and applications that a court may concedely decide without opinion. Whether this is a good or bad method of exercising discretion in a particular case, or even in general, is not at issue in this case. Because I do not believe that there is any per se rule that a court may never summarily deny an application for fees, I would affirm the decision below.
Accordingly, I dissent from the majority’s disposition of this case.
Combined text as published — syllabus, headnotes and all opinions in one document
455 U.S. 329 102 S.Ct. 1496 71 L.Ed.2d 187
CONSOLIDATED FREIGHTWAYS CORPORATION OF DELAWARE v. Raymond KASSEL et al
No. 79-1618
Supreme Court of the United States
February 23, 1982
On writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
PER CURIAM.
1
The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.
2
Justice WHITE, dissenting.
3
We granted certiorari in this case to decide one very narrow question: "May a court, without articulating its rationale, summarily deny an application for attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 ?" Petitioner concedes that "not . . . all cases require opinions," Brief for Petitioner 6, n. 6, but argues that with respect to an application for fees under § 1988 "[t]he combination of discretion and a standard for the exercise of that discretion necessitates a statement of reasons to determine whether the decision is proper." Id. , at 12. In my view, such an application is not sufficiently distinguishable from numerous other motions and applications that a court may concededly decide without opinion. Whether this is a good or bad method of exercising discretion in a particular case, or even in general, is not at issue in this case. Because I do not believe that there is any per se rule that a court may never summarily deny an application for fees, I would affirm the decision below.
4
Justice O'CONNOR took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
5
Accordingly, I dissent from the majority's disposition of this case.
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(cert. dismissed as improvidently granted)
Cited by 2 cases
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