Duncan v. United States
Ovie L. Duncan v. United States
Opinion of the Court
C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Dissent
Justice White,
dissenting.
This case involves the interpretation of 18 U. S. C. § 3663 (a) (1982 ed., Supp. V), which provides that a court may order a defendant convicted under that title to make restitution “to any victim of such offense.” Ibid. In this case, the Tenth Circuit read the term “offense” as used in § 3663(a) broadly: the term does not “restrict a sentencing judge to conside[r] only those acts for which conviction was had, or for which the defendant pleaded guilty.” 870 F. 2d 1532, 1536 (1989). The Sixth Circuit, by contrast, has “adopted a narrow definition of ‘offense’ holding that ‘[a] natural construction of this language would require that the defendant make restitution only to victims of the offense for which he was convicted.’” United States v. Mounts, 793 F. 2d 125, 127 (1986) (citations omitted). I would grant the petition for a writ of certio-rari in order to resolve this conflict.
Combined text as published — syllabus, headnotes and all opinions in one document
493 U.S. 906 110 S.Ct. 264 107 L.Ed.2d 214
Ovie L. DUNCAN, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.
No. 88-7294.
Supreme Court of the United States
October 10, 1989
Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
1
Denied.
2
Justice WHITE, dissenting.
3
This case involves the interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (a) (1982 ed., Supp. V), which provides that a court may order a defendant convicted under that title to make restitution "to any victim of such offense." Ibid. In this case, the Tenth Circuit read the term "offense" as used in § 3663(a) broadly: the term does not "restrict a sentencing judge to conside[r] only those acts for which conviction was had, or for which the defendant pleaded guilty." 870 F.2d 1532, 1536 (1989). The Sixth Circuit, by contrast, has "adopted a narrow definition of 'offense' holding that '[a] natural construction of this language would require that the defendant make restitution only to victims of the offense for which he was convicted.' " United States v. Mounts, 793 F.2d 125, 127 (1986) (citations omitted). I would grant the petition for a writ of certiorari in order to resolve this conflict.
How later courts describe this case
Explanatory parentheticals written by citing courts — 6 in all; the most informative distinct ones are shown.
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(permitting court to order restitution for "other criminal acts that had a significant connection to the act for which conviction was had”)
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(rejecting assertion of a psychotherapist/patient privilege by target of grand jury murder investigation)
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(the term offense does not “restrict a sentencing judge to [consider] only those acts for which conviction was had, or for which the defendant pleaded guilty”)
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(petitioner could have submitted mixed petition and then asked the district court to hold it in abeyance and issue a stay of execution pending exhaustion)
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