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Grants State Bank v. Pouges

GRANTS STATE BANK, a New Mexico Banking Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James POUGES, Defendant-Appellee

Grants State Bank v. Pouges, 503 P.2d 320 (N.M. 1972)
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Court
New Mexico Supreme Court · State Highest Courts
Decided
November 22, 1972
Docket
No. 9505
Judges
Steppienson, McManus, Oman
Citations
503 P.2d 32084 N.M. 340

Opinion — Steppienson

OPINION STEPPIENSON, Justice.

Grants State Bank (“the Bank”) sought judgment against Mr. Pouges for a deficiency on a promissory note after repossession and sale of an automobile. Judgment was for defendant, and the Bank appealed.

The Bank in its first four points asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to make certain findings requested by it.

The first two of the requested findings relate to whether or not Mr. Pouges was in default on the date of repossession, and whether or not defendant properly received notice of the proposed sale. If these findings favorable to the Bank had been adopted, they would not necessarily have affected the ultimate disposition of the case. Thus, the trial court’s failure to adopt these requested findings was not reversible error. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Foster, 76 N.M. 310 , 414 P.2d 672 (1966); Hunker v. Melugin, 74 N.M. 116 , 391 P.2d 407 (1964); Save-Rite Drug Stores v. Stamm, 58 N.M. 357 , 271 P.2d 396 (1954).

The other refused requests relate to the fair market value of the automobile at the date of the sale and the balance owing to the Bank after the sale. If adopted, these findings would have been supported by substantial evidence, but the trial court adopted contra findings also supportable by substantial evidence. Flere again, this does not constitute reversible error. As we stated in Armijo v. Via Development Corporation, 81 N.M. 262 , 466 P.2d 108 (1970):

“Where the evidence is conflicting, the refusal to make findings and conclusions favorable to the unsuccessful party cannot be sustained as error. Gilon v. Franco, 77 N.M. 786 , 427 P.2d 666 (1967); Varney v. Taylor, 77 N.M. 28 , 419 P.2d 234 (1966).”

Finally, in its last two points the Bank argues that the trial court erred in making certain findings as to the fair market value of the automobile at the time of the sale and the commercial reasonableness of the sale. These findings cannot be disturbed since they are supported by substantial evidence.

Finding no error the judgment is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

McMANUS and OMAN, JJ, concur.

How later courts describe this case

No later court has written an explanatory parenthetical about this case yet.

1973: 21974: 11985: 21993: 119732026peak 1973 · 2

Citing references are not a citator: they show that a later opinion cites this case, not whether it followed, distinguished, or overruled it. Check negative history before relying on this case.

Authorities cited 6

DepthCaseCited by
Varney v. Taylor, 419 P.2d 234 (N.M. 1966) 31
Md. Cas. Co. v. Foster, 414 P.2d 672 (N.M. 1966) 11
Armijo v. via Dev. Corp., 466 P.2d 108 (N.M. 1970) 9
Save-Rite Drug Stores, Inc. v. Stamm, 271 P.2d 396 (N.M. 1954) 9
Gilon v. Franco, 427 P.2d 666 (N.M. 1967) 8
Hunker ex rel. Estate of Jernigan v. Melugin, 391 P.2d 407 (N.M. 1964) 6

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