Gullard v. State
James Lee GULLARD, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee
Opinion
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, James Gullard, was convicted upon his plea of nolo contendere to one count of manslaughter under AS 11.15.040. The trial court, pursuant to its authority under AS 33.15.230(a) (1), imposed a ten-year sentence with one-third to be served without possibility of parole. The trial court also ordered that Gullard’s driving privileges be revoked pursuant to AS 28.-15.210.
1
Gullard has appealed to this court contending that the sentence was excessive.
The facts may be briefly stated. On the night of March 6, 1970, Gullard, who had been drinking and driving recklessly, was involved in a serious automobile accident which resulted in the deaths of four people. He was 19 years of age at the time. Gullard was indicted on four counts of manslaughter and he thereafter entered a plea of nolo contendere which resulted in a conviction on one count of manslaughter. Subsequent to the accident, but prior to the imposition of sentence, Gullard twice violated AS 28.35.030, the law prohibiting op *94 eration of a motor vehicle while intoxicated. He entered pleas of guilty to each subsequent charge prior to the imposition of the sentence in the instant case on September 24, 1971.
On appeal, Gullard argues that the ten-year sentence, with service of one-third mandatory prior to consideration being given to parole, is excessive. We find that the ten-year sentence and the revocation of Gullard’s driver’s license are well calculated to serve the reformative purposes of penal administration, promotion of societal norms, and deterrence, 2
and are thus within the zone of reasonableness.
3
However, we agree with Gullard that the mandatory service of one-third of his prison term prior to parole should be vacated. Because of Gullard’s youth and the length of sentence imposed, we believe that his eligibility for parole can be more appropriately determined by the parole board in these circumstances.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
ERWIN, J., not participating.
1
. The period of revocation under AS 28.15.260 is one year. However, the affected person must reapply for a license nnd tlie Department of Public Safety must evaluate the acceptability of relicensing him.
2
. State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 443 (Alaska 1970) ; Waters v. State, 483 P.2d 199, 202 (Alaska 1971).
3
. Gilmore v. State, 479 P.2d 301, 302 (Alaska 1971).
How later courts describe this case
Explanatory parentheticals written by citing courts — 7 in all; the most informative distinct ones are shown.
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(affirming ten-year sentence for nineteen-year-old defendant who killed four people and was convicted of manslaughter and had two subsequent DWI convictions while awaiting sentencing)
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(noting then-controlling AS 33.15.230(a); under that provision sentencing courts had authority to either restrict discretionary parole for any period up to one-third of the maximum sentence imposed or specify that parole elibigility would be determined by the Parole Board)
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(ten year sentence for nineteen year old defendant who had two driving while intoxicated convictions prior to sentencing and who had caused an accident killing four people)
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(nineteen-year-old first felony offender received ten-year sentence for traffic manslaughter; court affirmed sentence but vacated parole restriction in light of defendant's youth and the length of his sentence)
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(ten years for a driver with two prior DWIs who killed four persons)
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