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SeaRiver Maritime Financial Holdings, Inc. v. Slater

SEARIVER MARITIME FINANCIAL HOLDINGS, INC., Et Al., Plaintiffs, v. Rodney SLATER, Et Al., Defendants

SeaRiver Mar. Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Slater, 35 F. Supp. 2d 756 (D. Alaska 1998)
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Court
District Court, D. Alaska · Federal District Courts
Decided
July 13, 1998
Docket
No. A97-0060-CV-HRH
Judges
Holland
Citations
35 F. Supp. 2d 7561998 WL 9937321998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21984

Opinion — Holland

ORDER HOLLAND, District Judge.

Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment 1

Plaintiff moves pursuant to Rule 59, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for an alteration or amendment of the court’s judgment herein which dismissed plaintiffs complaint with prejudice. The motion is opposed. Oral argument has not been requested and is not deemed necessary.

By order filed June 4, 1998, 2

the court decided this case on cross-motions for summary judgment. In the instant motion, plaintiff suggests that the court misinterpreted paragraph 20 of the consent decree by which the parties concluded earlier litigation between them. The argument which plaintiff now makes is at best a modest variation of arguments already made by the plaintiff and already rejected by the court. Paragraph 20 of the consent decree provided with some amplification that the parties were settling “any and all claims”.

The plaintiff (and its predecessor, Exxon Shipping Company) is not an unsophisticated party. The plaintiff (Exxon Shipping) in the earlier litigation was represented by a substantial number of lawyers, all of whom are highly experienced and competent to handle the business of the most sophisticated of clients. Witness some of the other terms of the consent decree, clients and counsel of the sophistication of those involved in this case do not sign agreements without parsing them with extraordinary care to be certain that they have said what they meant to say; and the court believes that the consent decree (Paragraph 20) means exactly what it says. The parties settled “any and all claims”. Where the parties meant to except a matter from the reach of that term, the parties expressly included an exception. The peripheral (“including without limitation [etc.]”) language which follows the release of any and all claims is merely descriptive, and the court rejects the notion that the failure to *757 mention constitutional claims in the latter language detracts from the reach of the general proposition which was that the parties were buying complete peace except for very specifically enumerated matters which did not include this dispute over whether or not the tanker Exxon Valdez (now SeaRiver Mediterranean) has been unconstitutionally barred from Prince William Sound.

The motion to alter or amend judgment is denied.

1

. Clerk’s Docket No. 42.

2

. Clerk’s Docket No. 40.

How later courts describe this case

Explanatory parentheticals written by citing courts — 2 in all; the most informative distinct ones are shown.

2001: 220012026peak 2001 · 2

Relies on it most ⓘ

  1. The Exxon Valdez, Grant Baker, as Representatives of the Mandatory Punitive Damages Class v. Joseph Hazelwood, and Exxon Corporation Exxon Shipping Company, in Re: The Exxon Valdez, Grant Baker, as Representatives of the Mandatory Punitive Damages Class v. Exxon Corporation Exxon Shipping Company, and Joseph Hazelwood, Daniel R. Calhoun Bradford J. Chisholm David P. Clarke Thomas S. McAllister Phillip G. McCrudden Michael J. McClenaghan Guy Piercey Hugh Wisner Grant C. Baker Larry L. Dooley Kim J. Ewers John W. Herschleb Kent Herschleb David B. Horne Michael J. Owecke Gerald E. Thorne George A. Gordaoff Old Harbor Native Corporation Timberline, Inc. Barbara Brown John Foges Jamie L. Halladay Charles McMahon Jennifer Briggs Terri Mast Mark T. Coles Fred Galicano Mike Hollerbeke Kathy Bryan Vincent Libed Art Huddleston Opinion Robert Love Roxane Villaueva Marcelo Rombaoa Scott Hulbert Brian Gillis Frank Michael Carlson Elenor McMullen Native Village of Larsen Bay Native Village of Chenega Bay v. Exxon Corporation Exxon Shipping Company Joseph Hazelwood270 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2001)
  2. Baker ex rel. Mandatory Punitive Damages Class v. Hazelwood270 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2001)

Most recent

  1. The Exxon Valdez, Grant Baker, as Representatives of the Mandatory Punitive Damages Class v. Joseph Hazelwood, and Exxon Corporation Exxon Shipping Company, in Re: The Exxon Valdez, Grant Baker, as Representatives of the Mandatory Punitive Damages Class v. Exxon Corporation Exxon Shipping Company, and Joseph Hazelwood, Daniel R. Calhoun Bradford J. Chisholm David P. Clarke Thomas S. McAllister Phillip G. McCrudden Michael J. McClenaghan Guy Piercey Hugh Wisner Grant C. Baker Larry L. Dooley Kim J. Ewers John W. Herschleb Kent Herschleb David B. Horne Michael J. Owecke Gerald E. Thorne George A. Gordaoff Old Harbor Native Corporation Timberline, Inc. Barbara Brown John Foges Jamie L. Halladay Charles McMahon Jennifer Briggs Terri Mast Mark T. Coles Fred Galicano Mike Hollerbeke Kathy Bryan Vincent Libed Art Huddleston Opinion Robert Love Roxane Villaueva Marcelo Rombaoa Scott Hulbert Brian Gillis Frank Michael Carlson Elenor McMullen Native Village of Larsen Bay Native Village of Chenega Bay v. Exxon Corporation Exxon Shipping Company Joseph Hazelwood270 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2001)
  2. Baker ex rel. Mandatory Punitive Damages Class v. Hazelwood270 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2001)

Citing references are not a citator: they show that a later opinion cites this case, not whether it followed, distinguished, or overruled it. Check negative history before relying on this case.

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