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Carson S. Kee v. United States of America, Willie J

Carson S. KEE, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee; Willie J. JOHNSON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee

Kee v. United States, Willie J, 418 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
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Court
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · U.S. Courts of Appeals
Decided
August 13, 1969
Docket
No. 21877_1
Judges
Bazelon, McGowan, Leventhal
Citations
418 F.2d 465

Opinion — Per Curiam

PER CURIAM:

We have considered the contention of insufficiency of the evidence, and we conclude the evidence was sufficient, though not by a wide margin, to support a conviction of unauthorized use of an automobile (22 D.C.Code § 2204).

We are more concerned with the sufficiency of the evidence to support the convictions for robbing the complainant of two dollars in violation of 22 D.C.Code § 2901, and for transporting a stolen vehicle across state lines in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1964). Obviously more proof is necessary for the Dyer Act charge, dependent on an intent that requires a stealing, than for an unauthorized use charge.

The Government contends the point is moot because the trial judge sentenced the appellants pursuant to the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5010 (b) (1964), which necessarily means concurrent sentences.

Compare Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 , 63 S.Ct. 1375 , 87 L.Ed. 1774 (1943). The question is not necessarily appropriate for a flat rule.

There may well be a significant difference between a record of three felonies (including robbery) and a record of one felony, in regard to what appellants will receive in terms of treatment and supervision, and also early conditional release under 18 U.S.C. § 5017 (1964).

We think the interest of justice which controls appellate disposition, see 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1964), has particular vitality when the future of youth offenders is at stake. Accordingly, we enter judgment of affirmance of the sentence as a judgment entered following a conviction of unauthorized use, 1

but limited to that conviction.

So ordered.

1

. Since the point was not contested and may become academic in the light of future release, we do not consider the question arising from the fact that there is a possibility of a 6-year period prior to appellants’ unconditional discharge, see 18 U.S.C. .§ 5017 (c), although the maximum penalty for unauthorized use is 5 years.

Compare In re Lee’s Petition, 232 F.Supp. 415 (E.D.N.Y.1964).

How later courts describe this case

No later court has written an explanatory parenthetical about this case yet.

1971: 119712026peak 1971 · 1

Relies on it most ⓘ

  1. United States v. Dennis O. Miller449 F.2d 974 (D.C. Cir. 1971)

Most recent

  1. United States v. Dennis O. Miller449 F.2d 974 (D.C. Cir. 1971)

Citing references are not a citator: they show that a later opinion cites this case, not whether it followed, distinguished, or overruled it. Check negative history before relying on this case.

Authorities cited 2

DepthCaseCited by
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) 696
In re Lee, 232 F. Supp. 415 (E.D.N.Y. 1964) 6

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