United States v. Reginald Lorenza Mathews

OPINION Before KOELSCH and DUNIWAY, Circuit Judges, and TAYLOR, * District Judge.

PER CURIAM:

Reginald Lorenza Mathews appeals from a judgment of conviction of two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a) [possession of a firearm, in or affecting commerce, by a convicted felon]. We affirm.

His sole contention, that the district court’s charge to the jury erroneously permitted his conviction without proof that he knew he was a convicted felon at the time of the offense, is without merit. Mathews’ argument is essentially that his ignorance of the law, i. e., of the statutory classification rendering his pri- or conviction a felony within the meaning of § 1202(a), precludes his conviction here. But the short answer is provided by the time-honored maxim:

ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

Such was the rationale in United States v. Crow, 439 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir. 1971), vacated on other grounds, 404 U.S. 1009 , 92 S.Ct. 687 , 30 L.Ed.2d 657 (1972). There we held that § 1202(a) does not require proof of knowledge or intent, “except as the word ‘possession’ imports a knowing possession.” 439 F.2d at 1195 . We seize this opportunity to reaffirm that conclusion.

1

We have reviewed the district court’s instructions as to the § 1202(a) counts and conclude they were wholly proper— both consistent with the reasoning underlying Crow and in accordance with the plain language of the statute.

Affirmed.

1

. We note that other circuits have followed the reasoning of Crow on the specific intent issue.

See United States v. Horton, 503 F.2d 810, 813 (7th Cir. 1974);

United States v. Mostad, 485 F.2d 199, 200 (8th Cir. 1973);

United States v. Thomas, 484 F.2d 909, 914-915 (6th Cir. 1973);

United States v. Lupino, 480 F.2d 720, 724 (8th Cir. 1973);

United States v. Wiley, 478 F.2d 415, 417-418 (8th Cir. 1973);

United States v. Smith, 477 F.2d 399, 401 (8th Cir. 1973).