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Buckingham's Appeal From Probate

Irene M. Buckingham's Appeal From Probate.

Buckingham's Appeal From Probate, 22 A. 509 (Conn. 1891)
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Court
Supreme Court of Connecticut · State Highest Courts
Decided
March 4, 1891
Judges
Torkance, Andrews, Carpenter, Loomis, Seymour, Torrance
Citations
22 A. 50960 Conn. 1431891 Conn. LEXIS 20
Syllabus
G, who had several thousand dollars standing to her credit in a savings hank, requested the teller of the bank to transfer $1,500 to each of three nieces whom she named, one of whom was with her, which he did, charging her account with $4,500, and opening an account with each of the nieces for $1,500, and preparing a bank book for each. C requested that the hank books should be so made that the money could not be drawn out during her life, and the teller endorsed on each of them — “ Only Mrs. O has power to draw.” C and the niece who was present wrote their names in a signature book kept by the bank, the teller adding to G’s name the word “Trustee.” The names of the others were afterwards written by them on slips and sent to the bank, the teller writing C’s name with the word trustee added. Chad before the transfer declared her intention to make the gifts. After the transfer she took the new books and kept them during her life. It was found that she so held them only as trustee for the nieces, and that the nieces accepted the gifts in her lifetime. Held to be a valid gift inter vivos. B, one of the residuary legatees under the will of O, appealed from a probate decree allowing the final account of the executor, in which he had not charged himself with money which he claimed had been given to these nieces by G in her lifetime. B had previously procured her daughter, also one of the residuary legatees, to bring a bill in equity against the executor and the three nieces, to compel the latter to pay to the executor the money so received and the executor to receive and account for it, and had employed counsel to. manage the suit, and upon the facts proved the bill had been dismissed. Held that though B was not a party on the record, yet that she was an actual party to that suit, and that the decree was admissible against her upon the trial of the probate appeal. The decree did not show the facts on which it was based, but the opinion of the court stated them. Held that the opinion was inadmissible as not being in itself evidence. It might be shown by parol evidence what was in issue in the former case. Where inadmissible evidence has been received by the court below, unless it clearly appears that no harm could have been done, the safer rule is to grant a new trial. The legal title to all personal property of a decedent vests in his legal representative, who holds it as trustee for all parties interested in it.
Summary
Appeal from a probate decree accepting and approving the administration account of the executor of the will of Irene Clark, deceased ; taken to the Superior Court in New Haven County. The case was heard before Robinson, J., by whom the following finding of facts was made. Irene M. Clark died in April, 1887, leaving a will, dated November 11th, 1881, which was duly probated, by which she gave all the residue of her personal property to the appellant and five others, to be equally divided among them. On the 15th of October, 1884, she had on deposit in the Connecticut Savings Bank of New Haven $5,871. A few days prior to that date she told one Georgiana Hubbell that she was going to give to each of her nieces, Mary Bell Clark, Emma Clark, and Ellen C. Platt, a sum of money, and requested her to go with her to New Haven for the purpose. This she was unable to do, and Mrs. Clark then requested the said Ellen C. Platt to go with her. On the 15th of October, 1884, Mrs. Clark and the said Ellen went together to the savings bank at New Haven, and Mrs. Clark told the teller to write up her deposit book, and desired that $1,500 should be transferred from her account to each one of the three nieces named. This was done, and three new accounts were opened in their names. Each was credited with $1,500, and Mrs. Clark’s account was reduced $4,500. Three new pass-books were made out in the names of the three new depositors, and were given to Mrs. Clark. She told the teller, in the presence and hearing of said Ellen, that she wanted to have the bank books so fixed, or the entries so made, that the money should belong to the three nieces named by .her, but so that they could not draw it out and spend it during her life. The teller therefore entered upon each of the pass-books — “ Only Mrs. Irene Clark has power to draw.” The ledger accounts of these deposits were in the names of the three nieces. Mrs. Clark declared to Mrs. Platt while at the bank that she had given her $1,500, and that she had given the same amount, each, to Emma Clark and Mary Bell Clark. The bank had a book called a signature book, in which was entered the signature of each depositor, with other facts relating to the depositor, for purposes of identification. When the bank books were given to Mrs. Clark, Mrs. Platt wrote her name on this signature book opposite the number of the book in her name, and Mrs. Clark also signed under the name of Mrs. Platt, and the two names were included in a bracket. The teller added to the name of Mrs. Clark the word “ Trustee.” The words “ Mrs. Clark only to draw,” were also written in the margin by the teller. Bank slips were also handed to Mrs. Clark by the teller, and she was desired to obtain the signatures of Emma Clark and Mary B. Clark upon those slips, and to have them write upon the slips certain other required facts, and return the same to the bank, to be pasted in the signature book. On the same day, upon her return to Milford, Mrs. Clark showed these three bank books to the husband of Mrs. Ellen C. Platt, and said to him that she had given the girls $1,500 each, and that the girls should share equally in the will, as if she had not given them the money; she also showed him the two slips, and instructed him to have Emma Clark and Mary B. Clark informed that these slips must be signed and returned to the bank. Emma Clark called at Mrs. Clark’s house, and was told by her that she had given each of her said nieces fl,500 ; she was shown the pass-book issued to herself, and those issued to the other two nieces, and was given the slip to fill out, sign and return to the bank. At the same time Mrs. Clark gave to Emma Clark’s husband the slip for Mary B. Clark, with instructions to deliver it to her to sign and return to the bank. The slip delivered to Emma Clark and the one sent to Mary B. Clark were filled out and signed by them, and returned to the bank, where the signatures were pasted in the signature book in their appropriate places. After these signatures were pasted in the book the teller wrote under each signature the words “ Mrs. Irene Clark, Trustee,” and on the margin, the words “ Mrs. Clark only to draw.” Afterwards, and within a few days, Mrs. Clark and Mary B. Clark met, and Mrs. Clark informed her that she had made her a gift of $1,500, and informed her of the fact of her having taken out a bank book in her name for that sum, and also named the other two nieces as having received from her a like gift. Mrs. Clark also inquired of her whether she had received her paper, referring to the slip, and whether she had signed it and returned it to the bank. Mrs. Clark after her return from New Haven declared to a number of her personal friends and neighbors that she had given to these nieces $1,500 apiece, and to two of these persons stated in addition that notwithstanding these gifts her nieces were to share equally with the others under her will. The bank books were retained by Mrs. Clark in her possession. Mrs. Clark, at the time she made the transfers at the bank from her own name to the names of the nieces, intended to give to each of them the sum deposited in her name, and intended to retain custody and control over the bank book and deposit only as trustee for them. The teller at the bank was honestly attempting in making the various entries on the deposit books, and in the signature book, to carry out this intention of Mrs. Clark thus expressed to him. The court finds that the donees accepted the gifts of the sums of money so deposited. The bank books remained in the possession of Mrs. Clark until her death, with the exception of a short period before her death, when they were delivered to Mrs. Ellen C. Platt, with four other bank books belonging to Mrs. Clark absolutely, she remarking at the time — Nellie, I want you to take these bank books and keep them until I call for them: possession is half.” They were retained by her for a few days, when they were asked for by Mrs. Clark and returned to her. Shortly after October 15th, 1884, Mrs. Platt informed the appellant that Mrs. Clark had given the three nieces $1,500 each, and on December 14th, 1884, the appellant wrote a letter to Mrs. Clark, saying she had been informed of the gifts, and asked her to give her some money that was deposited in the Bridgeport Savings Bank. This letter Mrs. Clark gave to Mrs. Platt and told her to keep it, as it might be of value to her. To the admission of this letter the appellant objected as irrelevant and incompetent. The court overruled the objection, and the appellant duly excepted. Each of the three nieces has drawn $500 on her book. Upon the hearing at the trial the appellee claimed that, upon the question of the title to the deposits in the three bank books, the decree in the case of Miller v. Clark and others, hereinafter referred to, was, if admissible in evidence, conclusive, and would estop the appellant from offering evidence upon the point in question, and requested the court to allow him to open the case and offer the judgment; but the court declined to permit it, and the appellant offered evidence in regard to the title of the bank deposits, and both parties were fully heard in reference thereto ; and upon the evidence so received the above finding in relation to the ownership of the deposits is made. The appellant claimed that the facts showed a gift of a testamentary nature to take effect at the death of Mrs. Clark, and that her control over the deposits and retention of the books during her life rendered it such a testamentary gift, and therefore void because not in testamentary form ; but the court overruled this claim, and affirmed the judgment of the court below. On the 3d of January, 1887, Martha A. Miller, of Iowa, a daughter of the appellant, and one of the residuary legatees with her of the personal property under the will, brought a bill in equity in the United States Circuit Court for the District of Connecticut against the said Emma Clark, Mary Bell Clark, Ellen C. Platt, and the executor, the present appellee, asking that they be compelled to turn over to the executor said bank books, and that the executor be ordered to receive said books and the money deposited in the Connecticut Savings Bank, and to include said sum and accrued interest as assets of the estate of Mrs. Clark, and amend his inventory so as to include the same. The executor offered in evidence a certified copy of the record in the case, including the opinion of Judge Shipman-, and the printed proofs taken before an examiner, on which the decree was based, supported by oral testimony that these printed proofs were those so taken and the only proofs used at the hearing. The printed proofs were not certified, but certification was waived by the appellant, and it was admitted that the proofs were correctly printed as taken.* The appellant excepted to the whole evidence as irrelevant, and res inter alios acta, and also to the copies as not showing on what proof the decree was based, and as showing that the executor disclaimed any title and interest in the bank books, and did not claim to represent the appellant in the matter ; and objected also to so much of them as contained Judge Shipman’s opinion, as being no part of the record and mere hearsay, and irrelevant and incompetent to explain the grounds of the decree. The court overruled all these objections and admitted the evidence, and held that the opinion of Judge Shipman: might be read to show the grounds of the decree. Said action was brought at the request of the appellant and for her benefit, and the appellant’s attorneys, Mr. McMahon and Mr. Buckingham, appeared and had the exclusive charge of the case during the preparation and trial thereof, except that the bill in the case was originally drafted by Mrs. Miller’s counsel in Iowa. This bill was sent to the appellant’s attorney, Mr. McMahon, who made such changes in it as he deemed best, and had the action commenced. Mr. Baldwin, the appellant’s attorney in this appeal from probate, was not concerned in the Miller case. Mr. McMahon advised with the appellant touching the case. The executor’s charges consisted of time and money spent, principally in attending to lawsuits which were brought against the estate. A small part only accrued upon the Miller case. The appellant was a very active promoter of this litigation, and either directly or indirectly was- responsible for the existence of most of it. The charges of the executor were reasonable arid fair charges. At. the hearing before the probate court the executor appeared with Touchers for each item of his account, and offered to show them to the appellant and her attorney; but the appellant waived the production, and made no objection to the account, except by filing certain written objections. All the items of the account were true and just charges against the estate, and all, except the executor’s charges for services, were admitted to be correct and just. The appellant claimed, and asked the court to hold, that the form of the account was not proper, in that it was in gross, without proper explanation of its nature; but the court overruled the objection. The court affirmed the decree of the probate court, and the appellant appealed to this court.

Syllabus and headnotes are prepared by the reporter or publisher, not the court, and are not part of the opinion.

Opinion of the Court — TorkANCE

TorkANCE, J.

In the case at bar the present appellant, Irene M. Buckingham, took an appeal to the Superior Court from a decree of the court of probate for the district of Milford accepting and approving the final administration account of the executor upon the estate of one Irene Clark, deceased. The appellant was ohe of the residuary legatees of the personal property under the will. The reasons assigned for taking the appeal were three in number, namely:— First.

Because the executor had not charged himself with all the assets and property belonging to the estate that came into his hands.

Second.

Because the court allowed the executor’s account “ in gross and without proper itemizing and explanation.”

Third.

Because the court allowed amounts for personal services and expenses to the executor, which were alleged to be “ excessive, unnecessary, unjust and illegal.”

Upon the trial in the Superior Court the principal point in dispute between the parties related to the matter referred to in the first assigned reason of appeal. The decision of this point turned upon the question whether Mrs. Irene Clark, in her lifetime, had or had not made to three of her nieces a valid gift of certain moneys in bank, amounting in the whole to forty-five hundred dollars. If such gifts were valid, then the money in question did not belong to the estate, and ought not to have been inventoried as part thereof. If they were not valid gifts, then, of course, the money formed a part of the estate and should have been so returned.

The Superior Court found all the facts and circumstances under which the claimed gifts of fifteen hundred dollars to each of three nieces were made ; that in what Mrs. Clark so did with reference to the making of the gifts, she intended *157 to make a valid gift of that sum to each of the nieces, to take effect at that time; and that the nieces then accepted the gifts.

The facts and circumstances aforesaid are particularly found and stated upon the record, but for the purposes of this decision it is unnecessary to state them at greater length here.

We are satisfied that the conclusion of the court below, upon the facts as found, that these gifts of money to the nieces were valid gifts, was right, whether regarded as a conclusion of fact or as one of law. But in the trial of the case we think the court erred in admitting certain evidence against the objection of the appellant. We do not here refer to the admission of the letter written by the appellant to the deceased, for we think that was, under the circumstances, properly admitted, and indeed this point was not pressed before us on the argument. We refer to the admission of the opinion of the judge in the case from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Connecticut, to which reference is hereinafter made.

It appears from the record in the case at bar, that in 1887, oue Martha A. Miller of Iowa, a daughter of the appellant, and one of the residuary legatees of the personal property under the will of Mrs. Clark, brought a bill in equity, in the above named court, against the executor of Mrs. Clark’s will and the three nieces to whom the gifts were made by Mrs. Clark in her lifetime, asking that the nieces be compelled to turn over to the executor the money so given, and the bank books which had been taken therefor in the names of the nieces, and that the executor be ordered to receive and account for the money as such executor. The court upon the facts dismissed the bill. Upon the trial of this present case in the court below, the executor of Mrs. Clark, who is the sole appellee in the case at bar, offered in evidence a certified copy of the record of the case aforesaid, in the United States Circuit Court, together with a like copy of the opinion filed in the cause by the judge who tried it, and the printed proofs taken before an examiner in the *158 cause. The appellant objected to the whole of this evidence, as among other things “irrelevant and res inter alios acta,” and also to the copies, “ as not showing on what proof the decree was based.” She also objected to the opinion of the judge “ as being no part of tbe record and mere hearsay, and irrelevant and incompetent to explain the grounds ol the decree.” The court overruled each and all of these objections, admitted the evidence, and held that the opinion of the judge might be read and used to show the grounds of the decree.

If tbe present appellant was a party or privy to the suit in the United States Court, then of course the legal record in that suit would have been admissible against her upon any matter which had been there litigated and determined between herself and the present appellee.

She was clearly not a party of record in that suit, but the appellee claims that she was, within the meaning of the law, an actual party thereto, and in privity with himself, as executor of the estate which he, in that suit, represented. In regard to the actual connection of the present appellant with the suit in the United States Court, the record is as follows : — “ The said Martha Miller is one of the devisees under said will, (that is, of Mrs. Clark), and the daughter of the appellant,' and said, action was brought at the request of the appellant and for her benefit, and the appellant’s attorneys, Mr. McMahon and Mr. Buckingham, appeared and had the exclusive charge of said case during the preparation and trial thereof, except that the bill in the case was originally drafted by Mrs. Miller’s counsel in Iowa. This bill was sent to the appellant’s attorney, Mr. McMahon, who made such changes in it as he deemed best, and had the action commenced. Mr. Baldwin, the appellant’s attorney in this appeal from probate, was not concerned in the Miller case. Mr. McMahon advised with the appellant touching this Miller case.”

It thus appears from the record that the present appellant, for her own benefit as a legatee under the will of Mrs. Clark, caused a suit to be brought in the United States *159 Court in the name of ber daughter, another legatee under the will, against the executor of Mrs. Clark’s estate and those to whom the gifts aforesaid had been made, to determine whether the money claimed under the gifts was or was not the money of the estate, for which the executor should account. This suit was commenced by her attorneys, it was prosecuted by them to a final conclusion, and they had the exclusive charge of it during the preparation and trial thereof, with the exception of the original draft of the bill. To that suit the estate of Mrs. Clark, through the executor thereof, was a party. So far as legatees and distrib-utees of the personal property were concerned, the executor represented them and their interest in the estate in this proceeding.

“ The rule of law is well established that the legal title to all personal property of the deceased vests in his legal representatives. They can dispose of it at pleasure, being responsible for the faithful execution of the trust.”

Beecher v. Buckingham, 18 Conn., 110; Johnson v. Connecticut Bank, 21 id., 156 . The ...........................personal representative holds such property as a trustee of all parties interested therein. Schouler on Exrs. & Admrs., § 289.

Assuming that the United States Court had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter, we think, if the decree in that suit had determined that the gifts in question were invalid, and that the money so given belonged to the estate, such a decree would have been admissible in evidence iii the present case in favor of the appellant and against the ap-pellee. If this be so, we see no good reason why it is not admissible in evidence against the appellant and in favor of the estate upon this same point, more especially in view of the fact that the appellant was the party who actually brought and conducted the suit.

The following authorities support this conclusion.

Crandall v. Gallup, 12 Conn., 365 ;

Gould v. Stanton, 16 id., 21;

Teague v. Corbitt, 57 Ala., 529 ;

Scott v. Ware, 64 id., 174;

Stone v. Wood, 16 Ill., 177; Castellaw v. Guilmartin, 54 Geo., 299;

Steele v. Lineberger, 59 Penn. St., 308.

*160 Whether, when so admitted, such decree would be conclusive or not, we have no occasion at present to determine.

In admitting the record itself therefore, under the circumstances disclosed by the finding, we do not think the court below erred. But the court also admitted in evidence the written opinion of the judge who tried the case in the United States Court. This was no part of the record. It was admitted for the purpose of showing the grounds of the decree. The decree itself did not show on what facts it was based.

After the record was admitted, the question then was whether the validity of the gifts to the nieces, which was in issue in the case at bar, had been in issue and had been determined in the prior suit. In such a case, if the record does not clearly disclose the facts upon which the judgment or decree is based, they may be shown by any proper evidence outside of the record.

Supples v. Gannon, 44 Conn., 424 ;

Mosman v. Sanford, 52 Conn., 28 . But the witnesses who give such evidence must give it in the ordinary way, and under the conditions imposed upon all witnesses. It must be given under oath and subject to the right of cross-examination, and it must not be what is termed “ hearsay ” evidence.

By the admission of the opinion aforesaid, as evidence to show the grounds of the decree, these fundamental rules of evidence were violated, and the court committed an error. But the appellee claims that, if the court did so err, the decision at which the court arrived upon the merits of the case, was not affected by the admission of the aforesaid testimony. This may be true, but we cannot be certain of it. The conclusions of the court below were drawn after the reception of the entire testimony, and we cannot profitably speculate as to the degree of influence which the objectionable testimony had in the final result. In such a case, unless it clearly appears that no harm could have been done, perhaps the safer rule is to grant a new trial.

Jacques v. Bridgeport Horse JR. JR. Co., 41 Conn., 66 ;

Richmond v. Stable, 48 id., 22.

*161 We regret the necessity tbat compels us to grant a new trial in a case like the one at bar, where the real questions at issue have been so fully tried before two able and impartial judges, but we see no way of avoiding such a result in the present case.

For the reasons herein given the judgment of the court below is reversed and a new trial is granted.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

How later courts describe this case

No later court has written an explanatory parenthetical about this case yet.

Cited by 18 cases

View all citing references →
1893: 21894: 11895: 11896: 11901: 11907: 11908: 11914: 21920: 11925: 11927: 11948: 11978: 11994: 11999: 12009: 118932026peak 1893 · 2

Relies on it most ⓘ

  1. Barbieri v. Cadillac Construction Corp.389 A.2d 1263 (Conn. 1978)
  2. Borkowski v. Borkowski638 A.2d 1060 (Conn. 1994) · Dissent
  3. State v. Schleifer130 A. 184 (Conn. 1925)
  4. Rice v. Bennington County Savings Bank108 A. 708 (Vt. 1920) · Dissent
  5. Meriden Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Miller90 A. 228 (Conn. 1914)
  6. Oles v. Furlong57 A.2d 405 (Conn. 1948)

Most recent

  1. Wasniewski v. Quick and Reilly, Inc.971 A.2d 8 (Conn. 2009)
  2. State v. Fitzgerald737 A.2d 922 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999)
  3. Borkowski v. Borkowski638 A.2d 1060 (Conn. 1994) · Dissent
  4. Barbieri v. Cadillac Construction Corp.389 A.2d 1263 (Conn. 1978)
  5. Oles v. Furlong57 A.2d 405 (Conn. 1948)
  6. Pettee v. Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co.136 A. 111 (Conn. 1927)

Citing references are not a citator: they show that a later opinion cites this case, not whether it followed, distinguished, or overruled it. Check negative history before relying on this case.

Authorities cited 6

DepthCaseCited by
Beecher v. Buckingham, 18 Conn. 110 (1846) 10
Teague v. Corbitt, 57 Ala. 529 (1877) 42
Stone v. Wood, 16 Ill. 177 (1854) 33
Supples v. Cannon, 44 Conn. 424 (1877) 25
Jacques v. Bridgeport Horse R.R., 41 Conn. 61 (1874) 18
Crandall v. Gallup, 12 Conn. 365 (1837) 5

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