Clark v. Parsons

Clark v. Parsons.

Clark v. Parsons, 39 A. 898 (N.H. 1897)

Court: Supreme Court of New Hampshire · State Highest Courts
Decided: June 5, 1897
Judges: Wallace
Citations: 39 A. 89869 N.H. 147

Headnotes

The statute of limitations does not run against a tenant in common of a remainder during the continuance of the life estate; and Ms cotenant, who also owns the life estate, cannot acquire title by adverse possession until after its termination. A life estate will merge only to the extent of the life tenant’s interest in the remainder. A remainder-man who stands silent while a life tenant, believing ho owns the fee, improves the estate, is not thereby estopped to assert his title after the termination of the life estate, when an examination of the records would have diselosed his interest.

Summary

Bill in Equity, to remove a cloud upon the plaintiff’s title to a parcel of land in Bye, of which the defendant by his answer claims to own an undivided half. Eacts found by a referee. November 13, 1820, one Parsons conveyed the premises in question, with other land, to Amos 8. Parsons by warranty deed. Amos had three sons, Joseph, James M., and IsaacI)., and by his will, duly probated February 14, 1851, gave all his real estate, including the disputed premises, to Joseph for life, with remainder to James and Isaac. Isaac; lived in Portsmouth and died at sea, leaving two sons, William R and Lewis P. December 14, 1865, Joseph and James conveyed a tract of land containing about three fourths of an acre, known as the “ sea field,” with other land (all being part of the land devised by Amos), to William Berry, and Berry entered into occupation of the premises and continued in occupation till April 3, 1868, when he conveyed the same to 0. W. Trefethen. Trefethen occupied until September 2, 1871, when he conveyed the part called the “sea field” to Crosby and Henry Knox. In 1872, the Knoxes laid the “ sea field” out into house lots and built a large house on the lot, the title to which is in issue in this action. December 5, 1872, Crosby Knox conveyed his interest in the “ sea field,” including the premises in question, to G. W. Stone, and April 2, 1873, Henry Knox conveyed his interest in the same premises to Stone, who occupied them until July 6, 1880, when he conveyed them to George II. Emery, who June 6, 1891, conveyed them to the plaintiff, who» has occupied them ever since. All these conveyances were made by warranty deeds, duly recorded. None of the grantees, unless it was Berry, examined the records, and there was no evidence whether Berry did or not; each relied on the warranty in his deed. April 15, 1876, Isaac’s son' "William, and January 27, 1877, his-son Lewis, conveyed by deed each all bis interest or title to the lands of which Amos died seized to the defendant. Their deeds were immediately recorded. Joseph- died December 20, 1891. Amos was seized of the “ sea field” at the time of his death. The defendant is seventy-seven years old, and was acquainted with the land and knew all about the title long before he purchased it in 1876 and 1877. He was about the place in 1872, saw a plan of the house to be erected thereon before it was built and the house while they were building it, and knew the Knoxes had laid the “ sea field ” out into house lots and were selling them and building houses thereon ; but he never told them that their title was defective. In 1874, Stone built a stable, put up a tank, and laid out more than three hundred dollars on the premises. Emery made improvements while he owned the property to the extent of five or six hundred dollars. In 1881, the owners of the premises built additions to the house at a cost of twelve hundred dollars. In ]885, the owners of the “sea field,” which included the lot in question, built a heavy stone wall upon that part of the field next to the seashore, at considerable expense. The defendant knew when the additions to the house were made and saw the work being done, but did not then, nor at any time thereafter during the life tenant’s term, make claim upon or give notice to any occupant of the land that he owned or claimed to own any interest therein. He also knew, or ought to have known, of the construction of the wall. After the defendant bought out Isaac’s sons, he never claimed to any one until after the death of the life tenant that he owned one half of the land. At the trial, the defendant testified that he made no claim to the land until after the death of the life tenant, because counsel advised him it was unnecessary to-do so. Berry and his grantees have been in open, notorious, exclusive occupation of the premises since 1865, and have paid all taxes and insurance thereon. They had no actual notice of any adverse claim or of any defect in their title until after the death of Joseph in 1891, but believing the deed of Joseph and James conveyed a good title, expended their money relying thereon. The defendant either knew or ought to have known that the plaintiff was, and that his grantors had been, occupying the premises under a claim of exclusive ownership and without any actual knowledge of any adverse claim or defect in their title until after the 'death of the life tenant.

Syllabus and headnotes are prepared by the reporter or publisher, not the court, and are not part of the opinion.

Opinion of the Court — Wallace

Wallace, J.

The plaintiff has not acquired title to the premises by adverse possession as against the defendant, nor did the statute of limitations begin to run against an action for possession until the death of the life tenant, Joseph, in 1891.

Foster v. Marshall, 22 N. H.

491; Bodwell v. Nutter, 63 N. H. 446, 448;

Mixter v. Woodcock, 154 Mass. 535 .

But it is urged that Isaac or his sons might, at any time after the deed to Berry by Joseph and James, December 14,1865, have maintained an action to establish their title to the remainder according to the doctrine of Walker v. Walker, 63 N. H. 321. That case only gives the remainder-man the right to establish his title when it is questioned. It is a right of which he may avail himself, or not, as he may elect. If he does avail himself of it and the controversy is decided in his favor, it gives him no right to the possession or to a writ of possession during the existence of the life estate. Until the termination of the life estate no right of entry or right of possession exists in favor of the reversioner. Until the right of entry and the right of possession to the property accrue, the statute of limitations does not begin to run against an action for the possession.

It is claimed that when the life estate and the estate of one tenant in common of the remainder were granted to Berry, a merger of the life estate in the fee was effected by the coincidence of the two estates in one person, and that the life estate in the entire property was thereby extinguished. It is a sufficient answer to say that the life estate in the undivided half of the remainder belonging to Isaac could not merge in the undivided half of the remainder belonging to Berry; neither could the conveyance of the life estate to Berry, construed as a surrender, enure to the benefit of Isaac or those who claim under him. “ Merger is coextensive with the interest merged, as in the case of joint tenants and tenants in common; and it is only to the extent of the part in which the owner has two several estates. An estate may merge for one part of the land and continue in the remaining part of it.” 4 Kent *100, *101; Clark v. Clark, 56 N. H. 105, 113;

McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 80 Md. 115 .

*157 Another question which arises is whether the defendant is estopped by his silence to assert his title to the land in question. The general principle of estoppel in pais is, that where one by his words, conduct, or silence “ causes another to believe the existence of a certain state of things, and induces him to act on that belief, so as to alter his own previous position, the former is precluded from averring against the latter a different state of things, as existing at the same time.”

Pickard v. Sears, 6 A. & E. 469;

Corbett v. Norcross, 35 N. H. 99;

Richardson v. Chickering, 41 N. H. 380;

Horn v. Cole, 51 N. H. 287;

Stevens v. Dennett, 51 N. H. 324;

Allen v. Shaw, 61 N. H. 95. It is essential to the application of this principle that the party setting up the estoppel be ignorant of the truth of the matter in regard to which he claims he has been misled, and induced to act to his injury by the conduct or silence of the party to be estopped. If he was fully acquainted w/ith the facts of the case, there would be no estoppel. In respect to the title to real estate, if the party claiming the estoppel is acquainted with the true state of the title, or has an equal means with the other party of ascertaining it, as in the case of a duly recorded deed, there will be no estoppel, at least from mere silence.

Odlin v. Gove, 41 N. H. 465, 477;

Wood v. Griffin, 46 N. H. 230, 237;

Allen v. Shaw, supra; Jones v. Aqueduct, 62 N. H. 488;

Brant v. Iron Co., 93 U. S. 326, 337 .

The plaintiff claims that the defendant is estopped to assert title to the premises, because after he acquired the title he remained silent while the plaintiff made some permanent improvements. The situation of the title was shown by the records, and the information in regard to it was equally open to both parties. Although the plaintiff and those under whom he claims had no actual knowledge of the defect in their title, they had by the records constructive notice of it. Their failure to examine the records was not caused by anything said or done by the defendant. They might and should have informed themselves as to the title of the premises before purchasing or making permanent improvements. Their failure to do so was their own fault, and they cannot resort to an estoppel based upon the defendant’s silence to avoid the consequences of their own negligence.

It is not found, nor does it appear, that the plaintiff will be injured by the defendant’s assertion of his title. Upon partition of the entire common property, it may be that the defendant’s share can be assigned to him without affecting the plaintiff’s title to his improvements.

Holbrook v. Bowman, 62 N. H. 313, 320, 321. Whether the plaintiff can or cannot avail himself of the betterment law, is a question not considered.

Judgment for the defendant.

All concurred.

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Cited by 10 cases

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Relies on it most ⓘ

Blanchard v. Ward92 S.E.2d 776 (N.C. 1956)
Lotspeich v. Dean211 P.2d 979 (N.M. 1949)
Mizell v. Walley44 So. 2d 764 (Ala. 1950)
Medicine Lodge Investments, L.L.C. v. Ear, Inc.2008 OK CIV APP 107, 197 P.3d 502
Superior Oil Corporation v. Alcorn47 S.W.2d 973 (Ky. Ct. App. 1930)
Salyer's Guardian v. Keeton283 S.W. 1015 (Ky. Ct. App. 1926)

Most recent

Medicine Lodge Investments, L.L.C. v. Ear, Inc.2008 OK CIV APP 107, 197 P.3d 502
Blanchard v. Ward92 S.E.2d 776 (N.C. 1956)
Mizell v. Walley44 So. 2d 764 (Ala. 1950)
Lotspeich v. Dean211 P.2d 979 (N.M. 1949)
Superior Oil Corporation v. Alcorn47 S.W.2d 973 (Ky. Ct. App. 1930)
Salyer's Guardian v. Keeton283 S.W. 1015 (Ky. Ct. App. 1926)

Citing references are not a citator: they show that a later opinion cites this case, not whether it followed, distinguished, or overruled it. Check negative history before relying on this case.

Authorities cited 3

Depth	Case	Cited by
	Brant v. Va. Coal & Iron Co., 93 U.S. 326 (1876)	209
	McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 30 A. 607 (Md. 1894)	12
	Mixter v. Woodcock, 28 N.E. 907 (Mass. 1891)	4

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