TaiLexi AI U.S. Case Law

Aiken v. Ela

Aiken v. Ela.

Aiken v. Ela, 62 N.H. 400 (1882)
Download
Format
Include

Star paging (*137) is kept for pin cites.

Court
Supreme Court of New Hampshire · State Highest Courts
Decided
December 5, 1882
Judges
Blodgett, Allen
Citations
62 N.H. 400
Headnotes
A party cannot acquire title to land by adverse possession merely by occasionally going upon it.
Summary
Writ oe Entry, dated October 9, 1880, to foreclose a mortgage to the plaintiff from one Clark, made and executed October 25, 1860. November 8, 1861, Clark conveyed the same land to the defendant by quitclaim deed. The land was sold for taxes, and the defendant has a quitclaim deed thereof, dated February 6,1860. He claims title against the plaintiff by twenty years’ adverse possession. The proceedings under which the land was sold for taxes were invalid. The land was and is sprout land, was taxed to one not the owner as non-resident land, and sold for the taxes-while the owner and mortgagor was in possession. There was no-change in the possession except that wrought by tbe delivery of the deed, and the defendant has made no use of the land, and has performed no other acts of ownership than were done by occasionally going upon it. There is to be judgment according to the rights of the parties-on these facts.

Syllabus and headnotes are prepared by the reporter or publisher, not the court, and are not part of the opinion.

Opinion of the Court — Blodgett

Blodgett, J.

The defendant at most only got color of title to the land in controversy under his deed from the tax collector, and *401 the question then is, Has his title become perfected by adverse possession for twenty years? But one answer is possible; for the facts plainly show that the owner’s dominion over and free enjoyment of the land have not been disturbed or interfered with by the defendant, either in fact or in law. He has done nothing to indicate a claim of property of a character to attract the attention of the true owner, and has exercised no public acts of ownership such as he might not naturally exercise over property he did not claim to own. He has in fact had no possession except “by occasionally going upon the land.” It is manifest that such a possession cannot operate as a disseizin of the legal owner; and, if the contrary were true, whatever possession the defendant has had since November 8, 1861, is to be regarded as having been under his quitclaim deed, and therefore not in opposition to the plaintiff’s prior mortgage title, but in subordination to it.

Judgment for the plaintiff.

Allen J., did not sit: the others concurred.

How later courts describe this case

No later court has written an explanatory parenthetical about this case yet.

1994: 119942026peak 1994 · 1

Relies on it most ⓘ

  1. Riverwood Commercial Properties, Inc. v. Cole639 A.2d 714 (N.H. 1994)

Most recent

  1. Riverwood Commercial Properties, Inc. v. Cole639 A.2d 714 (N.H. 1994)

Citing references are not a citator: they show that a later opinion cites this case, not whether it followed, distinguished, or overruled it. Check negative history before relying on this case.

Authorities cited 0

No citations to other opinions in this database were found.

Keyboard shortcuts

/Focus the search box
j kNext / previous result
EnterOpen the selected result
xAdd / remove the selected result from the download list
n pNext / previous search term in a case
cCopy the citation of the current case
+ −Larger / smaller reading text
?Show this list