TaiLexi AI U.S. Case Law

Mahagan v. Mead

Mahagan v. Mead & A.; Willey v. Same

Mahagan v. Mead, 63 N.H. 130 (1884)
Download
Format
Include

Star paging (*137) is kept for pin cites.

Court
Supreme Court of New Hampshire · State Highest Courts
Decided
June 5, 1884
Judges
Carpenter
Citations
63 N.H. 130
Headnotes
A verbal promise by A to pay B one half the proceeds of a piece of land when he should sell it is not within the statute of frauds. Judgments and awards bind only parties and privies-
Summary
Bills in Equity, for the removal of a cloud from the plaintiffs’ title to their respective lots of land, &e. Facts found by the court. In 1866 the defendants, at the solicitation of one Quimby and his wife, advanced to them $250 with which to buy a tract of land called the Yail tract, upon a verbal agreement that the Quimbys would pay the defendants one half the proceeds of the land when they should sell it, above the purchase-money, interest, and taxes. Upon receiving the money the Quimbys gave the defendants their note for $250, and a mortgage of the tract to secure it. May 7, 1868, Mrs. Q., to whom the tract was conveyed when purchased, conveyed a portion of the same, lot A, to the defendants, in performance of an agreement between the Quimbys and the defendants that in consideration of such conveyance the defendants would relinquish their claim to profits under the agreement of 1866. The plaintiffs are respectively the owners of other portions of the Vail tract, deriving their title from Mrs. Quimby through mesne conveyances. June, 1872, Mrs. Quimby, then administratrix of her husband’s estate, agreed with the defendants in writing “ to refer our account and note to J. B. Rand, of Concord, for adjustment, and his decision shall be final.” Rand awarded that $100 should be applied on the $250 note on account of the above conveyance of lot A to the defendants; and having adjusted the accounts, awarded a general balance of $96.72 and interest due from the estate to the defendants. September 18, 1876, the defendants brought a writ of entry against Mrs. Quimby to foreclose their mortgage, and recovered conditional judgment at the October term, 1882, for $618.15 damages. The defendants claimed that the record of the foreclosure suit is conclusive evidence of the amount due upon their mortgage, and excepted to the admission of all evidence introduced for the purpose of showing that a less sum, or nothing, was due upon the note. Independent of the award, the court finds that the defendants agreed in the life of Mr. Quimby to apply upon their note the amount that might be found due from them to him upon an adjustment of their respective accounts, and that there was a balance of $81 due from the defendants to Quimby on account, April 1, 1871, which should be indorsed on the note.

Syllabus and headnotes are prepared by the reporter or publisher, not the court, and are not part of the opinion.

Opinion of the Court — Carpenter

Carpenter, J.

The Quimbys’ agreement in consideration of the loan to pay the defendants one half the proceeds of the land when sold, above the purchase-money, interest, and taxes, was not within the statute of frauds, and was valid.

Graves v. Graves, 45 N. H. 823. The evidence to establish it was properdy received; it did not contradict or affect the contract shown by the note and mortgage. If the agreement was usurious, it was not void. G. L., c.

232, ss.

3 and 4. The release of the Quimbys from that agreement' was a valuable consideration for their conveyance of lot A to the defendants, and for ought that appears may have been equal in value to their interest in the lot. After that deed the defendants held an unincumbered title in fee to lot A, and their mortgage upon the remainder of the Yail tract for the full sum of $250. The plaintiffs claim under Mrs. Quimby by subsequent deeds, and take the portions of the tract conveyed to them subject to the mortgage.

The title to the plaintiffs’ lots passed from Mrs. Quimby long before the commencement of the defendants’ suit against her. The plaintiffs were neither parties nor privies to that suit, and are not affected by the judgment. For the same reason they are not bound by the award, and as they are not, neither are the defendants in this proceeding, however it might be as between them and Mrs. Quimby, but for the judgment. If the defendants and Mrs. Quimby had agreed upon the amount due upon the mortgage, it would not affect the plaintiffs; they might nevertheless show that, nothing was due upon it, and it would be as against them equally open to the defendants to prove that the whole was due. Such an agreement would be evidence against the defendants, but not conclusive. The result is, that $81 must be applied upon the mortgage note as of April 1, 1871, and that the remainder is due to the; defendants.

Case discharged.

.Smith, J., did not sit: the others concurred.

How later courts describe this case

No later court has written an explanatory parenthetical about this case yet.

1891: 118912026peak 1891 · 1

Relies on it most ⓘ

  1. Pitman v. Hodge36 A. 605 (N.H. 1891)

Most recent

  1. Pitman v. Hodge36 A. 605 (N.H. 1891)

Citing references are not a citator: they show that a later opinion cites this case, not whether it followed, distinguished, or overruled it. Check negative history before relying on this case.

Authorities cited 0

No citations to other opinions in this database were found.

Keyboard shortcuts

/Focus the search box
j kNext / previous result
EnterOpen the selected result
xAdd / remove the selected result from the download list
n pNext / previous search term in a case
cCopy the citation of the current case
+ −Larger / smaller reading text
?Show this list