TaiLexi AI U.S. Case Law

United States v. David Anderson

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David ANDERSON, Defendant-Appellant

United States v. Anderson, 652 F.2d 10 (9th Cir. 1980)
Download
Format
Include

Star paging (*137) is kept for pin cites.

Court
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · U.S. Courts of Appeals
Decided
July 11, 1980
Docket
No. 79-1731
Judges
Sneed, Poole, Zirpoli
Citations
652 F.2d 101980 U.S. App. LEXIS 15824

Opinion — Per Curiam

PER CURIAM.

After pleading guilty to one count of conspiracy to import heroin to Guam, appellant Anderson was sentenced to seven years imprisonment and a special parole term of three years. Prior to the imposition of the sentence, appellant requested he be sentenced under the Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 , an Act not expressly made applicable to Guam. The sentencing judge expressly determined that appellant was not a proper candidate for sentencing under the Act, notwithstanding the existence of serious doubt concerning the application of the Act to Guam.

Appellant argues that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that the Act be applicable to Guam, that he should have been sentenced under it, and that, in any event, the special parole term was not authorized for violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963 .

We need not address the appellant’s first argument because no reversible error was committed by the sentencing judge in determining that appellant was not a proper candidate for sentencing under the Act. Under these circumstances we need not address the issue of the application of the Act to Guam. The appellant’s second argument is without merit, of course.

The appellant’s third argument prevails, however. In Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381 , 100 S.Ct. 2247 , 65 L.Ed.2d 205 (1980), the Supreme Court held that a court may not impose a special parole term for conspiracy to commit a drug offense under 29 U.S.C. § 846 (1976). Though appellant’s conviction was obtained under 29 U.S.C. § 963 (1976), the wording of that section is identical to that of section 846.

Bifulco makes it clear, we think, that the special parole term given in this case was improper. We reverse and remand to the trial court for resentencing in accordance with the authority of Bifulco .

Affirmed in part, Reversed in part.

How later courts describe this case

Explanatory parentheticals written by citing courts — 1 in all; the most informative distinct ones are shown.

1982: 11986: 11990: 12020: 119822026peak 1982 · 1

Relies on it most ⓘ

  1. United States v. Phungphiphadhana640 F. Supp. 88 (D. Nev. 1986)
  2. Joseph David Rousan v. United States668 F.2d 1006 (8th Cir. 1982)
  3. United States v. Rodney Lynn Guion914 F.2d 249 (4th Cir. 1990)
  4. (PS) Singh v. GuzmanNo. 2:19-cv-01692 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2020)

Most recent

  1. (PS) Singh v. GuzmanNo. 2:19-cv-01692 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2020)
  2. United States v. Rodney Lynn Guion914 F.2d 249 (4th Cir. 1990)
  3. United States v. Phungphiphadhana640 F. Supp. 88 (D. Nev. 1986)
  4. Joseph David Rousan v. United States668 F.2d 1006 (8th Cir. 1982)

Citing references are not a citator: they show that a later opinion cites this case, not whether it followed, distinguished, or overruled it. Check negative history before relying on this case.

Authorities cited 1

DepthCaseCited by
Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381 (1980) 601

Keyboard shortcuts

/Focus the search box
j kNext / previous result
EnterOpen the selected result
xAdd / remove the selected result from the download list
n pNext / previous search term in a case
cCopy the citation of the current case
+ −Larger / smaller reading text
?Show this list